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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the interaction between a museum-going subject and a 
patterned museum object from two perspectives: scholarly writing about pattern and the 
experiences of visitors to the Aga Khan Museum in Toronto, Canada. Patterning is 
fundamental to human meaning-making, but in Euro-American theories of art, especially 
in categories of decorative art or ornament, it tends to be overlooked and under-theorized. 
In museology, visitors are rarely if ever asked about their responses to the patterned 
objects that they view. I combine situational analysis methodologies with digital 
humanities methods of data mining and data visualizations to compare my findings from 
my interviews with AKM visitors to scholarly writing about pattern. My argument arising 
from the comparison is that visual patterns on objects do not fulfil a “mere” decorative 
function, but have a narrative power that moves in the space between object and subject 
via their unique histories, interacting with the subject’s histories and prior experiences to 
produce meaning that is situated, contingent, and embodied. Specifically, I highlight 
visual patterns on objects as transdiscursive, a term which describes their paradoxical 
nature as signifiers of meaning. I argue that they are fixed and fluid at the same time: 
fixed to the technical properties of their objects, but apt to appear on objects spanning 
many geographies and time periods. By approaching them in this way, I assign new 
prominence to patterned objects as conveyors of stories in museum gallery viewing. 
Finally, beyond this study, the methodological pairing of situational analysis and data 
mining that produced my new understanding of patterns has possibilities for future 
research beyond museology and pattern studies to pursue a broader set of questions. 
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Prelude: Into the Labyrinth2 
Where was I? Ah yes, I was thinking about pattern. I was thinking about its 
rhythms, for one thing. I was thinking about its habit of slipping into the background, into 
the territory of the unthought. Pattern is always with me, like the beating of my own 
heart, vitally necessary but just beyond my reach, as Mary Frame writes.3 As Jacques 
Derrida writes, “la chose même se dérobe toujours / the thing itself always hides away" 
(La voix et le phénomène 117). 
These threads of my thinking insistently weave back and forth, back and forth, as 
I reflect on meanings hidden within patterning and visuality, patterning and materiality, 
patterning and virtuality, patterning and narrative. All these threads interlace with one 
another in an endless enchaînement.4 Where are they leading me? What fabric are they 
gradually building up and what will it reveal? 
 
2 “La galerie est le labyrinth qui comprend en lui ses issues / The gallery is the labyrinth, which 
includes its own ways out within itself” (Derrida, La voix et le phénomène 117; Derrida, Voice and 
Phenomenon 89). 
3 “Floating just beyond the reach of hearing, the complex patterns come to us in snatches, 
tantalizingly regular, yet with variations and overlays that syncopate the rhythm” (Frame 113). 
4 In using this word in French, I am paying attention to Derrida’s choice of it: “L’incarnation 
linguistique et la constitution de l’espace scriptural supposent donc un “enchaînement” de plus en plus serré 
de l’idéalité dans la réalité à travers une série de mediations de moins et moins idéales, et dans l’unité 
synthètique d’une visée. Cette synthèse intentionelle est un movement incessant d’aller et retour, travaillant 
à enchaîner l’idéalité du sens et à libérer la réalité du signe, chacune des deux opérations étant toujours 
hantée par le sens de l’autre, qui s’y annonce déja ou s’y retient encore. Par le langage, l’idéalité du sens se 
libère donc dans le labour même de son “enchaînement.” / Linguistic incarnation and the constitution of 
written or scriptural space suppose, then, a closer and closer “interconnection” of ideality and reality 
through a series of less and less ideal mediations and in the synthetic unity of an intention. This intentional 
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Introductory Chapter, Thinking about Pattern 
Since my childhood, I have been preoccupied with patterns. For many years I 
wanted to make patterns, mostly in cloth and yarns but sometimes in words. Now I want 
to think about pattern, to plumb its depths, to expose its secrets, and to better understand 
the rationale for its existence. I realize that this sounds ludicrously overambitious. But 
here it is; the task is before me.  
I have narrowed my inquiry into pattern considerably by focusing on its role in 
two sites of concern: the permanent gallery of a museum of Islamic art, and the scholarly 
literature about visual patterns that appear on and in objects and works of art. In the first 
site, I have conducted interviews with visitors to the Aga Khan Museum in Toronto, 
Canada with the aim of investigating the encounter between a museum-going subject and 
a patterned museum object. In the second site, I have gathered scholarly views of pattern 
from the fields of museology, visual and material cultures, digital humanities, and from 
writings about pattern itself, especially about its role in systems of perception and 
cognition. In this dissertation I will report on my findings in these two sites before 
undertaking a comparative analysis of them with the aim of expanding the space for the 
interpretation of a patterned museum object, to give it more possibilities – to give it, in a 
way, more air to breathe. 
 
synthesis is an unceasing movement of going and returning that works to bind the ideality of sense and to 
free the reality of the sign. Each of these two operations is always haunted by the sense of the other; each 
operation is already announced in the other or still retained in it. Language frees the ideality of sense, then, 
in the very work of its “binding” (“interconnecting” [enchaînement])” (Husserl 87; Derrida, Edmund 
Husserl’s Origin of Geometry 89). 
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For the purposes of this study, I need to distinguish between “patterning” as the 
umbrella word for a repeating set of circumstances, data, or actions, and “pattern” as the 
term for a visual pattern on a museum object. These two definitions are closely related in 
that visual pattern and its objects are enmeshed, in the sense that pattern actualizes in and 
on an object. I define a “patterned museum object” as a human-made object that exhibits 
regular repeat patterns as part of its structure or its surface; this definition encompasses 
objects often described using terms like “decorative art” or “ornament.”  
Patterning is fundamental to human meaning-making (Bateson; Frame; Roe; 
Washburn and Crowe) but in Euro-American (“Western”) theories of art, especially in 
categories of decorative art or ornament, visual pattern tends to be overlooked and under-
theorized (Ahani et al.; Bal, ‘Visual Essentialism’; Blair and Bloom 153; Carroll 119; J. 
Jones; Luhmann). In recent museum display methodologies, the trend has been to use 
objects as “accessories to tell stories” (Dudley, ‘Chinese Horse’ 6), with figurative art 
considered the preeminent and potent vehicle for the telling. As Nicolas Luhmann puts it, 
“Painting, too, pushes its ornaments to the margins or the background which needs to be 
filled anyway – in order to foreground its figures” (121). Carol Bier maintains that norms 
of viewing and interpreting Euro-American art are focused on narrative, pictorial 
representation, and systems of proportion based on the human form, and therefore 
viewers accustomed to these traditions find patterned art hard to read (‘CarpetMath: 
Exploring Mathematical Aspects of Turkmen Carpets’ 38). I propose to remedy the lack 
or misdirection of theoretical attention to patterned art by highlighting visual patterns 
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with the aim of advancing a deeper understanding of patterning’s role in human learning 
and understanding.  
Research Questions 
Two research questions drive my investigations in my two sites of concern: what 
matters most about visual patterns to interview respondents, and what matters most about 
visual patterns to scholarly writers. To explain each of my questions in more detail: first, 
in the museum gallery, how do visitors perceive patterned objects? To put it another way, 
how do systems of visual patterns on objects operate in the interpretive space of a 
contemporary museum of Islamic arts? Is pattern organized like a language in this 
context, perceived as systems of smaller units – like phonemes – grouped into larger 
systems – like sentences? This is a question about structure, but it is also a question about 
meaning. It is a leading question; that is, other questions arise from it such as, what does 
it mean to frame visual pattern as a language? How is pattern like language, and how is it 
unlike language? I posit that visual pattern communicates, and my inquiry focuses on 
how it accomplishes this rather than what the particular message is. My project is an 
exploration of how visual pattern communicates by exploring its relationships with 
visuality, materiality, virtuality, and narrative, and by examining how these concepts 
intersect and interrelate. 
Initially I answered my question about pattern as a language with an assumption 
that I formed over many years of engaging with textile objects in my curatorial work with 
the Textile Museum of Canada. In answer to the question of whether quilts can be 
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considered art, Anna Chave notes that they are not art because they are “something else, 
just as complex and complexly aesthetic” (253).5 Mamadou Diawara concurs with Chave, 
calling the European view of Kongo statues as art a “category mistake” (179).6 The key 
concept that I borrow from Chave’s statement is her resistance to legitimating patterned 
objects by calling them art. Applying her logic to my first research question, I argue that 
visual pattern is not a language because it is something else, something as complex and 
complexly communicative as language. It is both universally human and culturally 
diverse; it is a multiplicity. I make the case in this dissertation that the umbrella term, 
patterning, is a multiplicity of transmedial guides for thinking/action; visual pattern in 
objects is the trace or echo of that action. To look at a figurative representation is to look 
through a window at your own imagined life. To look at a patterned representation is to 
look at a record of moving through the world at a certain pace, in a certain way. I started 
my study with an impulse to investigate patterning as Gilles Deleuze’s “dark precursor” 
(Difference and Repetition 119), and as Gregory Bateson’s “difference that makes a 
difference” (‘Form, Substance, and Difference’ 459), but I quickly narrowed down my 
 
5 Anna Chave wrote about the quilts of Gee’s Bend, “Gee’s Bend quilts are not art because their 
makers had in fact no concept of art; because until recently no one valued them enough to see to it that they 
acquired basic nutrition, health care and literacy, much less any knowledge of art . . . [the quilts] are as 
compelling, as layered and as exciting as art can be, or more so. But they do not amount to art because they 
amount to something else, just as complex and complexly aesthetic. That something else warrants less 
knowing into and more enquiry.” I interpret Chave’s “knowing into” as the same kind of “overlooking and 
under-theorizing” of visual pattern that I mentioned earlier. 
6 Diawara quotes John Ryle, “Whether you call these Kongo sculptures fetishes or power objects 
or ritual tools, one thing they are not is art. Or not until Westerners get their hands on them. To treat them 
as such is a category mistake, it is to fetishize the fetish.”  
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focus to visual patterns as trace or record of patterning in the broader sense. I draw many 
of my approaches to patterning as a fundamental organizing principle from the writings 
of these two authors, as I discuss in Chapter Three. A detailed discussion of the position I 
have arrived at as the result of my multisite study is the topic of Chapters Five and Six, 
but here I will say that my initial assumption about this “something else” has not been 
disproved by my findings but has been greatly deepened. 
My first research question can be probed by restating it slightly. I can reframe 
“how do systems of visual pattern on objects operate in the gallery” as “what is the nature 
of the effect a patterned museum object has upon a viewing subject? Conversely, what is 
the nature of the effect a viewing subject has upon a patterned museum object?” A start 
can be made to answer this question by pointing to a world full of things by means of 
which humans communicate with each other and with their environments. I suggest, 
following Daniel Miller (38), that these things may both reveal and construct the realities 
of the humans who use them. On the other side of the encounter, how can a viewing 
subject have an effect upon an object? I posit that the viewing/experiencing subject 
changes the knowledge ecosystem of an object – the earth, water, fire, and air that it 
breathes – and that this transformation is ongoing, in fact never-ending. I go into detail 
about this process by means of my comparison of findings in Chapter Five. 
In the same vein, “what do museum visitors notice?” can be restated as, “does 
visual pattern consistently slip into the background when any figuration is in a 
representation? If so, why? If only sometimes, under what conditions?” I hypothesize that 
this slip happens, but that a museum display works against the move to the background 
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by separating and highlighting patterned objects, making them objects of contemplation 
in their own right. When digital technology is used in a museum context to make patterns 
“come to life” through animation, this further draws the viewer’s attention to them and 
enhances their performative quality. Pattern’s quality of slippage into the background and 
its resistance to this slippage is a primary focus of my interviews at the Aga Khan 
Museum.  
My second research question asks of the literature, what matters most about visual 
patterns to scholarly writers? What does the research emphasize? What does it elide? 
This question allows a historical and theoretical framing of past approaches to visual 
pattern. I approach it with ideas about representation from poststructuralism, and ideas 
about interpretation from hermeneutics. These two terms, representation and 
interpretation, have broad applications across disciplines, so it is necessary that I provide 
some clarification about how I am using them. In the scholarly literature, "representation" 
is perhaps the more vexed term of the two. It has been associated in recent 
conceptualizations of perception and cognition with its converse, non-representation, as 
proposed by such writers as Brian Massumi and Nigel Thrift. Ruth Leys offers a cogent 
explanation of non-representation and its cohort, affect:  
According to Thrift and other like-minded theorists, affective responses involve a 
kind of 'thinking' that takes place in a nonreflective, nonrepresentational manner 
in the form of embodied habits, that is, in the form of subpersonal bodily thinking 
that is said to precede cognition and intentionality (452). 
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When "representation" enters the museum field, it often takes on a political 
meaning, as in the politics of the representation of diversity. This is certainly how 
Andrew Dewdney et al. use the term (55). Further, Mats Alvesson and Kaj Skoldberg 
note that in poststructuralist thinking the meanings of representations are not fixed (200). 
While acknowledging the importance of attention to this aspect of representation in a 
public space, I take a somewhat different position, binding representation to 
interpretation: a representation of what Edward Said calls "brute reality" (1869) – 
whether it is an idea, a piece of writing, or a work of visual art – is an interpretation. It 
has been interpreted by its maker and continues to be interpreted, probably differently, by 
every subsequent viewer. This act of interpretation, I would argue, has its social/political 
aspects but before it is social it is individual; it is an individual act of perception and 
cognition. Sibel Bozdoǧan, Said, and Gulru Necipoğlu promote an alternate way of 
understanding the cultures and products of diverse, Muslim-dominant societies, one that 
does not assume a canonical way of seeing that "sets up the world as a picture" and 
allows only one interpretation of that picture (Bozdoǧan 39).  
“Islamic art” is another category that needs definition in the context of this study. 
Like “Western culture,” it is something of a misnomer, suggesting some monolithic 
entity, when in truth it describes the hugely diverse arts of Muslim-dominant societies 
over hundreds of years and thousands of kilometres of distance. Ladan Akbarnia et al call 
it a catch-all term, adding that “as a field that has existed only since the nineteenth 
century, Islamic art remains an artificial concept imposed upon the material culture of an 
enormous area” (8). As a primer, Stephen Vernoit provides a useful history of the 
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development of the field of Islamic art in the nineteenth century as objects began to come 
into the collections of European museums (24), and Edward Madden classifies the 
cultural production of these vastly diverse societies according to certain rubrics, among 
them the presence and sophistication of visual patterns on objects (234). I use the term 
“Islamic art” sparingly, preferring the terms patterned object and patterned art to refer to 
the objects I use in my study. I note that the objects I use may feature figurative imagery 
as well as pattern. In sum, my approach to them is not a totalizing one that attempts to 
pull them together into a universal system, but one that acknowledges and wonders at 
their diversity and variety.  
Rationale and Significance 
The museum imaginary is the conceptual site in which my investigation takes 
place; I picture it as a highly hierarchical and mediated site of collecting and displaying 
heritage objects. As a site, it is a spatial field and it is also a disciplinary field, subject to 
theoretical analysis and critique. A museum exhibition is the public face of the 
institution, and it always creates an imaginary world. In it, a curator combines objects, 
written texts, and, in the twenty-first century, multimedia devices to create an arranged 
version of a historical or cultural moment, with a strong point of view to match. It is 
within this public space that a private transaction takes place: the interpretive encounter 
between viewer and viewed. However, to describe it in this way may impute agency only 
to the viewer's side, and a limited, rather passive agency at that; rather, I hypothesize the 
transaction as one that is active and robust in both directions.  
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This current study is a continuation of a long engagement with the ideas that I 
propose in it. For my master’s thesis in Interdisciplinary Studies, I worked with magic 
square symbolism on textiles in Muslim West Africa. Briefly, a magic square, the 
ancestor to Sudoku puzzles, is an arrangement of numbers in a square array in such a way 
that each row, column, and main diagonal adds up to the same sum. From their origins in 
ancient China, the numeric arrays that are today known as magic squares were 
considered models of the perfection of the universe (Cammann, ‘Islamic and Indian 
Magic Squares. Part I’ 183); this consideration has led to their use as components of 
talismans with the power to effect protection and healing for the wearer. Looking at the 
magic square as a “pattern engine,” my thesis traced its transformations from a concept in 
the mind to its explicit representation in patterns on objects, then to patterns that refer to 
it obliquely, and finally to patterns on objects in a museum environment. Through this 
trajectory, I became interested in the way that the “magic” in magic squares operates as a 
kind of “logical depth” in the patterns on West African cloth that visually reference them. 
Similarly, the notion that the deep histories of patterns as protective talismans could be a 
part of their meaning-making agency inspired in me a drive to pursue the current study. 
In Chapters Two and Three I discuss in detail my views on the role of logical depth in 
visual patterns. 
I also discovered that representations of magic squares on West African garments, 
viewed as communicative vehicles, combine elements of mathematics, magic, patterning, 
and language, and I needed to understand all of these elements in order to comprehend 
the magic squares’ agency. Indeed, I have found that a study of pattern irresistibly glides 
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into these fields – the insistent repetition in patterns can be evaluated in terms of 
geometric structures (Washburn and Crowe, Symmetries of Culture), magic (Greenwood; 
Savage-Smith, Science, Tools & Magic.), ritual practices (Gell, Art and Agency; V. W. 
Turner), and even psychological syndromes like obsession (Graves, ‘Pattern: A 
Psychological Approach’); through pattern, these structures, systems, and syndromes 
bleed into one another.  
Alain Epelboin posits that textiles with magic squares written on them constitute 
“un métalangage non verbal transculturel” (150). My aim is to reposition pattern as a 
primary communicator in the interpretive space of a museum, to dismantle the notion that 
it is of negligible or inferior value compared to figuration, and to explore its modes of 
communication. Thus, my study may result in a deepening of attention to the dimensions 
of visual pattern on objects in museum contexts. Euro-American art theories tend to 
discount visual patterns on objects. Noel Carroll furnishes a clear example of this: he 
cites an Amish quilt as “beneath interpretation” (Carroll 119). In my view, if something is 
“beneath interpretation,” it is, as Gilles Deleuze puts it, subrepresentative (Difference and 
Repetition 267), therefore enfolded, and, in my view, sure to be doing something 
interesting down there. It is not a question of raising patterned art up to be above the 
acceptable line of interpretation, but of going down there and examining it on its own 
ground and in its own terms. My hope is that my study will focus awareness on visual 
pattern’s effects, especially in a museum of Islamic arts, and thus help to foster a more 
open space of “pattern thinking” for understanding those effects.  
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I define “pattern thinking” as a sensitivity to patterns as relational (DeLanda, 
Assemblage Theory; Washburn), non-Cartesian (Solymosi; Lefebvre), processual and 
fluid (Ingold, ‘The Textility of Making’), iterative (Bateson, ‘Style, Grace, and 
Information’; Deleuze, The Fold), and communicative (Hay, ‘Passage of the Other: 
Histories’; Latour, ‘On Technical Mediation’) visual forms. As the title of my dissertation 
suggests, developing my thesis of pattern thinking is really my core objective, and the 
remainder of my study is dedicated to describing how I have formulated it through my 
investigations and to arguing in favour of it as an important new paradigm and a shift in 
perspective in museum interpretation. Given the unique role of visual patterns in the 
historic arts of Muslim societies, my approach is especially pertinent to the subject/object 
encounter at the Aga Khan Museum. 
Furthermore, by giving patterned museum objects a role to play in the more 
general function of patterning in systems of perception and cognition, a widely 
acknowledged aspect of investigations in cognitive science (Neisser 150; Dawson 41), 
my study may provide a much-needed, robust, and multidimensional conduit between the 
theories and methodologies of the arts and humanities and those of the mathematics and 
sciences. 
Limitations of the Study 
It must be noted that I am a Canadian scholar of European heritage, equipped with 
an education in Euro-American philosophical and methodological approaches; it may be 
posited that I am unsuited to a study that investigates museum objects outside my own 
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background and cultures. However, I would counter that I have spent many years 
working on culturally diverse objects from all over the world as a museum curator and 
educator, first at the Textile Museum of Canada and then at the Aga Khan Museum, and I 
consider my understanding of patterns to be grounded in them. I might also add that my 
aim to propose a theory of pattern’s meaning-making agency uses in its foundation the 
theoretical frameworks of Bateson, especially as interpreted by Peter Harries-Jones, and 
of Deleuze, especially as interpreted by Manuel Delanda. These are European scholars 
whose ideas about pattern nevertheless work against the dominant understandings of it in 
the “Western” art paradigm.  
In fact, I find that “the West” is an extremely vexed and confusing term when it is 
used to refer to cultural products and concepts; for example, it is geographically 
inaccurate to refer to certain African societies as non-Western when their location is 
situated far to the west of other societies called “Western.” I must assume that the “West” 
is shorthand for a conceptual space of European post-Enlightenment sociocultural norms 
that is assumed to be distinct from the sociocultural norms of any other conceptual space. 
Kwame Anthony Appiah maintains that “if Western culture were real, we wouldn’t spend 
so much time talking it up” (4) and suggests that it has always been an artificial construct. 
It is far beyond the scope of this study to resolve the contradictions of the many uses of 
the “West” in the literature I review. I will note them as they occur in my discussions and 
analyses of the following chapters and will attempt to use more specific terminologies 
than blanket terms like “the West.”  
14 
 
I must also declare that I am not dealing with the whole topic of twentieth-century 
art in terms of figuration and abstraction. I am nevertheless aware that the space of 
representation shifted, then changed dramatically in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, with, on the one hand, condemnations of the use of pattern in architecture by 
Adolf Loos, who equates plainness with modernity and claims that decorated surfaces are 
“primitive” (23); and, on the other, concepts such as the carpet paradigm of Joseph 
Masheck, who links the development of abstract impressionism in painting to the visual 
aesthetics found in carpets (98).  
The question arises, what are the limitations of pattern thinking as an explanatory 
mechanism? I think it is fair to say that its limitations are my limitations. Because 
patterning as a field of scholarship is vast and truly interdisciplinary, pattern thinking 
has the potential for expansion to include the theories and concepts of scientific 
disciplines such as cognitive science (Dawson), mathematics (Henderson and Taimin̦a), 
biology (Ball), and philosophy (Stengers) that I can only touch upon and refer to in a very 
general way. 
Overview of Chapters 
The study has six chapters and four additional small pieces I am calling 
“interludes.” The interludes are meant as a commentary on the main work of the study. 
They come from a place of condensed and elliptical thought, rather like poetry, and they 
walk beside the more methodological path of the chapters. In this sense, they can be said 
to come from the “possibility space” of the study (DeLanda, Deleuze: History and 
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Science 97). All illustrations are placed in sequence at the end of each chapter in which 
they first appear, and all tables are embedded in the chapter text. In addition, a digital 
portfolio of illustrations, plus links to digital projects, exists at 
https://bentleypbentley.myportfolio.com 
The present introductory chapter, Thinking About Pattern, introduces the study’s 
research problem, questions, and approach. Chapter One, The Methodology, elaborates 
on the methodology and methods used in the two sites of my investigation: first, the 
scholarly literature on pattern and second, the results of my interviews with visitors to the 
Aga Khan Museum Permanent Collection Gallery. The first site is, strictly speaking, a 
literature review; but it is also an analysis that I conduct according to the methodological 
principles of situational analysis, a recent variant of constructivist grounded theory 
(Clarke et al.). In grounded theory, theory comes out of the data that is gathered by the 
researcher. Constructivism posits that meaning is not objective and pre-existing but is co-
constructed by the knower and the object of knowing. Situational analysis extends this 
notion by insisting that this interaction of knower and known is particular to a specific 
situation and cannot ever be idealized out of it. Further, the research approach differs 
from its parent in an important distinction: where grounded theory sees a unified, core 
theory as its final goal, situational analysis rejects this aim as totalizing and in fact 
impossible and looks for sensitizing concepts and integrated analysis to come out of the 
data. I use the assumptions of situational analysis to frame my review of the literature by 
seeing the literature itself as a situation – a site – in which my analyses, and the theories 
that arise from them, are formed by the experiences that I bring to the site; they are not 
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taken as any kind of eternal truth but rather as sensitizing concepts about pattern. I also 
use the theoretical and methodological apparatus of situational analysis in the second site, 
the interviews.  
My data from both sites is imported into NVivo, a qualitative software package 
with an extensive suite of instruments that apply machine reading to data. Its mapping 
function allows me to make visualizations of my data and its coding functions organize 
terms into searchable groups. Chapter One features an exposition of my methods in detail 
but suffice it to say here that working in NVivo enables the development of theory 
grounded in the research. It also enables an approach characteristic of digital humanities, 
with that subdiscipline’s emphasis on visualizing, machine reading, and auto-coding data.  
In Chapters Two and Three, The Conceptual Site: Parts One and Two, I survey 
the past and current scholarly literature from the perspectives of the five fields in which I 
situate my study: museology, visual cultures, material cultures, digital humanities, and 
patterns’ roles in perception and cognition.The museology section examines four 
interrelated questions: first, are museums only sites of authoritative knowledge, or can 
they also be hubs of pluralistic knowledge-sharing? Second, how does the dominance of 
“Western” cultural perspectives influence the role of museums in today’s diverse 
societies? Third, how is digital technology changing the space of a museum and the 
“aura”7 of its objects? Fourth, what is the role of the visitor in the sensory encounter 
between a museum-going subject and a patterned museum object?  
 
7 The “aura” of a work of art is an important issue raised by Walter Benjamin, who defines it as 
“the here and now of the work of art – its unique existence in a particular place” (‘The Work of Art’ 20).  
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Because museums are primary sites of visuality, the second section’s references 
deal with visual cultures. In this section of the literature review, I examine the positions 
of different writers on the semiotics of images, especially focusing on two related issues: 
figure/ground relationships, and the privileging of form over material and figuration over 
repeat pattern in art interpretation. These perspectives uncover two more issues that are 
important to my study of pattern: the profoundly acculturated nature of seeing, and the 
role of other senses than sight in the event of seeing. 
The third section discusses references pertaining to material cultures. Here, the 
important themes are the debates about “thing theory,” and the related notion of making 
as thinking. In the material cultures section, we are a long way from Carroll’s 
meaningless Amish quilt. The references posit making as a mode of thinking, especially 
through repetitive and patterned movements, and repudiate the view of making an object 
through the force of will and muscle acting on inert materials.  
Because the contemporary museum space can be either physical or digital, the 
fourth section lists references taken from the sub-discipline of digital humanities. My 
reading in this sub-discipline, albeit limited, indicates an approach among its scholars that 
is entirely “Western” in its assumptions. Here, I pose three questions: is coding – building 
digital objects – a theoretical activity or strictly a practical one? My second question asks, 
what is hidden about a seemingly transparent medium? Third, I ask, what is pattern’s role 
in the configuration of software?  
One important theme that arises from the writers in this section concerns the 
notion of hiddenness, which I believe to be closely allied to "beneath interpretation." In 
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terms of art criticism, I have mentioned Carroll's designation of the Amish quilt as 
"beneath interpretation." In terms of digital technology, that which is hidden about 
software can be scaffolding the whole system, much like the uninked lines in the Topkapi 
scroll drawings that are not meant to be a part of the finished design (Necipoğlu, The 
Topkapi Scroll: Geometry and Ornament in Islamic Architecture). These lines are not 
discarded, for they are needed as an intermediate stage, but they are hidden from the 
viewer in the final version of the drawing.  
Finally, the pivotal Chapter Three, The Conceptual Site: Part Two contains 
references that examine the theory and practice of patterning as a humanist endeavour. I 
call this chapter pivotal because the references in it address patterning as a connective 
tissue that enmeshes diverse fields of study: art, mathematics, anthropology, cognitive 
science, philosophy, and sociology. My task here is to uncover and examine these webs 
of connectivity, to help me to write my account of pattern thinking.  
My questions reflect my particular concerns with pattern: first, in what manner 
has visual pattern been fitted into the confining box called “decoration” or “ornament”? 
Second, what is pattern’s implication in systems of perception and cognition? My third 
question is, how do visual patterns communicate with viewers? What, in turn, is the 
nature of the viewer’s response to visual patterns? If the viewer’s response to figurative 
art arises from emotion – from storytelling, from identity, or from personal feeling – does 
their response to patterned art arise from the affective layer of their sensory functions?  
My framing of patterning’s role in systems of perception and cognition is 
particularly informed by the work of two scholars of the twentieth century, Bateson and 
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Deleuze. I focus on Bateson’s and Deleuze’s use of the term “difference” as an operator 
in their systems of thought – for Bateson, in the “pattern which connects” (Mind and 
Nature 153); for Deleuze, in the flat ontology of becoming in which actual and virtual 
states fold and unfold into each other (The Fold 137). I also review literature on patterns 
as devices, on patterns’ roles in systems of ritual and magic, and finally, on the “pattern 
thinking” of Bruno Latour. Chapter Three ends with my articulation of a conceptual 
framework for the study that is shaped by my responses to the literature in the five fields 
I have reviewed. 
Chapter Four, The Experiential Site, features a report on my findings in the 
gallery interviews, as the title suggests, along with my analysis and interpretation of 
them. I begin with a description and evaluation of the Aga Khan Museum gallery space 
as the site for my inquiry. This is followed by an account of the gallery objects that I used 
for the interviews – in Clarke’s terminology, my visual discourse materials (270) – and 
my analysis of them. My report on and analysis of the interviews I conducted proceeds in 
accordance with the principles of situational analysis and constructivist grounded theory: 
although I try to maintain an open-ended approach by beginning with a question – “What 
do you see?” – that could go anywhere, the resulting interviews are conversations I have 
had with the respondents, in which I inevitably become a co-producer of the views they 
express. The conversations take place in a fluid space that is never finished, because 
neither conversant is ever finished; the knowledge that emerges from those conversations 
is always situated, embodied, and contingent upon the situation in which it is expressed. 
20 
 
In Chapter Five, The Twisted Cord, I interrogate the results from my two sites of 
concern. I take the composite set of ideas that I have gleaned from scholars thinking 
together – or back and forth to each other – in Chapters Two and Three and compare it to 
the primary focus of my study in Chapter Four, the subject-object encounter in the AKM 
Permanent Collection Gallery, to develop new ways of thinking about patterns in a 
museum exhibition context. Some of my guiding questions are adapted from Clarke’s 
recommended list:  
• What discourse topics are in all datasets? What topics are present in some 
and not in others? 
• What similar positions are articulated across datasets? What different 
positions are articulated? 
• What do the consequences of these differences seem to be? (Clarke et al. 
236) 
In this chapter, my comparison of the findings from my two sites leads me to a 
reformulation of my thesis of pattern thinking. Specifically, what results from my 
analysis of the interview texts is the discovery that visual patterns, far from being 
nondiscursive, are in fact transdiscursive, rich sources of stories arising from multiple 
discourses, and that the stories develop out of a synergy of the patterned object’s histories 
and the experiencing subject’s histories. 
Chapter Six, The Museum Imaginary, the final chapter of the dissertation, recaps 
the study’s purpose and design and features an assessment of its outcomes. In this 
chapter, the notion of the museum imaginary serves as a focus for an exposition of the 
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space taken up in it by pattern thinking. I present my case for the agencies of patterns 
based on my findings in each site of concern. Patterns’ communicative agencies arise 
from their transmediality, transculturality, and transdiscursivity. Furthermore, their 
stories are co-created in the charged and buzzing space between the experiencing subject 
and the patterned museum object. Imagination, far from being an abstracted and pure 
function of cognition, is lived in the body. The museum imaginary is an ideal site for its 
exercise and patterned museum objects are rich sources of its inspiration, for they are 
open-ended, open to interpretation like Deleuze’s lines of flight (72), and further, in their 
likeness to puzzles – like Oleg Grabar’s games of covering space (152) – to play.  
My project seeks to meet Bardzell &Bardzell’s criteria for a research design 
project that  
proposes a perspective-changing holistic account of a given phenomenon, 
and that this account is grounded in speculative theory, reflects a 
dialogical methodology, improves the public’s cultural competence, and is 
reflexively aware of itself as an actor – with both power and constraints – 
within the social world it is seeking to change (9). 
In other words, my project introduces a new, holistic, perspective-changing 
account of visual pattern that I call pattern thinking. As a self-reflective actor within the 
project, I bring all of my past experiences and beliefs to the task of theorizing a change in 
the social world of the museum by asking how it might be possible to improve the 
visitor’s perception and cognition of patterns. Might one set up a dialogical methodology 
in which the literature about visual patterns has a conversation with visitors’ actual 
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experiences? To ask these questions and to explore this view of patterns, this is the task 
before me. 
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Chapter One, The Methodology 
The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on the methodologies and methods that 
I use in the two sites of my study: first, the scholarly literature on patterning and visual 
pattern and second, the results of my interviews with visitors to the Aga Khan Museum 
(AKM) Permanent Collection Gallery. These are my two theoretical and practical sites of 
concern. I approach these sites with my research questions in mind: in the literature, what 
matters most about visual patterns to scholarly writers? In the interviews, what matters 
most about visual patterns to my respondents? In the following chapters I will provide 
specifics about each research site, demarcating each and analyzing the data I collected 
there, but in this chapter, I give an overview of my research methodology in theoretical 
terms: why I chose my methods and how they pertain to my topic. 
I begin with a general discussion and rationale for using qualitative research and 
then move to the particular details of a branch of that method called situational analysis. I 
present first, my research design in each site and next, my deployment of the qualitative 
software NVivo to organize and analyze the data. My account of NVivo’s affordances 
leads me into a reflection on prototype-making as a data visualization and research 
method. The chapter concludes with a summary in which I consider limitations and 
potential weaknesses inherent in the research design. 
Overview of Methodologies 
I conduct my study guided by the philosophical and methodological tenets of 
qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, research. Quantitative research measures the 
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validity of a supposition about something or its meaning by the quantity of verifiable data 
collected about it. As a theoretical position it dovetails with logical positivism, an early 
twentieth-century paradigm based on the idea that what makes propositions meaningful is 
their verifiability. Knowledge is composed of verifiable propositions only. If something 
cannot be verified, it is meaningless. This paradigm is at the root of a principle that one 
method – the scientific method – can be developed across all the sciences to produce 
objectivity in researchers and their results (Gibson and Hartman 14). In contrast, 
qualitative research is defined by Linda Dale Bloomberg and Marie Volpe as “pragmatic, 
interpretive, and grounded in peoples’ lived experiences. Qualitative research is typically 
enacted in naturalistic settings, focuses on context, and is emergent and evolving” (44). If 
the quantitative approach finds qualitative research inexact and not evidence-based, 
qualitative approaches view quantitative ones as “instruments inextricably tied to ontic 
realms, enmeshed within systems of power and domination, unable to see beyond their 
own technological frenzy and completely incapable of accessing the ‘essential’ or the 
‘primordial’” (K. A. (Keith A. Robinson 7). A qualitative research approach is obviously 
the better choice for my investigations; it accords with my sense of knowledge as 
contextual, emergent, and incomplete – I hold the position that meaning-making is a 
search for interpretation, not for absolute truth.  
A qualitative research approach contains various branches that come ever closer 
to my formulation of meaning-making for the purposes of my study. As I mentioned in 
the Introductory Chapter, the branch called grounded theory posits that theory is not 
objective, universal, or preexisting, but that it emerges from the data (Gibson and 
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Hartman 1). Grounded theory is a theory/methods package, in that it has practical 
methods to prescribe for its users; I find that NVivo facilitates one of the most important 
of these, the constant comparative method, by the flexibility of its options; I will expand 
on NVivo’s assets later in the chapter.  
Grounded theory also stresses that it uses induction as a hypothesis-forming 
method, or reasoning from the particular to the general, rather than deduction, or top-
down reasoning. Furthermore, grounded theory gives prominence to abduction, a third 
method of reasoning which is defined by Alvesson and Skoldberg as the ability to see 
patterns to reveal deep structures (58). Abduction was first formulated by Charles 
Sanders Peirce, a nineteenth-century American philosopher who is considered to be a 
founder of pragmatism. He describes abduction as “The first starting of a hypothesis and 
the entertaining of it, whether as a simple interrogation or with any degree of confidence” 
(‘Chapter 11: Abduction and Induction’ 209). The method operates by hunches and 
“educated guessing” rather than by direct inference (De Waal 64). Abduction is 
significant to several of the scholars whose writing I review in Chapters Two and Three, 
and I shall revisit it there. Constructivist grounded theory arose as a refinement of 
grounded theory; it stresses that meaning is continually constructed, and that it is co-
constructed in a network of agency that includes humans and non-human agents, both 
animate and inanimate. Kathy Charmaz, an architect of the theory, maintains that “ a 
constructivist approach places priority on the phenomena of study and sees both data and 
analysis as arising from shared experiences and relationships with participants and other 
sources of data” (130).  
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Situational analysis, a recent variant of constructivist grounded theory, starts from 
the position that all knowledge-building and meaning-making is situational, in that a 
particular situation is the ground of all knowledge and cannot be separated from that 
knowledge (Clarke et al. 41). While grounded theory as originally formulated by Barney 
Glaser and Anselm Strauss stresses the pursuit of a substantive and formal theory, even a 
core, unifying theory (Clarke et al. 54), situational analysis resists this pull toward purity 
and seeks instead to find sensitizing concepts that emerge from the data and are always 
changing (Clarke et al. 349). Situational analysis has become my prime methodological 
approach, for three reasons. First, it is grounded in Peirce’s philosophy of pragmatism in 
that it asserts the agency of objects – for my purposes, patterned museum objects – and 
the relative worth of multiple positions, not valuing one position above another, but 
seeking to understand the relationships between them (Clarke et al. 86, 174). Second, it 
emphasizes lived, embodied experience as the basis of all interactions. Third, it seeks to 
bring to light marginalized discourses, what is missing or what is normalized in a 
situation. In a sense that is significant for my study of a museum of Islamic art, 
situational analysis takes Michel Foucault’s notion of the gaze as the arbiter of the 
situation (Clarke et al. 79). As I will discuss in the following chapters, the “Western” 
gaze is one of the most frequently cited and analyzed attributes in the literature I review.  
While I do not claim that I am a by-the-book grounded theorist or situational 
analyst, I have paid close attention to the precepts of these research methodologies and 
have found that they complement the approach that I want to take in serendipitous ways. I 
was encouraged to discover that Jenny Kidd called grounded theory her approach in her 
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analysis of contemporary museums as multimodal media. In her study, her position is 
constructivist and reflexive, and she acknowledges that her presence, personality and 
reflections are strong influences on the data she collects at her museum sites (19). Like 
Kidd, I consider that my approach is deeply grounded in reflexive interpretation. My 
work with museums is based on my belief that each person, however young, brings his or 
her own unique life experience to an encounter with a work of art, and that learning is an 
active process of inquiry (asking questions), dialogue (exchange of ideas), and 
interaction. This pedagogical space creates room for speculation, interaction, and new 
learning (Bentley and Kana’an 17). 
Research Design 
My research design, then, arises from my aim to collect data in two “situations,” 
which I am also calling my two research sites. In both sites, I proceed from the position 
that my personality and life experiences are bound to influence my findings, and that my 
work is a work of interpretation. My research questions are subsets of the very much 
larger question of how the human mind makes meaning. This is a vast topic, and my 
study deals with a very small constellation of questions within it. Figure 1 is a diagram 
showing where this constellation is located within the largest span of the topic, at 1. Its 
narrowing proceeds through 2: how the mind makes meaning through visuality, 
materiality, narrative, and virtuality, and 3: the role of patterning in meaning-making. I 
have specialized my questions even further by confining my inquiry to 4: the role of 
patterned art, and by specifying the site of inquiry as 5: the exhibition space of the 
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museum. This is not to say that I plan to take a narrow theoretical view of my study: in its 
richness and interdisciplinarity, the larger topic is the ocean my study swims in, and it 
thoroughly imbues my conceptual framework. But when the time comes to state my 
arguments about the findings of my inquiries – both the scholarly literature and the Aga 
Khan Museum interviews – I argue in the more specific context of viewers’ meaning-
making in a museum exhibition space. 
In the following paragraphs I give a detailed account of my method, moving 
through the steps of charting the data in Word, importing it into Zotero and then NVivo, 
and the coding and mapping exercises I undertook to reveal my interpretive analysis and 
sensitizing concepts. I defend my decision to go into such technical detail here as 
follows: in grounded theory, the theory arises from the method; therefore, the method 
must be taken – and examined – as part of the theory. Coding, memoing, and making 
digital prototypes are meaning-making activities and how they are conducted influences 
what they reveal in important ways. As Lev Manovich put it, “A prototype is a theory” 
(as quoted in Galey and Ruecker 406). In addition, I am working in a digital environment, 
and the significance of this is not lost on me: I am doing digital humanities and my study 
is, in a virtual space, composed of zeroes and ones – just bits.8 
 
8 “Pronouncing upon the thingness of things has historically been considered the special preserve 
of philosophers, but programmers, being the practical engineering types that they are, simply had to get on 
with the job. The things represented in software in one way or another all ultimately reduce to patterns of 
series of on- and- off switches, zeros and ones. No bit- pattern can represent anything without a program to 
interpret it. The meanings plied through natural language may, they say, be subject to the drift and swerve 
of an indefinitely deferred semiosis, but software’s hermeneutic regress must finally bottom out. It’s 
interpreters all the way down – then it’s just bits” (D. Robinson 2). 
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In the first of my two sites, the literature on pattern, my inquiry proceeds in the 
more or less standard manner of a literature review: to begin, I enter into a Word chart 
my summary and analysis of each scholarly reference. I also include my insights on how 
the reference’s author engages in a discourse with other scholars in the field, and how the 
reference is useful to my research. Next, I enter this writing into the citation software 
Zotero in the reference’s fields for abstracts and notes. Zotero is a bibliographic software 
that allows users to import, aggregate, organize, cite, and share information gathered over 
years of research in one or many disciplines, to create a personalized electronic archive. 
All of the writing is then batch imported from Zotero into NVivo and becomes the data 
for coding and analysis. I go into detail about this process in my account of my method in 
the next section. However, here I note that by the time it is imported into NVivo, my data 
contains, not only the author’s words and thoughts, but my words and thoughts about the 
author’s piece of writing. This is reflexive interpretation in its essence, shot through and 
through with my perspectives and my lived experience. 
In the second of my sites, the research inquiry at the Aga Khan Museum, my 
objective was to gather and analyse viewers’ responses to patterned objects as mediated 
by two variables that affect how pattern is perceived and made sense of: the effect of 
figuration when it appears on objects along with pattern, and the effect of digital 
technology when it is employed in interpretive strategies by museum curators, designers, 
and interpreters. I planned to gather data by means of a series of personal interviews in 
the Permanent Galleries, where a selection of patterned objects is on display. To my 
knowledge, casual visitors to the AKM – and, I might venture to claim, to many other 
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museum galleries – are rarely surveyed to document their responses to the art on display. 
Olga Belova asks, “What if we asked ordinary people with no particular training in visual 
skills to share their ways of making sense of the visual? Studies involving viewers 
making sense of imagery are possible but extremely rare, as is research into imagery from 
phenomenological perspectives” (96). Official institutional surveys tend to have more of 
a marketing focus: what is sought is information like the visitors’ postal codes, how they 
found out about the museum, and whether they would recommend it to a friend.  
While the core of my project is not the patterned museum object, nor the 
museum-going subject, but rather the space between them, it was necessary to select 
certain patterned museum objects to take up the object position in that relationship. In 
this sense, my study concerns both the pattern and the object the pattern is on since the 
pattern only gains its communicative agency through becoming visible and tangible. In 
the object selection, I give preference to objects in textile media. My reasons for this are 
personal, professional, and scholarly. My process of learning about textiles has been 
lifelong. As a child, I learned how to cut and sew my own clothes from paper patterns. As 
a young woman, I spent several years designing and making costumes for theatre and 
opera and subsequently studied material art and design at the Ontario College of Art and 
Design. I have curated several exhibitions about various aspects of textile histories and 
cultural meanings and consider my understanding of these subjects to be both broad and 
deep. Furthermore, the patterning of textiles in both its formal and its cultural aspects has 
been my main concern in my study of them. With the exception of felt, all textiles are 
patterned objects. Even in textiles which feature figurative imagery, the underlying 
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structure of the textile is in a patterned arrangement, and the threads themselves are 
twisted and plied together in another pattern.  
However, I did not focus exclusively on textiles. I give a detailed account of the 
AKM study in Chapter Four, along with information on the objects I worked with, but 
here I will say that the study focused on relationships, not only of the museum objects 
with the subjects, but also of the objects with each other. In the gallery, there is much 
evidence of what Gerhard Wolf calls transmediality and transmateriality:  
Transmedial phenomena here refer to those artistic forms or contents that 
are shared by or spread across various media: for example, an 
iconographic formula that can be found in marble reliefs, ivories, textiles, 
paintings, and metalwork . . . The various levels of transmediality rather 
schematically displayed here show many points of contact with the 
semantic field of the other term, that of “transmateriality.” For a media-
specific pattern can simulate one material in another – for example, by 
means of translating traditional textile patterns in wood or marble 
(‘Vesting Walls, Displaying Structure, Crossing Cultures: Transmedial 
and Transmaterial Dynamics of Ornament’ 104). 
I spent time in the AKM Permanent Collection Gallery during two periods: the 
summer of 2017 and the summer of 2018. In the first period, my focus for the interviews 
was on three areas of the gallery: the introductory animation (figures 2 and 3), a group of 
Central Asian embroidered and ikat-dyed robes (figure 4), and a large oil painting on the 
west wall (figure 5). In the second period, the robes had been replaced by a group of 
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textile hangings, also from Central Asia (figures 6 and 7), and the painting had been 
removed. I worked with the textile hangings instead of the robes and substituted a display 
of small illustrations for the painting (Figures 8 and 9). I continued to ask visitors about 
the animation and added questions about an iPad on a stand showing details of paintings 
(figure 10). At the suggestion of Dr. Kana’an, in the 2018 sessions I also added a mosaic 
panel (figure 11), with the logic that a viewer might respond differently to an object that 
was all pattern with no figuration. Table 1 lists my choices in the two periods and figure 
12 shows a floor plan of the gallery with the objects’ positions marked. 
Gallery objects Summer 2017 Gallery objects Summer 2018 
Central Asian robes Central Asian hangings 
Introductory animation Introductory animation 
Oil painting of Fath Ali Shah Painted illustrations 
 iPad in Shahnameh area 
 Mosaic panel 
Table 1: Gallery objects for interviews 
In the summer of 2017, I interviewed twenty-six casual visitors, six AKM 
teachers, and five AKM tour guides (the teachers conduct the school programs and the 
tour guides conduct tours of the galleries and the grounds for groups of visitors). In 2018 
I interviewed another eleven visitors but decided not to interview teachers and guides any 
further, for reasons I will elucidate in Chapter Four. My method for the casual visitor 
interviews was as follows: first, I approached a visitor or small group of visitors near the 
west end of the gallery. I chose this location because it was near the end of the gallery 
furthest from the entrance and this meant that the respondents would likely have had the 
chance to walk through and look at several objects. To establish a connection, I started 
with, “Hello, I am doing a research study on how visitors respond to the art in the gallery. 
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Would you be willing to speak with me for a short time about this?” The response to this 
gambit was generally positive; I only had five visitors refuse to talk with me. When I 
showed them the clipboard with a consent form, a further three people did not want to 
embark on the interview if they had to sign a form. Once the formalities were 
successfully negotiated, I turned on my digital audio recorder and we began. My 
questioning was open-ended and neutral, based on questions like, “What strikes you 
about this; what is your first impression?” If the respondent did not mention pattern 
specifically, neither did I.  
I followed a rough outline of questions in every interview, which I summarize 
below. This outline has emerged from my summative reading of the interview texts – I 
had only an idea to start with of asking, “What do you see?” The pattern of questions that 
I used developed spontaneously as a result of my conversation with the first respondent 
and remained consistent throughout all subsequent interviews. 
1. The robes (2017) or suzanis (2018): What strikes you about them? What 
do you notice? Does anything you have seen in the gallery remind you of 
them? 
2. The animation: Did you notice the animation when you came in? What are 
your impressions of it? Did you see anything in the gallery that reminded 
you of it? 
3. The painting (2017) or manuscript illustrations (2018): What do you think 
of this painting / these paintings? What do you notice when you examine it 
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up close? What do you notice when you step back? Does it remind you of 
anything else in the gallery? 
4. (2018 only) Did you notice the iPad? Did you use it? What do you think of 
this mosaic panel? Is it reminiscent of anything you have seen already?  
At the end of a day of interviews, I transcribed the audio files into Word.  
Using NVivo to Analyze the Data 
As I did with the scholarly references, I imported the transcripts of the interviews 
into NVivo and categorized the data according to codes. Coding the data is a method that 
is basic to grounded theory, and indeed to qualitative research. Johnny Saldaña defines a 
“code” in this usage of the term as “a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a 
summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or evocative attribute for a portion of 
language-based or visual data” (3). Coding is the first step in making sense of the data; to 
“code” a piece of data means to identify its attributes with the aim of finding more 
general themes and trends in the data as a whole. This definition of “coding” is distinct 
from the meaning of coding in computer programming; in qualitative research, the coding 
action is really “tagging” or “keywording:” the researcher assigns a piece of data to a tag 
that identifies it as an example of a particular attribute such as “viewer preconceptions,” 
thus grouping it under that tag with other examples of the same attribute. Memoing is 
another important tool in qualitative data analysis; as noted by Clarke, Friese, and 
Washburn, writing reflective memos sparks important questions about core assumptions 
and strategies (356). In NVivo, memos and annotations can be attached to any piece of 
35 
 
data, whether an interview document, a code, or a reference file; this makes the retrieval 
of past reflections much easier than rifling through a series of hand-written journals. 
Among its affordances, NVivo has a map-making function that allows the user to 
create visualizations of possible attributes in a dataset. This function can be used to create 
the situational maps, social worlds maps and positional maps afforded by the situational 
analysis method (Clarke et al. 108). Situational maps outline the attributes found in the 
situation of the study and are created as a first foray into the material; social world maps 
show the actors, human and nonhuman, animate and inanimate; and positional maps 
schematize the various theoretical positions that the two previous maps point to. 
Although they are not labelled with these names in NVivo, I was able to adapt the mind 
map function to create my initial situational maps. I used this function to make five maps 
of the attributes that might be found in the scholarly literature dataset (figures 13-17) and 
three maps of attributes that I proposed to find in the interview dataset (figures 18-20). 
Once I completed these maps, I was able to automatically create the attributes as codes 
and begin coding my data according to these codes or, as I have said, tags representing 
attributes of the data. I grouped the literature maps under the title “What the research 
mentions about the mediating works of patterned art in a museum exhibition,” and named 
the three interview maps “What viewers mention about the objects,” “What viewers 
mention about the animation,” and “Perceptions of the gallery experience.” These titles 
kept me close to my research questions and made explicit the information that I was 
looking for in the data. As work progressed on my two datasets, I adapted, deleted, 
combined, and added to the attributes I had identified in my maps.  
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Once the first phase of coding was completed, I began using NVivo’s features to 
run text searches, word frequency tests, and comparative queries in order to identify how 
many times certain phrases turned up in my coding of the data. This querying strategy is 
quantitative in that it gives me definite numbers, but it also functions as the “constant 
comparative method” of grounded theory. It can show me trends in the data, and, 
significantly, it can uncover what is missing in the data. Is there a code that I put on my 
mind map that no one mentions? Clarke, Friese, and Washburn stress that situational 
analysis pushes the researcher to “see positions not taken in the data, positions that 
remain unarticulated” (172). 
Saldaña asks, “What are the three major codes, categories, themes, and/or 
concepts that strike you?” (186). Guided by this question, I made two new maps using 
NVivo’s concept map function (figures 21 and 22). These maps attempt to answer my 
research questions; accordingly, they are named “What matters most about patterns in the 
literature” and “What matters most about patterns to respondents.” 
I turned again to the situational analysis theory/methods package for help in 
improving my understanding of the data I had collected, in order to find and formulate 
the sensitizing concepts and integrated analysis that the package identifies as its 
objective. I found that my observations of the Permanent Collection Gallery and its place 
within the Aga Khan Museum situation easily coalesced into a social worlds map, with 
the Museum functioning as an actor both material – as the physical building, and 
conceptual – as the museum imaginary. Also present on the map are the human actors in 
the situation – all of the groups who drive what happens there – and the non-human 
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actors, the gallery objects. Mapmaking in NVivo does not have a transparency 
functionality, so I made the social worlds map in Adobe Illustrator in order to picture the 
different actors as overlapping each other, thus sharing the space of the AKM. This map 
is figure 23. By the same process of sifting through the queries and comparisons in the 
literature dataset, I arrived at two positional maps (figures 24 and 25) that track the 
dynamic relationships in patterned objects with visuality, materiality, virtuality, and 
narrative. I will discuss these maps in detail in the next chapters.  
One last map proved to be useful: to organize and clarify my thoughts about my 
options for methodologies, I repeated my process on a new body of literature, entering 
my annotations on the references I had collected about the various methodological 
schools – summaries, analyses, connections, and relevance to my research – into a Word 
chart, thence into Zotero’s fields, and finally into NVivo. In NVivo I made a mind map of 
attributes I might find in the data of literature about methodologies (figure 26) and 
created codes out of them. In a sense, I was turning writing on methodology into a third 
research site, so I could look at it as a situation. When I ran a query to reveal how many 
times certain terms are mentioned in the literature, I found an emphasis on interpretation, 
abduction, semiotics of images, and affect, and I used the insights to structure my 
research design. 
Using Prototypes as a Research Method 
NVivo’s ease of creating mind maps and concept maps and situational analysis’ 
situational, social world, and positional maps combine to help my meaning-making 
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along. Making prototypes has long been a basic process in my method: I make prototypes 
in order to both visualize and formulate my ideas. The notion that a visual map, diagram, 
or even material object is a prototype that not only reflects but actively creates ideas 
comes from writings by various authors working in the fields of material culture, visual 
culture, and digital humanities. Here I give examples from a few of them, plus an 
example of my own prototyping practice, in order to zero in on data visualization as a 
method of research, or, as Alan Galey and Stan Rueker put it, “how a prototype argues” 
(405). My first example concerns how a physical prototype – in this case a speed bump –
argues. Bruno Latour explains,  
Instead of signs and warnings, the campus engineers have used concrete. 
In this context, the notion of detour, of translation, should be modified not 
only . . . to absorb a shift in the definition of goals and functions, but also 
a change in the very matter of expression. The engineers’ program of 
action, “make drivers slow down on campus,” is inscribed in concrete. 
Instead of “inscribed,” I could have said “objectified” or “reified” or 
“realized” or “materialized” or “engraved,” but these words imply an all-
powerful human agent imposing his will on shapeless matter, while 
nonhumans also act, displace goals, and contribute to their definition (‘On 
Technical Mediation’ 38). 
Latour’s reasoning on how a speedbump argues can be expanded to encompass a 
great many objects of human manufacture, including two examples that I mentioned in 
the Introductory Chapter: the Amish quilt deemed by Carroll to be “beneath 
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interpretation” (114), and the Gee’s Bend quilts that Chave maintains are not art because 
they are “something else” (253). Like the quilts, the prototypes that I make to think with 
are not art either, although they use art-making’s tools to express their ideas: shapes, 
colours, patterns, foreground / background emphasis, and other elements and principles 
of design. A prototype is fertile ground for asking productive questions; for example, 
what is the Aga Khan Museum building a prototype of? It is full of patterning in its 
surfaces and structures; it projects wealth and privilege in its no-expense-spared walls of 
marble and granite, as well as its use of no-glare glass in the gallery cases. It also projects 
the love and dedication of the volunteer guides and greeters who inhabit and animate its 
spaces. To adapt a question from Clarke, Friese, and Washburn: as an actor in the 
situation under study, I ask, what work is the Aga Khan Museum doing in the world? 
What are visitors being told to do or think or be? Not to do or think or be (283)? And, to 
turn these questions around, what set of preconceptions about museums do visitors fit the 
Aga Khan Museum into? What do they want it to do or think or be? In Chapter Four, I 
discuss the complex picture that has emerged from the interviews in an attempt to answer 
these questions. 
Stephen Ramsay and Geoff Rockwell put forward the advantages of creating 
digital prototypes as forms of argument, conjecturing that  
We may reject the understanding of the world put forth by a humanist 
using computational methods and even point to the output of those 
methods as evidence of insufficiency or error; but, if digital humanities is 
about using computers to provide robust interpretations of the world 
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(however contingent, provisional, and multiple), then it is manifestly not 
incommensurable with humanistic practice (7).  
To illustrate and critically reflect on how a digital prototype argues, I turn to my 
past project, “Digital Learning about Patterns in Museums,” a literature review on the 
relationship between patterns, learning, and museums that I completed in a Directed 
Reading course for Dr. Morbey. The end product of this project was twofold: the 
literature review of all the references I consulted as an annotated bibliography and a 
modified Venn diagram in Adobe Illustrator with spheres representing the four topics: 
Patterns, Face-to-face Learning, Museums, and Virtual Learning (figure 27).  
Where the four spheres intersect there are zones titled according to which of the 
spheres is present and listing the most important references in the literature review. 
Furthermore, the diagram is overlaid with a spiraling arrow. The arrow indicates the 
direction of my research from the exterior zones, which contain only one topic, to the 
centre zone, which contains all four. As my reading proceeds from the periphery to the 
centre of the diagram, the questions to the authors that arise become more problematic – 
especially questioning assumptions that technology always improves learning − until I 
come to the centre of the graphic and to my central question: how can we think about and 
then structure blended learning about patterns in museums?  
In its first iteration, the project was only partly successful. Each of its two parts 
was incomplete: the Venn diagram needed the Word bibliography in order to reveal its 
arguments, and the Word bibliography by itself was awkward and opaque. I attempted to 
solve this design problem by turning the Venn diagram into a digital prototype that had 
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interactivity: a user’s click on any part of the diagram would cause the relevant text to 
appear at the side of the screen. I made the interactive prototype first in Flash, an 
animation software, and when I decided that the text / visuals proportion was becoming 
too cumbersome, I deployed all the assets in Omeka, an open-source web publishing 
platform for sharing digital collections and creating media-rich online exhibits. Omeka 
has been created specifically to be useful to scholars of the Humanities; graduate students 
and faculty can create projects to be maintained on the server of the York University 
library system. Neatline is a set of add-on tools for Omeka that is usually used to create 
maps and timelines. By treating my data as a map, I was able to set up the site to 
highlight a region of the Venn diagram when it was rolled over, and to display text for it 
when it was clicked on.9  
I find my own answer to the question of a prototype as a theory by critically 
reflecting on my Neatline exhibition. I find that my diagram is already an argument, even 
in its static version, even just sitting on a printed page. Let us set aside the content or 
narrative that is carried by the words and just look, as Gregory Bateson suggests, at “not 
the message but the code” (Steps to an Ecology of Mind 130). The graphic form of the 
argument is structured by means of colour and shape: the shape of a circle is smooth and 
even, and the composite shape made by four of them is symmetrical and balanced. The 
four spheres are an identical size, although I give patterns the superior position. The 
spiral arrow acts to disrupt this field of symmetry, pointing to a dynamic path for the user 
 
9 The “Visual Patterns That Teach” Neatline site is available at 
http://omeka.library.yorku.ca/neatline/fullscreen/visual-patterns-that-teach#records/1873 
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to follow. The user follows the path of the argument along the spiral to the conclusion at 
the centre, which takes the form of a question which, like Derrida’s labyrinth, “includes 
its own ways out within itself” (Voice and Phenomenon 89). The colours of the spheres 
are simple in isolation, and more and more mixed along the path of the spiral, as the 
issues raised become more involved and complex, until the centre presents the most 
mixed colour of them all while asking the open-ended question that implies both a 
theoretical and operational answer. The Neatline version of the diagram gives the user the 
ability to navigate the spiral in an experiential way that may or may not be more effective 
than simply reading it on a page, but the great advantage to this model is the ability to 
navigate to the detailed content of references and commentary, and to travel from there to 
websites and examples at large. This allows for much more in-depth exploration of the 
content. 
“Patterns That Teach” serves here as an example of a data visualization that both 
pictures and creates knowledge, in much the same way that my NVivo mind and concept 
maps advance my understanding of my data. Several scholars of digital humanities argue 
for the value of digital prototypes as critical tools in their own right (Drucker, 
‘Humanities Approaches’; Galey and Ruecker; Manovich). The issue seems to me to be 
partly driven by professional concerns among scholars who want their work to be 
recognized. The debate is like the one between art and craft. In that debate I take the 
position, following Chave, that craft doesn’t amount to art because it amounts to 
something else, something just as complex and complexly aesthetic, just as compelling, 
layered and exciting, as art (253). By the same token, building digital projects is not 
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criticizing but something else, some other category of activity. It seems to me to be much 
more interesting and challenging to explore what this something else really is, rather than 
try to hierarchize it or equivocate it with an established and self-protective canonical 
discipline. 
The work of making “Patterns That Teach” led me to a reflection on the role of 
pattern in the critical study of digital media as media, which is variously referred to as 
critical code studies, software studies (Berry 2), and platform studies (Bogost and 
Monfort 1). As Dan Dixon notes, pattern is a term that is used frequently in discussions 
of digital humanities, and in a “very unproblematic manner” (191). Whenever it is just 
assumed that a term can be taken for granted, it indicates to me that there is something 
hidden about it that bears investigation. In fact, this happens a great deal with the term 
pattern and its synonyms, ornament and decoration. Dixon speculates that pattern is a 
substitute for structure, a term that has fallen out of favour (191). This may be, but the 
fact remains that patterns are deeply implicated in software, and this had led me to an 
interest in investigating software’s patterned nature. Federica Frabetti asks, what is 
software? She comes up with a list of definitions: it is hidden, a deep opacity (162); it is a 
cultural artefact (164); it is a distinctive form of writing (165); it is both a conceptual 
system and a material object (169). To these definitions I would add the most important 
one for my ongoing research: it is a set of instructions, or algorithms, or in other words, 
patterns. Willard McCarty writes, “If you only remember a single sentence from this brief 
essay, remember this one: the word computing is a participle – a verbal adjective that 
turns things into algorithmic performances” (254). Algorithmic performances is a very 
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good description of patterns in the broadest sense, one that takes them out of any strict 
relation to things and frees them to manifest in a myriad of ways, as visual patterning 
systems, as movements, or as strings of zeroes and ones. 
Limitations of the Research Design 
Several aspects of my research design point to its limitations, and in this section, I 
outline them. To begin with, I am limiting myself to examining visual patterns on human-
made objects, to the exclusion of musical patterns, or mathematical patterns, because I 
lack the expertise to analyse these properly and in depth. For the same reason I am also 
excluding comparisons of natural and biological patterns to human-made patterns. In 
addition, I am limited by the very same qualities and experiences that drew me to this 
research in the first place: I am an older, Caucasian female who has spent her life 
working in arts organizations that have mostly older, Caucasian females as their 
demographic audience. I hear a nail being hit on the head when Mark O’Neill writes, 
“museums are institutions which carry out museum functions for the benefit of people 
who like museums” (96). My position is my unique bias, and it is only in the course of 
the AKM interviews that I have had the opportunity to hear other voices, as I will report 
in Chapter Four. Turning to the voices of the interviewees themselves, my method was 
arguably preferential on several fronts: I went to the Museum on certain days, at certain 
times of day, and I selected out of the steady stream of visitors those who seemed 
approachable. I made something of an effort to counter my tendency to approach visitors 
who looked amenable, but I was also limited by the fact that everyone in the gallery had 
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chosen to be there and had paid an entrance fee. I did not interview anyone under the age 
of twenty or over the age of seventy-six.  
In the research site of the literature on pattern, I am limited by language. I am 
only able to read literature in French as well as English, and no doubt this restricts the 
scholars and schools of thought with which I am able to become familiar. Even in the 
literature that I did read, I often had the sense of being in Edmund Husserl’s gallery that 
Derrida calls the labyrinth:  
Nous errons à travers les salles . . . Un tableau de Téniers . . . représente 
une galerie de tableaux . . . Les tableaux de cette galerie représentent à 
leur tour des tableaux, qui de leur côté feraient voir des inscriptions qu’on 
peut déchiffrer, etc / We wander through the rooms . . . A picture by 
Teniers . . . represents a picture gallery . . . The pictures in this gallery 
represent again pictures which for their part would make visible 
inscriptions that we are able to decipher, etc” (Derrida, La voix et le 
phénomène 117; Derrida, Voice and Phenomenon 89). 
One scholar claims inspiration from another, earlier scholar, and in following that 
thread back I discover another one, and another, etcetera, and on and on. In other words, 
my review of the literature is limited by what I have been able to read, follow, and 
absorb. A similar conundrum arose in the interviews: as they progressed, I gradually 
formed the impression that the cohort of visitors to the AKM Permanent Gallery, whose 
responses to it are rarely sought, are a rich and varied source of ideas about the gallery’s 
effects upon its public audiences. I became convinced that on any given day I would find 
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wandering through the gallery mathematicians, philosophers, theoreticians, educators, 
and artists, because that is who I found there via my interviews. I came to feel I could go 
on interviewing them forever and I would always come away with inspiring and 
insightful material. 
However, I did find that the themes expressed in the interviews did not materially 
change from the first batch of interviews to the second, regardless of my move to include 
in the second batch a work of patterned art that had no connotative meanings that a 
viewer could latch onto in order to make sense of it (there is no figuration in the mosaic 
panel in figure 11 and it is clearly not a robe or a fountain or a dish). Therefore, I decided 
to call an end to the researching phase of my study and turn to reporting and analyzing 
the data I have collected, a task which I undertake in the next three chapters. 
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Figure 1: Where my study is located in the question of how the mind makes meaning  
 
 
Figure 2: The animation corridor on September 15, 2014 
1. How the mind makes meaning
2. How the mind makes meaning through . . .   visuality
       materiality
       narrative
       virtuality
3. The role of systems of patterning in this process
4. The role of patterned art in this process
5. The role of the exhibition space of a museum in this process
{
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Figure 3: Three frames of the animation showing the development of two motifs 
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Figure 4: The Central Asian robes in the Permanent Collection Gallery 
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Figure 5: Portrait of Fath Ali Shah 
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Figure 6: Central Asian suzanis in the Permanent Collection Gallery 
 
Figure 7: The suzani in figure 6, centre (Grube 4) 
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Figure 8: The case of illustrated manuscripts in the gallery 
 
Figure 9: Detail from the manuscript in the case, right 
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Figure 10: A visitor inspecting the iPad in the Permanent Collection Gallery 
 
Figure 11: The mosaic panel  
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Figure 12: Gallery floor plan with object locations coloured in green 
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Figure 13: NVivo codes for Museology 
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Figure 14: NVivo codes for Visual Cultures and Material Cultures 
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Figure 15: NVivo codes for Digital Cultures 
 
Figure 16: NVivo codes for Floating Ideas 
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Figure 17: NVivo codes for Patterns 
59 
 
 
Figure 18: NVivo codes for Viewers’ mentions of objects 
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Figure 19: NVivo codes for Viewers’ mentions of the animation  
 
 
Figure 20: NVivo codes for Viewers’ perception of the gallery  
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Figure 21: Concept map of what matters most about patterns in the literature 
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Figure 22: Concept map of what matters most about patterns in the interviews 
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Figure 23: Social worlds map of the Aga Khan Museum 
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Figure 24: Positional map of the virtuality/visibility relationships in visual patterns 
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Figure 25: Positional map of the narrative/materiality relationships in visual patterns 
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Figure 26: NVivo codes for Methodology  
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Figure 27: Venn diagram of “Patterns That Teach”  
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Chapter Two, The Conceptual Site: Part One 
The research site for my inquiry in this chapter and the next is a literature review, 
and the research sample is drawn from scholarly writing about visual pattern in five fields 
of research that I consider pertinent to my study: museology, visual cultures, material 
cultures, digital humanities, and patterns’ roles in systems of perception and cognition. 
Threaded through all five fields is the issue of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Euro-
American theories versus more recent, more diverse approaches to pattern. I highlight 
this issue for two reasons. First, the AKM Permanent Gallery, the site for my interviews, 
displays a collection of objects from Asia; further, the objects I work with come from 
Muslim-predominant societies. Second, the issue of what is noticed and what is passed 
over or ignored by both museums and systems of ideas bears some resemblance to the 
issue of patterned art’s diminution and figuration’s exaltation in the art historical canon. 
To perform this review of the literature on pattern's implication in the museum- 
situated subject-object encounter, I have sought out various sources, including books, 
articles in peer-reviewed journals, essays in topic readers, and dissertations. Three points 
may be noted here. First, I do not limit the time frame of my sources to the current 
period. I want to supply some historic depth to my analysis of writing on pattern, since 
the ways that the topic is dealt with in contemporary literature arise out of the historic 
literature, either as a reaction or a complement to it. Therefore, the time frame for my 
sources stretches back to the nineteenth century, when, as Gulru Necipoğlu mentions, the 
European fascination with Islamic ornament reached its peak (The Topkapi Scroll: 
Geometry and Ornament in Islamic Architecture 83). Indeed, the scholarship most 
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important to this chapter and the next comes from Necipoğlu, as well as from Walter 
Benjamin, Alfred Gell, Gregory Bateson, and Gilles Deleuze. I examine the ideas about 
pattern that are foundational to these five, with brief forays into the writing of other 
scholars who inform or contest their thinking. I also examine the considerable debates 
that have arisen around their arguments. 
Second, the literature I survey does not always take pattern explicitly as its topic. 
It may not be assumed, for example, that Deleuze's Le Pli: Leibnitz et le Baroque is a 
primer on pattern's role in the world, but I find much in his writing that speaks of the way 
Le Pli frames the world in a patterned manner, as I will argue in later pages. Third, 
although I follow the normative format of a literature review, I remind the reader that I 
am treating the scholarly literature as a research site; therefore, I am also reporting on my 
findings in the analysis of the literature. It must be noted that all five fields reviewed here 
are extensive and multidisciplinary; however, beyond general descriptions, my review 
keeps to the narrow focus of their relevance to the museum gallery situation. 
I view the intellectual work of these two chapters as a process of translation or 
transmutation of the literature I review in the five fields into a conceptual framework of 
four relationships: pattern and visuality, pattern and materiality, pattern and virtuality, 
and pattern and narrative. For each field, I begin with references to foundational texts that 
continue to influence recent scholars, either as an inspiration that they can build on or as 
a provocation that they can react against. I then build my analysis of more recent 
literature using the analytic mapping tools of situational analysis and the coding and 
memoing methods of grounded theory that I have laid out in Chapter One. I look for 
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“what the research mentions about the mediating works of patterned art in a museum 
exhibition,” the umbrella title of my mind maps of the scholarly literature (figures 13-17). 
Under this umbrella, most codes in the maps that I have created fit generally into one or 
another of the fields under investigation, with the exception of the codes in figure 16, 
which NVivo designates “floating ideas.” It is not that these six codes do not have a place 
in the mind maps; rather, they have multiple mentions in all fields and therefore cannot 
be assigned to only one or two of them. 
In my summary at the end of Chapter Three, I give an account of the process 
which has led me to make the concept map in figure 21, “what matters most about pattern 
in the literature.” Finally, I report on my findings from the analysis of the literature as a 
research site and articulate the conceptual framework I have arrived at through this 
process. 
Museology 
The recent and current debates in the field of museology revolve around changing 
visions for museums. I am especially interested in debates that concern museums’ roles 
as vehicles of communication. As I mentioned in the Introductory Chapter, I examine 
here four interrelated questions arising from these debates: first, are museums only sites 
of authoritative knowledge, or can they also be hubs of pluralistic knowledge-sharing? 
Second, how does the dominance of Euro-American cultural perspectives influence the 
role of museums in today’s diverse societies? Third, how is digital technology changing 
the space of a museum and the “aura” of its objects? Fourth, what is the position of the 
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visitor in the sensory encounter between a museum-going subject and a patterned 
museum object?  
1. Authority or Plurality? 
Eva-Maria Troelenberg proposes two opposing metaphors for museums, the 
“temple” and the “forum” (2). The museum-as-temple is detached from daily life and 
imbued with a kind of sacredness that comes from its authoritative presence on a higher 
sphere. Andrea Witcomb likens the museum-as-temple to a treasure house that contains 
objects valued according to their physical characteristics and that furthermore is capable 
of communicating abstract moral qualities by means of these unique characteristics (105). 
The temple is an apt model for the kind of traditional museum that came into existence in 
post-Enlightenment Europe and became an instrument for social improvement in the 
nineteenth century there (Barrett 110). However, this model is problematic in a dynamic, 
rapidly changing environment: its very detachment makes it static, an unresponsive 
monolith. Troelenberg recounts Jean Cocteau’s comment that the Louvre in Paris is “a 
morgue, where one goes to identify one’s friends” and adds that this characterization  
. . . moves just slightly away from the idea of the ‘temple’ towards a more 
sinister sphere, while the double sense of the French term ‘morgue,’ 
designating a mortuary but potentially also alluding to an attitude of 
arrogance, hauteur, and self-containment, seems to open an ironic and at 
the same time nightmarish play with the image of the museum as well as 
with the attitude of the existentialist beholder (4). 
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The movement called New Museology replaced the temple model in the mid-
twentieth century with the model of the museum-as-forum, an institution which provides 
open spaces of cross-cultural and social exchange to its communities (Troelenberg 1). If 
this change is indeed as widespread as Troelenberg claims – and my experience working 
as a museum professional concurs with Murray Ross’s observation that there is still a 
significant percentage of the museum-as-temple cohabiting with the museum-as-forum 
(85) – what is the best way to accomplish this massive makeover? The scholars I 
surveyed in this field agree that the switch of metaphors has the potential to be a positive 
one, but they disagree on how this is to be accomplished. For example, Kylie Message 
and Andrea Witcomb see the current phase of New Museology enabling museums to play 
a transformative role for their communities by providing a space where different 
disciplines, theoretical approaches, and practices can meet (1), whereas Tony Bennett 
suggests the modern museum claims to be democratic and available to all but is really 
still racist, sexist, and based on bourgeois ideals of behaviour (97).  
Paul O’Neill and Mick Wilson believe museums have undergone an educational 
turn, focusing attention on museums as sites not of either authority or plurality, but of 
education (21). The authors relate education to the circulation of ideas: rather than being 
primarily collections of objects, museums are primarily centres of ideas. Eileen Hooper-
Greenhill concurs with this view, adding that “meaning is to be found neither wholly in 
the object nor wholly in the viewer. Meaning is dialogic – a dialogue between viewer and 
object” (117). In this dialogue, Phillip Yenawine asks, what kind of information is the 
most useful to a visitor? Is it of primary importance in a guided interpretation to include 
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actual information about the work of art, or is it enough to give the visitor a meaningful 
experience of discovering the work for herself (25)? He comes down on the side of the 
meaningful experience over the information, but other writers disagree. Rika Burnham 
and Elliot Kai-Kee recommend asking no questions (109) while Mike Murawski and 
Jackie Delamatre advocate a blended approach of some questions and some information 
as the best interpretive approach (sec.1). These writers are exchanging views about 
interpretation from the perspective of the museum, thinking about what kind of 
information – or meaning – the museum has to impart to its visitors. They all argue from 
the position that museums are centres of ideas rather than collections of objects. Other 
writers use “stories” interchangeably with “ideas” as the central concern of museums. For 
example, Leslie Bedford maintains that “These storytelling skills insure our place within 
human society and probably imply that information not structured as a story is more 
likely to be forgotten” (30). An opposing view comes from Sandra Dudley, whose 
commitment to sensory engagement with objects I referenced in the Introductory 
Chapter. Like Dudley, I tend to see museums, not as collections of objects, but as 
communicating through objects. Message and Witcomb use the term “nondiscursive” to 
describe this method of communication (xlvi). This term seems to me to confuse the issue 
since what objects communicate is ideas, stories, and meanings. Objects in a museum 
display communicate these ideas, stories, and meanings, not only through the official 
means of displays and texts, which I am calling “museum agency,” but through their own 
agency, and, significantly for this study, through the patterns on their surfaces and in their 
structures. By this statement, I do not mean to suggest a stance of “methodological 
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animism,” as Gerhard Wolf puts it, but instead follow his lead when he terms the gallery 
encounter he has with a little, ancient, Chinese pot-bellied jar with two human feet as 
possessed of a “contingency of presence” and therefore as dynamic and generative 
(‘Image, Object, Art’ 159). I will come back to the implications of object agency in the 
section on the Visual Cultures literature. 
2. Cross-cultural Questions 
My second question for this field asks, are museums still in thrall to the narrative 
of visuality that ranks “fine” art above the decorative arts? The “Western” art canon is 
rigidly hierarchical, with figurative paintings and sculpture at the top of the hierarchy and 
“decorative arts” at the bottom (Weber 33; Necipoğlu and Payne 3). This paradigm 
appeals to visitors who are already fairly conversant with it due to either education or 
long exposure, or both. However, contemporary museums are anxious to attract a wider 
audience than these committed visitors. Andrew Dewdney, David Dibosa, and Victoria 
Walsh set out to investigate audiences at the Tate Modern in London, UK through a 
collaborative project that combined interviews, workshops and ethnographies, with the 
aim of recommending ways of diversifying its audiences. They found that there is a huge 
demographic that is absent from the museum for various reasons. The driver of this state 
of affairs is a basic misrecognition by the museum staff of the absent demographic: that it 
is composed of settled minorities, when in fact it is not settled and exists in a constant 
migratory state. In other words, appealing to this population’s cultural origins, as has 
been done successfully in the past through exhibitions such as the Victoria and Albert 
Museum’s Shamiana: The Mughal Tent (Sarmiana), would not be effective in reaching 
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the current potential audience. Dewdney et al term this unsettled condition “transcultural” 
and “transvisual” and claim it leads to transmediality, a state that is generally unfamiliar 
to conservative museum professionals (204). 
An exception to Dewdney et al’s claim that museums are stuck in a monolithic 
approach comes from Ruth Phillips, who writes as director of the Museum of 
Anthropology in British Columbia, 
These days, the lessons that objects teach in museums are accomplished 
not by fixing their positions within unitary sequences of temporal change 
and geographical location, but by a post-structuralist recognition that 
objects are capable of generating multiple meanings through the 
interaction of their material traits with diverse individual subjects (87). 
Much scholarly thinking about diversity, based on the ability of one society to 
understand another, was affected by the 1978 publication of Orientalism by Edward Said, 
who wrote that “Oriental” societies have been conceptualized by “Western” ones in a 
way that has “less to do with the Orient than it does with ‘our’ world” (1875). This 
conceptualization hinges on the belief that only the “West” is progressive, while the 
“Orient” is stuck in an eternal past (1871). Necipoğlu takes up these views with specific 
attention to geometric pattern and ornament in Islamic art, pointing out the dominant 
assessment of the field's frozenness in time and space while contemporary Euro-
American art and culture are perceived to change and expand (‘The Concept of Islamic 
Art’ 59). Her emphasis on the cosmopolitanism of the arts of Muslim societies recalls 
Dewdney et al.'s attention to the fluid nature of today's diverse museum audiences. 
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Necipoğlu's analysis of geometric art as a language in The Topkapi Scroll (The Topkapi 
Scroll: Geometry and Ornament in Islamic Architecture 231) is especially pertinent to 
my investigation of pattern, albeit with a hypothesis that runs somewhat counter to hers. 
In her pursuit of the object’s point of view in a museum exhibition, Dudley makes 
what I consider a category mistake similar to the one pointed out by Diawara of turning 
Kongo statues into art: she likens museum objects to colonized peoples in order to show 
how their encounter with visitors is a power relation, “ambivalent, contested, and 
shifting, influenced by an array of factors” (‘What, or Where, Is the (Museum) Object?’ 
6). While Dudley is clear that she is using colonialism as a metaphor and not as a 
reference to actual colonialism as it has impacted museums and their publics, I would 
respond that the issue of colonialism is too raw and its evidence too obvious in a museum 
exhibition for the term to be used as a metaphor; it seems a mark of disrespect, an insult 
to the historical realities of the millions of human beings who suffered under the 
injustices of colonialism. The presence of the objects of global cultures in museum 
exhibitions is overwhelmingly due to the evils of imperialism and colonialism and 
turning them into art or referring to them flippantly as colonized in their current location 
is far from adequate compensation for the forces that got them there. 
3. Effects of Digital Technologies 
The subject of my third question for this field is the effect of digital technology on 
a museum space. Jenny Kidd takes up the notion of transmediality and applies it to 
museums’ current practice of deploying digital media in service to gallery interpretations. 
Citing “the auratic function of cultural texts, a problematic nowhere more evident than in 
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the museum or art gallery” (120), Kidd contends that digital technology amplifies the 
remix, aura shifts, and bricolage activities of contemporary museums (122). Her 
contention turns my focus to Walter Benjamin’s influential appraisal of the aura of a 
work of art, with particular attention to its “shifts.”  
Benjamin’s The Work of Art in the Age of its Technical Reproducibility was 
written at a time when photography and cinema were the new media; however, his notion 
of the way these media change a work of art’s authoritative aura is just as pertinent when 
it is applied to the digital age. Benjamin proposed that the development of photography 
altered the aura of authority inherent in a work of art by replicating it, thereby destroying 
its uniqueness (‘The Work of Art’ 22). Jean Baudrillard develops Benjamin’s notion 
further, envisioning a contemporary world that is full of simulacra without any originals 
(69), or a museum where every object is a simulacrum in the “hyperreality of culture” 
(47). I note here that the “masterpiece” paradigm10 upon which the notion of the 
artwork’s aura is based underlies the museum-as-temple metaphor, which in turn informs 
art theory’s approbation of figurative art, while “reproducibility” is a quality of patterned 
art, one which sometimes engenders suspicion of its automaton-like repetition (Araujo 
14). The innovation in Benjamin’s time was technology’s ability to make multiple copies 
of a work of art. In today’s museums, it is the digitization of museum objects’ images, 
and indeed of the museum experience itself, that is the contemporary version of 
Benjamin’s age of technological reproducibility and Baudrillard’s simulacra. While 
 
10 For an assessment of the notion of masterworks in Islamic art, see After One Hundred Years: 
The 1910 Exhibition "Meisterwerke Muhammedanischer Kunst" Reconsidered (Lermer and Shalem). 
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Benjamin takes an ambivalent position on the benefit of the aura’s devaluation, and 
Baudrillard characterizes the negative effect on cultural life by simulacra, other writers 
believe digital technology has the potential to make museums better at what they are 
trying to do but differ in the methodologies they suggest using to accomplish this, and in 
the theories underpinning their methodologies. For example, Ross Parry is unfailing in 
his support for the positive effect of digital technologies on museums’ abilities to provide 
visitors to virtual sites with enhanced educational experiences (290), while Fiona 
Cameron worries that the quality of museum digitization projects is not high enough and 
this will negatively affect whatever uses the data is put to in the future (‘Museum 
Collections, Documentation, and Shifting Knowledge Paradigms’ 72). 
In contrast to Benjamin and Baudrillard’s equivocation, André Malraux celebrates 
the increased accessibility of works of art by creating a Musée Imaginaire in which all 
the works of art in the world are available to all through reproductions (Musée imaginaire 
257). Walter Grasskamp extends Malraux’s idea of liberating works of art from their 
corporeal origins to claim that “medial ubiquity” based on digital multimodality is the 
work of art’s new aura, one more powerful than whatever Benjamin might have 
conceived (304). However, I would argue that this new aura is just like the old one if it 
gives precedence to the same “masterpieces.” In my view, Malraux’s real innovation in 
his Musée Imaginaire is to open the gallery doors to global art, which inevitably means 
opening the doors to much more patterned art. 
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4. The Agency of the Subject-Object Encounter 
My fourth question for the field of Museology investigates the position of the 
visitor to the museum in the museological literature. How does the scholarship view how 
museum visitors make sense of what they are experiencing? Stefan Weber suggests the 
museum needs to help visitors comprehend the art they are viewing but does not 
recommend how this is to be done (53). The usual methods include organizing displays 
thematically or chronologically and adding interpretive text panels to the displays. 
Necipoğlu points out that objects of Islamic art were originally meant to be seen en 
masse, activating multiple responses in their viewers and users, and asks “whether and 
how these layers of meaning can be communicated to the diverse audiences of the 
museum” (‘The Concept of Islamic Art’ 75).  
So far in my review of the museology literature, the focus has been on a 
museum’s role in sense-making, or museum agency. Is sense-making, then, all in one 
direction, from the museum to the visitor? Or is there, can there be, a co-construction of 
meaning in the subject-object encounter? If there is such a co-construction, then each 
element in the encounter has agency, an ability to affect events and each other. The factor 
of agency, where it resides and how it operates, is a key motivating factor that I take up 
now and that I will return to in its various guises – the agency of viewers, of objects, of 
digital technologies, and even of museums – throughout this study. In my discussions of 
agency, I am guided by Gell’s definition of it: “Whenever an event is believed to happen 
because of an ‘intention’ lodged in the person or thing which initiates the causal 
sequence, that is an instance of agency” (Art and Agency 17). Here, in considering the 
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subject’s and the object’s co-construction of meanings, I am dealing with the agency of 
viewers and of objects.  
In Dewdney et al’s view, visitors have agency in their exchange due to their new 
subject position of transculturality and transvisuality:  
In terms of what is happening for the viewer in an art museum, a new 
intersection can be identified between the mediation involved in the 
position of the transcultural subject and the remediation of the visual field 
in the technical networks. From this new intersection, it is no longer 
possible to imagine that the viewer can sustain a relationship to the 
painting without the effects of remediation and the transcultural being 
present. The stance of informed scholarship and the position of the 
confirmed aesthete will only work to hold such effects in abeyance for so 
long (203). 
This observation indicates that there is a move in museology from a paradigm of a 
visitor’s response to the artwork as scholarly and aesthetic to one complicated by 
transcultural and digital factors. Bradley Taylor charts this move as one from object-
oriented to visitor-oriented experiences, which he characterizes as a move from fixed to 
fluid meanings, and as increased sensitivity to the effect on visitors of the physical 
gallery space (180). 
In summary, if my review of the literature on Museology is looking for the places 
where pattern is, what I find is more the places where pattern is not – an absence of 
mentions of it, or at the very least its dismissal as “mere,” a frill or a support. For 
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example, Fatemeh Ahani characterizes decoration in architecture as nothing more than a 
“pleasing arrangement” (25). Adolf Luhmann maintains that “mere decoration must be 
distinguished from art” (121), while in a Guardian review of a William Morris ceramics 
exhibition, Jonathan Jones answers his own question, “Is this art?” with “No, it is merely 
craft” (2). In the field of Museology, I must conclude that figurative art is the art that is 
noticed, discussed, and theorized. That said, the kind of museum I am most familiar with 
is the art museum rather than the ethnographic, science, or natural history museum, and it 
makes sense that an art museum contains – well, a lot of what is considered art according 
to current paradigms. However, many art museums, including the one in which I base my 
research inquiry, also contain works of decorative art; that is, ceramics, textiles, 
metalwork, and pieces of buildings. These works may have figurative elements but also 
feature patterns either exclusively or with figuration. As I have stated in the Introductory 
Chapter, I am calling these works “patterned art” for the purposes of this study, while 
being aware that the very term “art” is vexed. The debate of what is or is not “art” is not 
one that I am concerned with here, except to note that in my view many aspects of it are 
culturally specific to and arise out of the Euro-American art canon, and I tend to agree 
with Alfred Gell that “there is no quality in the art-object, as material vehicle, that 
definitely qualifies it to be, or not be, an artwork. Whether it is or is not is dependent on 
whether or not it is taken to be one by the art world” (Vogel’s Net 220). In situating my 
study not in the patterned object – whether it is or is not “art” – nor in the museum-going 
subject but in the space between them, I investigate the agency of each party and the 
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effect of visuality on their interaction. To further my investigation, I turn now to the field 
of visual cultures. 
Visual Cultures 
I ended my review of the Museology literature with a passage discussing notions 
of art in a museum exhibition context. A sense among cultural and art historians of the 
limitations of such discussions led in the 1990s to the birth of a new, expanded field 
called visual culture. The new field, as conceptualized by Irit Rogoff,  
. . . opens up an entire world of intertextuality in which images, sounds, 
and spatial delineations are read on to and through one another, lending 
ever-accruing layers of meanings and of subjective responses to each 
encounter we might have with film, TV, advertising, art works, buildings, 
or urban environments (24). 
Rogoff alludes to a dimension of visual culture – its inclusion of all senses – that I 
will come to with my last question for this section, but to begin, I deal with visual 
culture’s perspectives on the sense of sight, or, as Olga Belova puts it, the event of seeing 
(120), specifically seeing objects in the context of a museum exhibition. For the purposes 
of this section, “seeing objects” means seeing images of those objects, and this is how I 
am using the word “image” in what follows. In this light, I pursue four questions: first, 
what is a patterned image’s position in a semiotics of images? Second, beyond a semiotic 
interpetation, how do patterned images come to a viewer’s attention? Third, how is vision 
culturally inflected? Fourth, can vision be separated out from the other senses? 
83 
 
1. Semiotics of Images 
Semiotics is a vast field of study and its comprehensive history and interpretation 
is an undertaking far beyond the scope of this study; however, it is important to start with 
one of its founders, Charles Saunders Peirce, and to track his influence on writers who 
take up his ideas and apply them to images. Peirce developed a theory of signs as a 
logical system to clarify human cognition:  
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, 
creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more 
developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first 
sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not 
in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes 
called the ground of the representamen (‘Chapter 7: Logic as Semiotic: 
The Theory of Signs’ 98). 
 Peirce’s writings influenced Alfred Gell’s theory of art and agency (Art and 
Agency 13), Gregory Bateson’s use of abduction in his formulation of “the pattern which 
connects” (Mind and Nature 153), and several theorists of digital humanities who adapt 
his division of signs into index, icon, or symbol to the workings of code (D. Robinson; 
Drucker, ‘Graphesis’ 22; Guillory 343). Peirce’s theories are also important for grounded 
theory and situational analysis, as I mentioned in Chapter One.  
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In Art and Agency, Gell proposes to approach an art object as an index, a term he 
borrows from Peirce’s typology of signs. According to Robert Layton, one of Gell’s 
interlocutors,  
An index refers to an object by virtue of being really affected by that 
object. The shadow on a sundial is an index of the time of day, a 
weathervane an index of wind direction. An iconic sign, such as a picture 
of a horse, or an onomatopoeic sound (woof, neigh), has some of the same 
characteristics of the thing it denotes. An icon is a sign of an object to the 
extent that it is like that object. A Peircian symbol is arbitrarily associated 
with what it denotes, and this is the case with the vast majority of the 
words in any language. The link between the word (symbol) and the object 
is wholly established by convention (452).  
For Gell, indexes operate as agents within a defined matrix of interactions with 
their prototypes, their recipients, and their makers that he calls the “art nexus” (Art and 
Agency 29). Gell calls his system a social agency of objects in that it concerns the social 
relations between persons and things, and persons and persons via things. He makes it 
clear that he excludes aesthetics as criteria for the classification of objects as artworks or 
artifacts and that he refuses an interpretation of art that sees it in semiotic terms, as a kind 
of language (Art and Agency 7). Gell uses the term abduction to denote the way an index 
can infer meaning. In his desire to avoid references to language or aesthetics in his 
discussion of art objects, he finds that abduction can signify a non-linguistic inference, 
and can lead the recipient (the viewer or user) to draw conclusions about what the index 
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means, by a series of cognitive steps. He gives as an example the finding of a chipped 
stone that he may decide is a prehistoric hand axe and therefore takes home and puts on 
the mantelpiece as an ornament. This example shows how arbitrary and changeable this 
meaning may be – the chipped stone may not be a prehistoric hand axe at all. What sets 
the chipped stone in motion along its way is the inferential scheme, or abduction, 
whereby he thinks this is what it is (Art and Agency 16). 
Chapter Six of Art and Agency is devoted to an analysis of geometric art. Gell 
suggests that this kind of art, which he defines as “(non-representational, or marginally 
representational) decorative designs” (Art and Agency 73), occupies a special place on 
the art nexus matrix. Because it does not necessarily represent an object in the physical 
world, it lacks a relationship to a prototype. Therefore, Gell proposes that a geometric 
pattern and an index – the art object – are “one and the same” (Art and Agency 75). Gell 
calls geometric patterns mind-traps. He writes, “We are drawn into the pattern and held 
inside it, impaled as it were, on its bristling hooks and spines” (Art and Agency 80). He 
goes on to define geometric patterns’ ability to entrap the viewer as their essential 
quality. This kind of agency comes from their always seeming unfinished to the viewer 
because of the difficulty said viewer has in deciphering them (Art and Agency 81). 
According to Gell, this captivation is the mechanism that binds people to things. He gives 
the example of a South Indian kolam, a kind of knot pattern drawn in white powder, and 
speculates that the viewer cannot extract individual loops from the design. This attribute, 
he infers, relates to the kolam’s apotropaic protective agency – he calls it “cognitive 
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stickiness,” a blockage in the viewer’s ability to understand the object (Art and Agency 
84–86).  
Gell’s ideas about patterned art objects are important to my study of them. I agree 
with his assessment that the density of some patterns’ convoluted designs can draw the 
viewer in, catching her on its “barbs and spikes,” but I think Gell gets caught on his own 
“barbs and spikes” as he has set up an elaborate system for figurative art that involves an 
interaction between agent, patient, object, and recipient, and he cannot neatly fit patterned 
art into it. Much more persuasive in my view is Alfred North Whitehead’s notion of 
“prehension” to explain an object’s agency. Whitehead avoids any vitalism – the 
attribution of cognitive structures to non-organic entities – by describing prehension as 
unconscious apprehension (as cited in Crawford 95) T. Hugh Crawford allies the term 
with metalsmithing and calls it “thinking hot,” for wrought iron has a grain that prehends 
any attempt to work with it (95). I am personally very familiar with the prehensiveness of 
textile materials, that curious limpness, stiffness, or twist of their threads that make them 
want to go in a direction, resisting or even defeating a maker’s efforts to make them go in 
another.  
In their responses to Gell’s system, his interlocutors take issue with his theories: 
Robert Layton argues that Gell’s theory is unworkable because it minimizes the role of 
culture in humans’ engagement with art objects, and that indexes – understood as art 
objects – depend on cultural convention (460). Howard Morphy concurs with Layton’s 
view, arguing even more strongly that Gell’s arguments are flawed by his exclusion of 
aesthetics and semiotics (8). As I mentioned earlier, Gell performs the exclusion by 
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defining an art object as “taken to be one by the art world.”11 Nicholas Thomas brings 
museums into the discussion by declaring that museums are prime sites for the 
examination of the object/human manifold that Gell proposes, and he calls for practices 
of curation and interpretation that make objects’ agency visible and questionable (204). 
On a positive note, Susanne Kuchler claims that critics are wrong to assume that Gell 
discounts culture and aesthetics. Rather, he introduces a new system by which objects, 
especially patterned ones, exert a “cognitive stickiness” that operates through culture and 
aesthetics, but that also references Bateson’s theory of cognition as mind plus 
environment (‘Threads of Thought’ 35). In fact, Gell’s pronouncement that “cognition 
and sociality are one” (Art and Agency 75) dismantles one of the binary oppositions that 
bedevil museology: are museums primarily sites of individual or social experiences? 
Gell’s statement implies that they are both, because it is pointless to separate these two 
kinds of experiences. 
Other writers who have addressed the question of the semiotics of images include 
Mieke Bal, Norman Bryson, James Elkins, and Jonathan Hay. Each writer approaches the 
topic from a different angle. Bal and Bryson consider Peirce’s semiotic system a useful 
conceptual tool to apply to interpretations of visual art (174). They reject Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s semiotics as a system arising out of linguistics that links signified and 
signifier in an entirely arbitrary relationship. As they explain, “There is nothing about the 
idea of a tree, for example, that indicates that the sound ‘tree’ can be made to correspond 
 
11 In my view, it seems a contradictory move to exclude semiotics from your theory, given that it 
is built upon the elements put forward by Peirce, one of semiotics’ founders.  
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to it; but can the same be said of images?” (195). Like Gell, Bal and Bryson are 
concerned with the relationships between an art object and a viewing subject; while the 
former charts these relationships as occurring in a network populated by the artist, the art 
object (index), the recipient, and the prototype (what the index points to), the latter use 
the terms “senders” (artists), “receivers” (viewers), and “context.” Beyond all of this 
terminology, Bal and Bryson conclude that a semiotic approach to art interpretation 
presupposes the existence of codes by which the art object can be understood. They 
borrow some of these codes from narratology and apply them to visual art, attempting to 
show that images are able to narrate stories by means of culturally accepted correlations 
between sign and meaning (202). The writers specify that it is necessary to approach the 
work of art as a whole, arguing that to approach it atomistically makes it into a thing, not 
an event (194). In another piece of writing, Bal delimits the field of semiosis to exclude 
both the materials of which the work is made, and the technical aspects, like brush 
strokes, paint thickness, and lines. These elements she terms subsemiotic and therefore 
beneath the level of interpretation (Reading ‘Rembrandt’ 400).  
I have already drawn the reader’s attention in the Introductory Chapter to Noel 
Carroll’s statement that an Amish quilt is “beneath interpretation,” and I draw a straight 
line from his statement to Bal’s, even though she refers to painting and he to textiles. He 
dismisses textile objects categorically, while she gives a technical rationale for the 
dismissal: qualities like materials and techniques are uninterpretable because they fall 
beneath notice.  
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James Elkins addresses Bal’s dismissal by resolutely turning to just those 
elements in paintings that she terms subsemiotic and writing a book about them, On 
Pictures and the Words That Fail Them. He contends that “no graphic mark is merely a 
sign, but none is a ‘technical,’ ‘meaningless’ gesture made only in service to some higher 
significance” (78). Although Elkins cites W.J.T. Mitchell’s contention that using a 
semiotic approach privileges a text interpretation of images (9), he nonetheless devotes a 
sizeable section of the book to his theory that writing, images, and numbers originated 
together in prehistory. Elkins writes from a Euro-American perspective, but his 
comments about the closeness of calligraphy and pattern on prehistoric artifacts, and the 
difficulty of identifying which is which, have resonance with one of Islamic art’s most 
striking characteristics, the use of calligraphy interchangeably with pattern, and 
sometimes as pattern, in its material arts.  
Elkins does not see patterned art as meaningful in semiotic terms. His few 
references to “decoration” are in relation to the difficulty of telling it from writing, and it 
is obvious which of them he considers meaningful. In contrast, Jonathan Hay writes 
about pattern as a meaningful component of art; I will return to discuss more of his ideas 
in the section on pattern. Here, I am concerned with his view of the subsemiotic elements 
that Bal dismisses, and Elkins advances. Hay’s semiotics is different again from Gell’s, 
Bal’s, and Elkins’ notions of it. The reason for this may be partly disciplinary: like 
Elkins, Hay is a historian of art, not an anthropologist like Gell, or a cultural theorist like 
Bal. However, unlike Elkins, Hay formulates his theory of the mediating work of art not 
only out of semiotic operations, but also out of material ones (‘The Mediating Work of 
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Art’ 435). Where Elkins is concerned with graphic marks in a purely formal way, Hay 
goes further into the “subsemiotic” realm, showing how the very silk and ink that 
comprise a painting on silk can convey meaning via what he calls elsewhere its 
“surfacescape” (Sensuous Surfaces 67) or “articulation of surface” (‘Passage of the 
Other: Histories’ 66). His vision of the viewer experience is that it must include the 
texture of the silk on which the ink is laid to portray a mountain. This is the meaning of 
Hay’s articulation of surface: the mountain melts into the silk, it is not separate from the 
silk – and the mediation, which is to say interpretation, or the power of the work of art to 
convey its meanings, is not separate from the viewer’s sensory perception of the ink and 
the silk. I will return to this important concept in my consideration of the fourth question 
in this section. 
2. Vectors of Attention  
Figure/ground relationships deserve a particular focus here partly because they are 
essential to perception – Elkins notes, “without a contrast between one thing and another, 
I cannot know anything” (79) – but also because a working hypothesis of my study is that 
when there are figurative elements in an image, they come to the foreground of a 
viewer’s attention, while patterned elements recede into the background. Figure/ground 
ambiguity is a feature of many patterned surfaces; for example, in the marble panel in 
figure 11, the eye picks out as the foreground now the light stone, now the dark. 
However, my hypothesis is that figure/ground ambiguity is never a feature of a surface 
that has a recognizable figurative depiction on it.  
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Elkins’ interest in the subsemiotic leads him to a treatise on the figure/ground 
relationship in images that highlights it as a logical system, even a Boolean one. He 
speculates, “If a figure can be seen as a ‘negative space,’ then it has become the opposite 
of what it was, and if a figure is on a ground, then that is the opposite of its being in a 
ground” (113). However, Elkins posits the relationship as ambiguous and changing, and 
suggests that his approach to figure/ground is more psychological than logical. He links 
the perceptual phenomena surrounding figure/ground to Benjamin’s statement that “It is 
through the camera that we first discover the optical unconscious, just as we discover the 
instinctual unconscious through psychoanalysis” (‘The Work of Art’ 37). The optical 
unconscious holds what the optical conscious, the conscious event of seeing, does not 
see. It is there, but it is not noticed. My argument is that pattern inhabits this space of the 
optical unconscious, by virtue of its being on objects that are beneath interpretation, as 
Carroll maintains, or in lines and shapes that are subsemiotic, as Bal and Bryson claim, or 
even so manifested with form that it is seen as ‘mere’ material, as in Elkins’ view.12  
In contrast to Elkins, Hay deploys his notion of surfacescape to put the ground of 
an image in its proper position, inextricably enmeshed with the imagery, whether abstract 
or representational:  
The importance of the concept of ornamentality and the damage it has 
done can hardly be overstated….In practice however the surfacescape that 
the master Chinese artisan sought to create included within itself both 
 
12 See my review of Material Cultures, question 2: Making as Thinking, for an example of the 
inextricability of form and material in a basket. 
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‘ornamentality’ and support, the two united and impossible to disentangle 
in a single topography of sensuous surface that also includes the object 
structure of which surface is usually thought to be the exterior 
manifestation. (Sensuous Surfaces 75).  
As in their approaches to semiotics, Elkins means by figure and ground the 
imagery alone, with no reference to its materiality, while Hay insists on keeping ground 
and imagery together in a double meaning of ground: both the material substrate of an 
image and its background imagery.  
Another approach to patterned images as vectors of attention comes from Barbara 
Stafford, who argues strongly for the arts and the brain sciences to draw closer together 
and share research (Echo Objects 208). For Stafford, the psychodynamics of images 
bridges the cognitive sciences and the arts through the primary concern that those 
disciplines share: namely, how the brain makes meaning from images (Echo Objects 
171). In this light, she sees memory as non-narrative, more of a montage of images, like, 
for example, the structures of crystals or intarsia. She quotes Benjamin as noting in his 
incomplete Arcades Project that history has a habit of decaying into crystallized shapes, 
not stories (Echo Objects 154).13 Furthermore, Stafford denies the normative notion that 
language is the royal road to knowledge (Echo Objects 76); rather, thought is an image 
 
13 Benjamin actually wrote, ““History decays into images, not into stories.” (Benjamin, The 
Arcades Project 476), but Hannah Arendt interprets this to mean that in Benjamin’s thinking, the process of 
decay is a process of crystallization (Arendt as quoted in Schwartz 51). See the interlude between Chapters 
Three and Four for Arendt’s longer quote and my reflection on the implications of this for my study. 
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(Echo Objects 148). In voicing this provocative view, Stafford challenges what she calls 
“the ‘language of thought’ hypothesis to put a more complex notion of image back on the 
table and at the interface of brain-mind with external reality” (Echo Objects 171). In 
Stafford’s model of this interface, pattern recognition and pattern generation replace the 
‘language of thought’ hypothesis in the creation of meaning (‘Crystal and Smoke’ 11). 
3. The “Cultures” of Visual Cultures 
In his critique of Art and Agency, Ross Bowden faults Gell for assuming that what 
people value about artworks is the same cross-culturally (312), and for preventing his 
discipline of anthropology from “solving many of the most interesting problems in the 
study of art cross-culturally, such as . . . why there are no close parallels of the modern 
Western concept of ‘art’ in the indigenous languages of Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Americas, or Oceania (320). I would answer Bowden by suggesting, first, that such a 
sweeping statement plunks modern “Western” art on one side of a divide and a huge and 
multifarious assortment of cultures on the other; and second, that he might consult 
Chave’s inference that these cultures are doing much more interesting things in their own 
ways than practicing modern “Western” art.14  
However, Bowden does have a point, namely that when theorizing about 
culturally diverse ways of seeing, Euro-American writers tend to make sweeping 
assumptions about those ways, based on their own theories. Here we are back to the 
cross-cultural questions I discussed in the Museology section. In a 1954 essay that 
 
14 See Introductory Chapter, f6. 
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presciently articulates many of Said's and Necipoğlu's points, Mehmet Aga-Oglu states 
that the attributes assigned by Islamic art specialists such as Richard Ettinghausen to the 
arts of Muslim societies as having a religious basis – for example, the abstraction of 
naturalistic forms and infinite patterns – have in fact an economic and technological 
basis; furthermore, these attributes are widespread in all cultures of the East from the 
Mediterranean to China (200). Bence Nanay attempts to rationalize cross-cultural ways of 
seeing by conjecturing that it is not what one sees but what one pays attention to that 
changes, and indeed over time. Following Michael Baxandall’s notion in relation to 
Renaissance painting, Nanay calls this a “period eye” (263). Finally, Hay suggests a 
theory of the intercultural that happens in the space between cultures, while reminding 
the reader of the constitutively hybrid nature of cultural systems (‘Intercultural’ 7). He 
recommends, along with Bal and Bryson, seeing the artwork as event rather than thing, 
operating via displacement (‘Intercultural’ 9). In my view, Hay’s way of seeing goes a 
long way toward solving the conundrum expressed by Dewdney, where the 
transculturality and transvisuality in contemporary museum audiences is out of sync with 
the usual portrayals of cultures in museum exhibitions. In particular, well-displayed and 
interpreted patterned objects have the potential to communicate these very values to 
audiences, since they express the unique transcultural and transmedial properties of 
pattern, as is pointed out by Kidd, Taylor, and Necipoğlu. To what extent this is 
happening in the context of the Aga Khan Museum Permanent Gallery is the subject of 
Chapter Four. 
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4. Other Senses Than Sight in Visual Cultures 
With my last question for this section, I begin to move into my consideration of 
the field of material cultures. In a diatribe against what she calls “visual essentialism,” 
Bal writes that “the act of looking is profoundly impure” and that this quality is better 
served by the methodologies of visual culture than of art history (‘Visual Essentialism’ 
9). She is concerned in her essay with how museums can be venues for visual culture: the 
essay was originally meant as a critique of Eileen Hooper-Greenhill’s book, Museums 
and the Interpretation of Visual Culture. In the same vein, Constance Classen stresses the 
importance of the senses in museum visitors’ experiences of the objects they view, and 
laments the exclusion of touch in the museum context (201). Olga Belova concurs, 
adding that the visual encounter is necessarily a bodily one. In an essay that is especially 
relevant to my study, she gives an account of a focus group study she conducted on the 
ways participants engage with visual images. She bases her conceptual framework on 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, in which every visual contact with the world 
is sensory and “lived-out” (97). The findings of her study validate her hypothesis of the 
visual encounter as spontaneous, bodily, and processual (105). 
Ingrid Monson references Merleau-Ponty as well, making the point that the new 
model of consciousness as embodied in cognitive science owes a debt to his claim that 
interaction with the world is dependent upon the inseparability of perception and action 
(50). I find Monson’s remarks particularly relevant to my study, since she explores 
pattern through her perspective as a musicologist. While I am not equipped to add 
patterns in music to my repertoire of concerns, here I note that her discussion of mimesis 
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and repetition in music, as well as its “rhythmic feel” (39), have direct applicability to 
visual patterns. My questions for the next field, material cultures, are sparked by 
Monson’s articulation of “embodied knowledge” (38). 
Material Cultures 
The twenty-first century has seen a marked increase in scholarly attention to materiality – 
coincident with the rise of digital technologies – but the roots of this attention can be 
found much earlier. “Material” is referred to differently by different writers, who 
sometimes pair it with, or oppose it to, form. It is called “medium” by Luhmann (102), 
“matter” by several writers (Whitehead; Deleuze, The Fold; Bois et al.; Ingold, ‘On 
Weaving a Basket’); and “surfacescape” by Hay (Sensuous Surfaces). Material cultures 
are the cultures of the material: how they are envisioned by their societies, how they are 
developed, and, importantly for material cultures, how they are cultivated, or 
enculturated. These processes of materiality are of interest to many fields, but I narrow 
my focus to those questions which concern the relationship of pattern to material cultures. 
First, how is pattern implicated in theories of embodied cognition, thing theory, and 
affect? Second, how is making as thinking theorized as a patterning activity? Third, what 
is meant by the materiality of the digital? 
1. Embodied Cognition, Thing Theory, and Affect 
Thinking about pattern inevitably strays for me into thinking about how the mind 
makes meaning. Does the mind recruit pattern recognition in this vital process? The 
discipline of cognitive science, called by neuroscientist Gerald Edelman a blend of 
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psychology, computer science, linguistics, and philosophy (228), identifies three models, 
listed from earliest to most recent: classical, connectionist, and embodied (Dawson 1). 
The embodied model concerns me here, but to fill in some background, the classical 
model posits the mind as a computer, working on a symbol system that makes meanings 
through representations that, taken together, form the “language of thought” hypothesis 
that Stafford and Edelman react against (Edelman 230). This model held sway in 
cognitive science from its development in tandem with the invention of the first serial 
computers in the 1930s until it was successfully challenged in the 1980s by the model of 
neural networks, or connectionist cognitive science. Connectionism rejects the notion that 
the mind is a computer operating on predetermined symbol systems and posits instead 
that networks, whether biological or artificial, acquire knowledge through experience 
(Dawson 199). Both these models of cognition base their operations on representations, 
and on pattern recognition (Dawson 201; Bechtel 43). In contrast, embodied cognition 
puts forward the view that “thought is not transcendent but depends on the body and 
brain. It is embodied. Meaning arises from relations to bodily needs and functions” 
(Edelman 234). It may seem that embodied cognitive science wants nothing to do with 
pattern, since it rejects the classical and connectionist view that pattern recognition works 
by way of representations. However, Edelman’s theory of meaning-making through re-
entrant loops is a pattern recognition theory, although the pattern is not a representation 
but a dynamic process that involves constant learning and adapting.15  
 
15 “To summarize: the brain carries out a process of conceptual self-categorization. Self-categories 
are built by matching past perceptual categories with signals from value systems, a process carried out by 
98 
 
Embodied cognition is taken up by several writers on material cultures; to give 
two examples, Kuchler, a powerful reinterpreter of Gell’s theories of art and agency, 
ascribes embodied cognition to things themselves, not just to peoples’ perception of 
them. She maintains that embodied cognition and material culture are linked through 
things’ ability to shape knowledge (‘Materiality and Cognition’ 226). 
Tim Ingold also writes eloquently about embodied cognition, especially vis à vis 
making, discussed in my next question. Here I note that he brings the concept of 
embodied cognition to its very ground by claiming that  
we should no longer speak of relations between people and things, because 
people are things too . . . This is not to treat persons as anything less than 
what they are, let alone to compare them to objects rather than subjects. It 
is rather to find a way beyond this troublesome dichotomy (Making 94). 
Thing theory, a conceptual byproduct of embodied cognition, is theorized by Bill 
Brown and others as a way of understanding the particular ways in which the 
subject/object encounter is a reciprocal one (Brown, Thing Theory; Brown, ‘Object, 
Others, and Us’; Gosden; Keane). For Brown, thing theory can also be called object 
culture, the means by which objects store the knowledge of a particular culture (“Objects, 
Others, and Us” 188); either term implies that objects have more meaning in them, or 
 
cortical systems capable of conceptual functions. This value-category system then interacts via reentrant 
connections with brain areas carrying out ongoing perceptual categorizations of world events and signals. 
Perceptual (phenomenal) experience arises from the correlation by a conceptual memory of a set of 
ongoing perceptual categorizations. Primary consciousness is a kind of ‘remembered present’” (Edelman 
119). 
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dimensions around them, than the purely material. Brown also advances the notion that 
objects store a culture’s memory in an immaterial or conceptual way, but that this 
memory is displaced by the object’s move into a museum (Ibid. 206). For Daniel Miller, 
materiality is central to the way humans understand ourselves, and, beyond even that, 
“the things people make, make people” (Materiality 38).  
In a move that seems to me one of unnecessary dualism, Brown separates things 
from objects and claims that “things lie beyond the grid of intelligibility the way mere 
things lie outside the grid of museal exhibition, outside the order of objects” (Thing 
Theory 141). By this statement he raises three questions that I address at particular points 
in my study: the first question, what determines an object’s suitability for “museal 
exhibition”? is one I have already asked in my questions for museology, and answered by 
means of a quote from Gell (According to Gell, calling it art is sufficient). My second 
question, interrogating what value judgment Brown is putting on the word “mere,” is one 
that I have addressed in my questions for museology. I turn to the third question now.  
What does Brown mean by claiming that things lie outside the grid of 
intelligibility? Are they “beneath interpretation”? I do not know if Brown was referring to 
affect theory when he wrote these lines, but for something to be outside intelligibility, it 
is either inexplicable because it is dead or inanimate, or it belongs to the precognitive 
layer of functioning that affect theory has staked out as its own.  
In a sense, affect theory permeates all five fields that I review, but I put its 
exposition in my discussion of material cultures because of its insistence on affect’s 
bodily nature. The concept of affect arose out of the writings of Gilles Deleuze, 
100 
 
especially out of his theories of the virtual and the actual as states of the real, and of 
becoming as different from being (DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy 
121). Recent writers such as Brian Massumi and Nigel Thrift have extended Deleuze’s 
ideas of affect: Massumi detaches affect from emotion, equating it with intensity and with 
possibility, both Deleuzean concepts (88). For Massumi, all of these terms are corporeal; 
for him, “the body is as immediately virtual as it is actual” (91). Thrift adds that affect is 
a phenomenon happening between bodies as well as within them, as “a set of flows 
moving through the bodies of humans and other beings” (Non-Representational Theory 
236). These other beings include things which, according to Thrift, have the agency to 
“enact themselves amidst the system of the world” (Non-Representational Theory 160).  
Ruth Leys delivers a strong critique of affect theory that accuses its theorists of 
perpetuating the old mind-body dualism by insisting that affect never crosses the 
consciousness divide (442); I concur with this, as it is my impression that the processes of 
becoming and the relationships of virtual to actual states are fluid in Deleuze’s 
conceptualization of them, continually transforming one into the other by means of 
difference (Difference and Repetition 183). He pictures them as two definite sides, or 
mirror images of each other, and posits that “there is no virtual which does not become 
actual in relation to the actual, the latter becoming virtual through the same relation” 
(Cinema 2 69). In my estimation, Massumi locks affect into a prison, fashioning its bars 
out of Deleuzean intensity, “a nonconscious, never-to-be conscious autonomic remainder. 
It is outside expectation and adaptation, as disconnected from meaningful sequencing, 
from narration, as it is from vital function” (85).  
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I search fruitlessly for mentions of pattern in writings about affect. It is as if 
pattern is so far beneath interpretation that even affect theorists do not notice it. However, 
some new writing by Jan Slaby and Rainer Mühlhoff theorizes affect differently from 
Massumi, putting more emphasis on the relationality of affect as a verb, in its original 
sense of affecting and being affected, so that affect refers to both a “dynamic relational 
ontology and also – or thereby – to the impression made, or trace left, on entities by their 
dynamic encounters with other such modes” (3). With the mention of trace, I recall my 
characterization in the Introductory Chapter of pattern on objects as a record of a 
dynamic encounter and can begin to see how the perception and cognition of patterns 
inhabits an affective, or virtual, layer of cognition through an embodied connection. But 
my position is never to keep it there. Part of pattern’s mobility involves its shifting, in the 
viewer’s apprehension of it, in and out of virtual and actual states – folding and 
unfolding, revealing and concealing, now in the foreground, now in the background.  
2. Making as Thinking 
For Ingold, material culture studies the object, where visual culture studies the 
image, and neither discipline has paid any attention to their making. He faults Gell for 
treating the art object as a finished work to be analyzed and not the results of an 
anthropological study, albeit not a text, photograph, or film (Making 7). I take his 
statement to mean that an object treated in this second way is a prototype, making 
statements about the world around it – and within it – as expressively as a written text, a 
photograph, or a film can do, just in other materials. In fact, Ingold claims that “materials 
think in us, as we think through them” (Making 6). He illustrates this process by asking 
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the reader to imagine weaving a basket, a patterned form if there ever was one: the basket 
comes into being gradually through the interaction of the weaver’s hands manipulating 
the strands of material. The emerging form has an inside and an outside simultaneously, 
so it is not a case of the weaver applying a pattern to the surface; it is a case of a field of 
forces, the force of the weaver and the force of the material – its stiffness, thickness, or, 
conversely, recalcitrant limpness – creating the pattern together (‘On Weaving a Basket’ 
87). What is this basket a prototype of? Depending on its place of origin, it may be a 
prototype of poverty versus wealth, of plenty versus scarcity, or of permanence versus 
transience. I would not call this nonlinguistic expressiveness “nondiscursive” as Message 
and Witcomb name it. Discursive can simply mean communicative. 
Warren Seelig focuses on the maker’s experience, arriving at the same conclusion 
as Ingold: the made object emerges through the engagement of weaver and material. He 
notes,  
Typically, there is a mindset, which is obsessive (sometimes to the 
extreme), and the desire to self-impose a regime of laborious activity 
where there is a deep belief that spirit is incarnate in material. 
Constructing surface involves dynamic participation between the body, 
material, and the psyche where there is the need to employ our hands in 
the activity of making. Along with this is the intense feeling that there is 
life and animateness in things, in objects, and in materials which make up 
the physical world. (22). 
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Primary to the process Ingold sets out is the sense of life in materials and the 
artist’s need to make, or, putting it more strongly, her compulsion to construct in tiny 
increments. This obsession with detail gives the work a profound emotional charge (Ibid. 
22). 
Kuchler calls this interlacing action of hands a form of “formulaic thought” which 
“makes possible associative strings, fashionably described by the term abduction, that 
connect up the world of the material with the world of humankind” (‘Materiality and 
Cognition’ 225). 
3. Materiality of the Digital 
My last question for material cultures is a logical bridge to the field of digital 
humanities, next reviewed for this study. What place can embodied cognition have in a 
virtual experience? Leslie Bedford asserts that objects in a museum exhibition can be 
brought to life by digital technologies “without necessitating a hands-on experience” 
(30), thereby dispensing with embodied cognition entirely. This relatively unnuanced 
stance is shared by other proponents of digital technologies in museums, sometimes with 
the legitimate intent to protect extremely fragile locations (Kenderdine), or sometimes 
because the novelty of digital technologies is appealing (Roussou). In contrast, Nigel 
Thrift takes a more complex approach to the materiality of the digital by identifying three 
new material registers that arise from the changing nature of materiality in the digital age: 
screens, software, and the body (‘Beyond Mediation’). The first two registers are 
obviously the new ones – they are mediated by machines and indeed are dependent on 
machines for their production. Software, in particular, is a “technological unconscious,” a 
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kind of traffic where you see the effect but not the thing (“Beyond Mediation” 241). 
Thrift makes the point that the body is so changed by the omnipresence of the digital in 
peoples’ daily lives, that it is so restructured by devices bearing flashing screens and 
buzzing software, that “technology inhabits us” (‘Beyond Mediation’ 247). 
In the section on Museology, I examined the impact of digital technologies on the 
ways that museums communicate with their audiences in both physical and online 
galleries. The increasing prevalence of these technologies has had the effect of 
dematerializing museum objects, which leads in turn to a reevaluation of their agency. 
This dematerialization has an effect in turn on the subject/object encounter. It may seem 
like a profound glimpse into the obvious to state that museums are about objects; 
however, recent trends in museology have turned away from this assumption in favour of 
the notion that museums’ messages are about ideas and stories. As Sandra Dudley writes, 
“There is a current, indeed dominant, view within museum studies and practice that the 
museum is about information and that the object is just a part – and indeed not always an 
essential part – of that informational culture” (‘Museum Materialities: Objects, Sense, 
and Feeling’ 3). As I noted in the museology section, Dudley is a museum scholar who 
advocates for the reinstatement of sensory engagements with objects as central to a 
visitor’s museum experience. Her commitment to sensory engagement with objects 
reflects her concern with embodied cognition, a set of ideas about the nature of cognition 
that is important to my investigation of pattern. 
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Digital Humanities 
Throughout this review I have been moving closer to the question of digital 
technologies’ effect on the subject/object encounter under study. If the humanities is, 
broadly speaking, the study of what it means to be human, the sub-discipline of digital 
humanities brings the humanities’ critical instruments and perspectives to bear on the 
study of how digital technologies are changing what it means to be human. This is my 
definition, based on those aspects of digital humanities that relate to my study of pattern’s 
implication in perception and cognition; others may define the sub-discipline in other 
ways, depending on their field of study. For example, an English literature scholar might 
say that it is the application of digital methods to aid in the critical analysis of texts. This 
approach reflects the side of digital humanities that is a practice, rather than a body of 
theoretical and critical analysis; however, my view is that, especially where the digital is 
concerned, theory and practice tend to blend into each other and inform each other. 
My three questions for this field stem from my concern with pattern’s function in 
digital media, especially in its inner workings. My first question attempts to clarify 
definitions of code and coding as the nuts and bolts of digital fabrication. My second 
question asks, what is hidden about a seemingly transparent medium?  
Third, I ask, what is patterning’s role in the configuration of software? I am 
particularly concerned in considering this last question with the entries in Software 
Studies, a collection of essays on code edited by Matthew Fuller. The authors make some 
important links between software and patterning; for example, Ted Byfield concludes that 
the most useful definition of information, “a difference which makes a difference” 
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(‘Information,’ sec.3) comes from Bateson (‘Style, Grace, and Information’ 459), whose 
work I return to in the next chapter.  
1. Reflections on Code and Coding 
The word “code” is used differently in general parlance than it is in regard to 
computing. I identify three distinct meanings for “code.” First, it refers to social 
conventions that are enacted in language or in behaviours. The linguist Roman Jakobson 
maintains that the code of a language is metalingual, in that it is not a part of the 
language, but performs a glossing function to ensure that the addresser and addressee are 
using the same meanings for the terms they are using (69). This is the way Bal uses 
“code” to outline culturally shared codes of viewing in her discussion of “receivers” of 
art, in a gallery context or not (202). Luhmann also discusses codes for understanding art 
in the same manner, although he imposes a condition that the code for his purposes is 
binary, and the binaries he chooses to best represent the reception of art are art/not art, 
and beautiful/ugly (191).  
Second, coding as it is used in qualitative analysis has a different meaning. It is a 
process of distilling, finding an essence of meaning in the amorphous data. In NVivo, 
codes are called nodes, like nodes in a network, implying that they are particular points 
along vectors where meanings tend to cluster. 
Third, the definition of “code” as it applies to computing is algorithmic: it is, 
according to Florian Cramer, “a transformation rule for symbols into action” (9). 
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Computer code has a fascinating recent history that merits a separate study;16 I only touch 
upon the features that emphasize its relationship to patterning.  
In its contemporary form, computer code features three levels: a programming 
language written by programmers that is understandable to humans, the most recent 
languages being the easiest to read and learn; an assembly language, sometimes also 
written by programmers but most often now interpreted by a machine compiler or 
interpreter; and machine language, written in zeroes and ones that a computer can 
understand. Figure 28 is a hypothetical example of the three levels of a piece of computer 
code that, if it would run, would place an image of a triangle on the screen. 
It may seem that what we have is, on the one hand, two meanings of code that are 
richly and subtly cultural in nature, and on the other, computer code as a purely 
mathematical algorithm. However, I review digital humanities writing, including 
Cramer’s, that makes a claim for the fully cultural nature of computer code as well.  
In “Critical Code Studies,” Mark Marino argues that code already has meaning 
beyond its functionality since it is a form of symbolic expression and interaction, “a 
social, semiotic system employing grammar and rhetoric.” For Marino, code is a text. He 
goes on to compare it to  
a musical score, a play script, blueprints, circuit diagrams, or any print 
text, since none of these can be processed or executed without being read. 
Or perhaps code is more like a spell or incantation: to read it is to cast it 
(7). 
 
16 See The Information: A History, A Theory, A Flood for a full history of computer code (Gleick). 
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Cramer expands on Marino’s last statement, undertaking to write a reconstruction 
of the cultural and imaginative history of executable code (9). He starts much earlier than 
does James Gleick, whose account begins in eighteenth-century England with Charles 
Babbage’s Analytical Engine, inspired by the jacquard loom (109). Cramer takes the 
reader much further back, starting with the Greek mathematician Pythagoras and the 
history of combinatorics, defined as formal-technical manipulation of symbols, usually 
alphabet- or number-based (64). He examines historic prototypes of combinatoric logic, 
including the Kabbalah and Ramon Lull’s Ars generalis ultima (1305), that purported to 
derive philosophical-theological statements through formal computation (36), arguing 
that the kinds of “word magic” featured in these prototypes are ancestors of executable 
code and proposing that “the technical principle of magic, controlling matter through 
manipulation of symbols, is the technical principle of computer software as well” (15).  
Cramer’s historical revisioning of the road to computer code highlights an aspect 
of it that is strikingly Anglo-American: it is written predominantly in the English 
language. This fact reinforces the argument that computer code is not neutral but rather 
deeply culturally inflected. Adrian Mackenzie, writing in 2008, points out that the 
internationalization of software is proceeding very slowly; part of the reason for this is 
the general assumption that software is already built on models of universality such as 
binary numbering systems, the Universal Turing Machine, and global technoculture itself 
(‘Internationalization’ 1). Mackenzie argues against this assumption, claiming that  
The very same construction and manipulation that transform numerals 
(graphic forms) into numbers (things in relations of plurality), constitute 
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bodies in structural relationships. Interpellation is one way of theorizing 
the ritual hailing that brings bodies of all kinds into forms of subjecthood 
in relation to number. This singularizing effect is deeply embedded in the 
graphical writing systems on which software so heavily draws. The very 
existence of a numeral zero has intense cultural specificity that passes 
from India through Arabic to medieval Italian calculation techniques 
(‘Internationalization’ 3). 
Mackenzie was writing ten years ago; it might be expected that there has been an 
increase in the development of non-English-language programming languages since then. 
However, the results of Sayamindu Dasgupta’s and Benjamin Mako Hill’s 2107 study 
reveal a similar state of affairs today, with Scratch, written for children’s education, being 
almost unique in programming languages to offer a translated version, and then in only 
five languages: Portuguese, Italian, Brazilian Portuguese, German, and Norwegian 
(Dasgupta and Hill 35).  
With all of code’s cultural and metaphorical implications, then, can it be claimed 
that the practice of its writing is a theoretical activity? The debates about making as 
theory are as lively among digital humanities scholars as they are in material cultures. 
Here, the making refers not to making physical objects, but to making software. The 
scholars ask, is building digital objects – coding – a theoretical activity or a purely 
practical one? Johanna Drucker cites the rise of digital information graphics – maps, 
charts, and graphs – to argue that visualizations are in a very real sense knowledge 
production (‘Humanities Approaches’ 5). Similarly, Alan Galey and Stan Rueker focus 
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on design as an intellectual method and advocate in favour of viewing digital objects as 
forms of argument (406). This is another way of phrasing Willard McCarty’s claim that 
talking about “comput-ing” rather than “comput-ers” turns “‘things’ into algorithmic 
performances” (254). Galey and Rueker also cite Manovich’s declaration that “a 
prototype is a theory” (407), a statement that is taken up by Stephen Ramsay and 
Geoffrey Rockwell and expanded into an epistemology built on an assumption that 
building – coding – is scholarship (5). Natalia Cecire is alone in raising doubts about the 
one-to-one concordance between coding and theorizing implied in a statement such as “a 
prototype is a theory,” and cautions about the efficacy of throwing out the language-
based tradition of criticism upon which the discipline of Humanities is based” (1). 
2. Logical Depth and Hiddenness 
“Logical depth” refers to the paradox of apparent transparency in a medium 
whose processes are increasingly hidden, a point made by Thrift in his posing of software 
as a “technological unconscious” (‘Beyond Mediation’ 241). The quality of hiddenness 
also arises from computing as an essentially nonvisual medium: Cramer explains, “The 
internet is accessed largely by graphical browser and client programs but with the 
constant awareness that non-graphical codes are running underneath the system” (98). 
Charles H. Bennett provides the foundational concept of hiddenness in computing 
with his definition of logical depth, a phenomenon that factors into a piece of information 
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or a solution all the calculations an originator had to do in order to arrive at it (3).17 
Wendy Chun maintains that the computer is nonvisual and nontransparent, but it has 
fostered a primary focus on visuality and the belief that it affords more transparency than 
other media (“On Software” 27). Axel Fliethmann explains this seeming contradiction: 
how can a medium that is all about visuality be nonvisual? He offers the reason that 
“digital technology treats image and text as the same form within the opacity of its code, 
and can only visualize both as different forms on its surface” (55). In other words, the 
computer screen is the surface interface. All available information is visible on the screen 
and can only be seen or heard. But the code creating these seen and heard forms is text 
and only text – and almost always English text – which the machine has to translate into 
patterns of zeroes and ones. 
Laura Marks relates logical depth to the Shia Islamic terms of zahir, exoteric 
knowledge, and batin, esoteric knowledge, and by extension to computer-generated art, 
which is, in cybernetic terms, about the code, not the content. Another connection is 
made by Frederica Frabetti, who takes up Derrida’s concept of deconstruction as a 
method of unpicking a conceptual system to ask, “What is it that has to remain unthought 
within the conceptual structure of software” (8)?  
 
17 In algorithmic processes like those computed by a Turing machine, a logically ‘deep’ or 
complex object is one that requires a lengthy calculation. Bennett argues that complexity includes a kind of 
buried redundancy consisting of all the calculations the originator had to do in order to arrive at a valuable 
piece of information. He refers to the halting problem – whether a computer program will continue running 
forever to try to solve a problem.  
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Scott Dexter and Adrian Mackenzie address hiddenness as a result of the layering 
of functions in object-oriented softwares that result in more and more functions being 
hidden and inaccessible not only to the user but also to the programmer. Dexter describes 
Alan Turing’s experiments with mechanical computation in which Turing found that a 
complex calculation needs to include “disposable intermediate figures” that are just there 
to assist fallible human memory (‘The Esthetics of Hidden Things’ 130) − an example of 
Bennett’s logical depth. He goes on to recount the rise of object-oriented software that 
organizes information into sets as economies of memory allocation and then conceals the 
sets from the user and from other programmers (‘The Esthetics of Hidden Things’ 140). 
This new quality of hiddenness in software – that it has layers inaccessible even to the 
programmer, making it possible to hide its workings, is allied with, but not identical to, 
logical depth. The former quality of hiddenness has resonances for Chun with a 
somewhat pernicious normalizing function, a tendency to take certain assumptions for 
granted. Chun urges the reader to critically interrogate software, because “reducing 
ideology to software empties ideology of its critique of power—something absolutely 
essential to any theory of ideology” (44). In contrast, logical depth marks Deleuze’s 
possibility space, a fertile space that dwells in the virtual as opposed to the actual layer of 
the world (Difference and Repetition 102). Taking up Bennett’s and Turing’s 
interpretation, I would argue that suppositions, beliefs, and paradigms reside there as well 
as calculations that are no longer needed; for Deleuze, alternate versions of historic and 
mythic events are in virtual space, where Caesar did not cross the Rubicon (The Fold 98), 
Sextus did not rape Lucretia (The Fold 61), Adam did not sin (The Fold 104), and the 
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labyrinth has no thread because Ariadne has hung herself, presumably with the thread 
(Difference and Repetition 56).  
For Mackenzie, sets as devices in object-oriented programing are so ubiquitous 
that they are considered trivial and, as Carroll remarked about the Amish quilt, “beneath 
interpretation.” In a further move that references Deleuze’s multiplicity theories and 
software, he mentions Deleuze’s resistance to set-based thinking: “A vital multiplicity for 
him . . . has no parts or elements. It only has intensive differences actualizing as extended 
things, with boundaries, with orderings” (‘Set’ 230). Deleuze’s sentiment about vital 
multiplicity resonates with Elkins’ and Hays’ reflections on the subsemiotic elements of 
visual images, and all three can be understood in relation to elements of code that are 
considered “trivial.” In a passage entitled “Why Study the Paint?” Marino defends 
studying code critically because it is not “merely” a means or procedure, it is a text (7). 
This seems to me to be a case of a writer justifying his attention to code by giving it a 
status of importance. I reiterate here my purpose is not to elevate pattern up above a sub-
interpretive or subsemiotic level, but to go down to where it is and examine it. In so 
doing, I am looking for what it is in visual pattern that takes it beyond decoration or 
ornament, with their connotations of supplement – as I said, on its own grounds and in its 
own terms. Elkins, Hay, and to some extent Cramer, provide clues about where to look, 
and how to interpret what I sense about pattern: that its meanings are subtle, paradoxical, 
hidden, labyrinthian, and even slippery and evasive. Pattern hides on purpose. 
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3. Software’s Patterned Nature 
In my discussion of the literature on code a picture emerges of software as the 
immaterial partner of the software/hardware pair. Perhaps software as a category is an 
amalgam of all the code – the symbols – issuing instructions to the hardware. Cramer 
frames software as “algorithms as control logic that was abstracted from the machine” 
(121). In other words, software is instructions: the programmer writes them and then the 
computer runs them. This process is an exact replica to how patterns are created. It is also 
just like loom weaving. Cramer goes on to note that  
the technical distinction between software and hardware is blurry itself. Is 
instruction code hardware once it is burned onto an EPROM, is it software 
when it is stored in an erasable flash ROM? . . . Is, for example, a human 
brain that performs a computation a piece of hardware? (123)  
Cramer’s last question pulls the argument back to the level of the body, and to the 
question addressed earlier, what is material about the digital? It appears to me that the 
picture drawn by Thrift in answer to that earlier question of humans attached to their 
devices with “flashing screens and buzzing software” visualizes the state of many if not 
most museum visitors. As they perambulate the galleries, they are experiencing with their 
bodies their own digital devices – as well as the digital gallery enhancements. It follows 
that what they are experiencing bodily in this interaction is the software. Because so 
much of what they can experience in galleries is visual as opposed to corporeal, visitors’ 
prime sensory interaction is with the software, not with the art. I will argue in Chapter Six 
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that the digital space, used in this way, facilitates contact with the mythic space of the 
museum imaginary.  
At bottom, the code that makes the devices perform is written in zeroes and ones. 
In a reflection that recalls the pictures in the Dresden gallery that made Derrida write, “la 
chose soi-même se dérobe toujours” (La voix et le phénomène 117), Derek Robinson 
claims of software, “It’s interpreters all the way down – then it’s just bits” (2). 
Robinson’s statement expresses how patterned software is; indeed, the very fabric of 
software is patterned. In the higher-level programming languages, “if,” “while,” and 
“for” loops form the pattern that issues instructions to the machine:  
• For (this distance) (or this duration), move forward;  
• While (this condition) is true, keep going;  
• If (this condition is false), stop, turn back, turn left, or turn right.  
These instructions are translated by the machine interpreter or compiler, which 
then issues the zeroes and ones that the machine understands and can operationalize. The 
lines sound exactly like pseudocode, a preliminary version of computer code often used 
by programmers to organize their thoughts. They also sound like the steps for navigating 
a maze. 
In summary, the claim of digital humanities is that the digital field – and indeed 
science generally – needs the kind of deeply humanistic critique that the humanities 
knows how to provide. If “visual cultures” and “material cultures” have become 
important fields of scholarship in their own right, I would add that “digital cultures” 
could be so named because it interrogates the social and cultural determinants of digital 
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technologies. Furthermore, the writers I review here provide, not only critique, but an 
entry into the layered, metaphoric poetics of software. Wilfreid Hou Je Bek calls the loop 
“the foremost poetic entity in programming” (1) and Scott Dexter recounts how code 
appears to hide and be invisible in the same way our bodies are invisible to us (‘Toward a 
Poetics of Code’ 4). I end this chapter with Frederica Frabetti’s list of software’s 
attributes that I would suggest is a good way to characterize software’s patterned nature: 
1. hidden – deep opacity; 
2. full of cultural meanings; 
3. a distinctive form of writing; 
4. a set of instructions; 
5. a conceptual system; 
6. a material object (161–69). 
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Figure 28: Levels of Programming Languages 
  
class Triangle { 
 …
 float surface ()
 return b*h/2;
 }
LOAD r1, b
LOAD r2, h
MUL r1, r2
DIV r1, #2
RET
0001001001000101
0010010011101100
10101101001
} High-level programming language 
} Low-level assembly language 
}  Machine language 
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Chapter Three, The Conceptual Site: Part Two 
Patterns’ Roles in Systems of Perception and Cognition 
Throughout the previous chapter, pattern has been the constant subject of my 
inquiries and my reflections, like a puzzle piece that I am trying to fit into its place. Now, 
I turn to pattern directly to investigate its broader biography through the writings of its 
interlocutors past and present. To reiterate, my questions reflect my particular concerns 
with pattern: first, in what manner has visual pattern been fitted into the confining box 
called “decoration” or “ornament”? Second, what is pattern’s implication in systems of 
perception and cognition? Figure 29 is a timeline of writers important to my first and 
second questions, to situate them in their period and to show them relative to each other. 
My third question for this field is, how do visual patterns communicate with viewers? 
What, in turn, is the nature of the viewer’s response to visual patterns? 
1. Historic Approaches to Visual Patterns as Ornament or Decoration 
My first task is to identify a point in the long human history of making patterns on 
objects as the starting date for my survey of historic approaches to visual patterns. I 
choose to start in England in the nineteenth century, for two reasons: first, that century’s 
obsession with ornament arose in response to vast quantities of objects from Asia and 
Africa arriving in public and private collections. They came as a result of worldwide 
European imperialism, as soldiers, missionaries, and diplomats took advantage of the 
paroxysms of history to acquire, through “theft or purchase” (Belting 166), the precious 
objects of conquered nations. Second, a great many of these objects came from places 
119 
 
where Islam was the dominant religion, and their systems of applied and structured 
patterning stirred fascination and awe in an intellectual milieu that was horrified by the 
design debasement of machine-made objects. Perhaps for this reason, the kinds of visual 
patterning systems that European writers like Owen Jones and Alois Reigl admired had a 
distinctly Asian or even specifically "Islamic" character. As Necipoğlu writes, "The 
European fascination with Islamic ornament . . . reached its peak in the nineteenth 
century" (The Topkapi Scroll: Geometry and Ornament in Islamic Architecture 61).  
The British architect and designer Owen Jones published The Grammar of 
Ornament in 1856. He was inspired by the Islamic geometric patterns of the Alhambra 
palace complex in Granada, Spain, and used them as a touchpoint to propose the thirty-
seven unifying laws of ornament. In the book’s introduction, he sets out these 
propositions as comprehensive instructions for creating ornament that is beautiful and 
uplifting, a benefit to its society and an antidote to the design found in mass market 
objects. Jones’ propositions are philosophical, technical, and even social. They dictate 
that all good design exhibits principles based on nature; furthermore, the decorative arts 
are generated from architecture, which in turn arises from its era. Balanced compositions, 
where nothing needs to be added or removed, create repose in eye, intellect, and 
affections. In technical terms, ornament should be based on geometry. Lines should flow 
out of a parent stem, and where colour is used, quiet hues like blue should be applied on 
the receding surfaces of a composition, and bright ones like yellow on advancing areas. 
Lastly, Jones pronounces that all social classes should be educated in art (7).  
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Following the thirty-seven propositions are sections detailing the visual 
ornamental styles of nineteen cultures and civilizations, with illustrations printed in the 
new technology of chromolithography. These sections separate the styles completely 
from their substrates; the material world is absent here. In an appraisal of the Grammar, 
John Kresten Jesperson argues that Jones’ system isolates the principles to establish 
ornament as “the irreducible element that is a gestalt whole. Decoration is the distribution 
of that element over a carpet, a wall, a dado, a frieze, a dress, or a cup” (151). Thus, Jones 
creates a primacy of form over material – and the superiority that attaches to this primacy 
– that influences artists and scholars working in European art historical practice for 
succeeding generations. According to Rémi Labrusse, the Grammar and its fellows in 
other European languages “obsessively set off in search of primeval forms and identified 
them in the so-called Orient . . . the ‘Orient’ was a way out of history, in a utopian world 
of eternally valid meanings” (324). 
In this survey of historic approaches, I trace the enduring influence of Jones’ 
system and its eventual, partial dismantling by recent theorists, Hay and Necipoğlu 
among them. I use the term “partial” because there is ample evidence that ideas of the 
superiority of form over material, with its concomitant associations of meaning to one 
and not the other, crop up in contemporary art critical discourse; for example, in his 
recent review in The Guardian of an exhibition of ceramic art, Jonathan Jones claims that  
Art is the opposite of decoration. It is deeper, stranger, wilder. The 
constraints of craft make it very hard to turn an objet d’art into an artistic 
masterpiece. It was different 500 years ago. The difference between art 
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and craft had not yet been invented. Islamic medieval tiles are part of a 
vast vision of paradise that transcends modern rationality. But in modern 
times, the well-crafted object is a commodity, a product. It’s luxury 
decoration (para.9). 
It is discouraging to read a sentence like the second last one in a contemporary, 
progressive newspaper. Contained in it is a multitude of assumptions, among them that 
Islamic historic material culture has one vision, that vision is religious, and that vision is 
timeless, while modern rationality rushes past it. These assumptions do a great disservice 
to an indeed vast practice, but one of “kaleidoscopic diversity” (Akbarnia et al. 12). 
Alois Riegl is the other nineteenth-century theoretician of ornament that I include 
in my survey, with the rationale that, like Jones, his theories have had an enduring 
influence on succeeding legions of artists and scholars. In Stilfragen /Problems of Style: 
Foundations for a History of Ornament, Riegl holds to Jones’ convictions that all art is 
inextricably tied to nature (14), and that the principles of ornament can be conceptualized 
in universal schemes (33). He gives precedence to the leaflike motif known as the 
arabesque, whose genealogy he traces from the Greek acanthus leaf through early Islamic 
art to modern times (229). However, his views diverge from those of Jones in his 
preoccupation with objects: in his lifetime, his most sustained task was to catalogue 
oriental rugs, and he wrote extensively on metalwork and jewelry. In Christopher Wood’s 
assessment, what Riegl claims to be doing in his theories of ornament and what he is 
actually doing are at odds:  
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In Riegl’s analysis, then, the fibulae are both decontextualized, that is, 
treated as disembodied apparitions, and historicized. But the thesis of this 
paper is that the anthropological, pre-aesthetic working of the artifacts is 
nevertheless inscribed in his text. Riegl’s book is, after all, a book about 
objects (164). 
Ernest Gombrich gives a useful précis of nineteenth-century European writing on 
patterning. Although the relevant chapter in The Sense of Order is titled “The Psychology 
of Styles,” it is not a psychological work, but an assessment of “Western” style theory in 
decorative art, especially in the nineteenth century. Its value for this study derives from 
the author’s expansiveness in attempting to codify how ornament fits into a more general 
theory of art and architecture. He does not aim to answer the questions of universality or 
cultural relativity, or of pattern as a language rather than another system, but rather 
attempts to organize the rules of ornament to fit them into a more general theory of art 
and architecture (‘The Psychology of Styles’ 210). However, his method is limited to 
European art-historical approaches, where figuration is inevitably considered more 
interesting than pattern.  
In early twentieth-century architectural theory, the reaction against ornament was 
extreme and widespread. Adolf Loos’ explicitly racist essay “Ornament and Crime” 
epitomizes the reaction with assertions such as “No ornament can any longer be made 
today by anyone who lives on our cultural level” (23). The preference for sleek, 
unadorned buildings and objects was associated with high Modernism, and largely ended 
with its demise, but a fascination with ornament continued on throughout the period at 
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the peripheries of scholarship. Different writers have envisioned ornament according to a 
variety of interpretations. I present some of them here, separated into three approaches: 
making, viewing, and using.  
The first approach of ornament making features theories of ornament as visual 
mathematical thinking. Primary among these is anthropologist Dorothy Washburn, who 
collaborated with mathematician Donald Crowe to analyze visual patterns produced by 
diverse cultures, finding their structures to be consistent with the principles of line and 
plane geometry (‘Chapter One: History and Theory of Plane Pattern Analysis’; 
‘Introduction: The Role of Pattern in Culture’). Carol Bier also makes a valuable 
contribution by reflecting that number, shape, and the nature of space are deployed in 
Islamic geometric patterns to express spiritual and philosophical concepts. She asks, 
“What if we pose the question differently and ask, how can knowledge be visualized? 
Can we perhaps view geometric pattern in Islamic art as a representation of the rational 
intellect, and thereby perceived as proof for the existence of God?” (‘Number, Shape, and 
the Nature of Space’ 270).18  
Another approach to ornament’s making sees it as evidence of a kind of 
unthought knowledge (inferring that the real knowledge is evident in text). David Brett 
surveys the history of pattern theory from the nineteenth century to the present and 
concludes that the primary purpose of decoration is to generate pleasure in the onlooker 
 
18 In this passage, and in her approach generally, Bier does not utilize a totalizing approach to 
Islamic art, but refers to its manifestations in a particular period – in this case, the ninth century CE – and a 
particular place – Abbasid Baghdad. 
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(4). He argues that decoration operates through tacit knowledge and defines this term as 
opposed to reason, thereby limiting it and placing it in a hierarchy below fine art (Ibid. 
255). He writes from the perspective of European art; his few references to Islamic art 
include a mistaken claim that the roots of its aniconism lie in Neoplatonic mysticism 
(Ibid. 8).19 
Brett maintains that “the powers of the decorative are precognitive and 
preconscious and our knowledge of them is always in large measure tacit” (255). Brett’s 
statement is an arrow pointing straight to the theories of affect I have discussed in my 
section on material cultures, with implications that I will need to untangle further in 
Chapter Five. Beyond its significance for affect theory, Brett’s vision of decoration as 
unconscious is entangled with his assessment of orientalism as a driving force behind 
decoration’s popularity and dissemination in the European nineteenth century. In his 
view, orientalism was about the “West’s” view of itself rather than any clear view of 
Asian cultures but he sees it as a beneficial influence since it allowed repressed 
Europeans to have an alternative fantasy life full of sexuality and colour (151). He even 
describes the Arab Hall of Lord Leighton as a place of erotic playfulness, interjecting – 
 
19 Mehmet Aga-Oglu notes that “The factors that caused the prohibition of pictorial art in Islam 
were manifold. The attitude originated in the monotheistic concept of Judaism; later it was widely 
propagated in early Christianity, resulting in iconoclasm, and then was readily accepted by al-sunna” (191). 
I submit this quote as one rationalization by one author for the preponderance of pattern in Islamic art. 
There are many other possibilities, but no definitive one. I would add that in my view, aniconism is not an 
accurate term to apply to Islamic art; representations of humans and animals were not used in religious art, 
but there are magnificent examples of figural art for secular use. For example, see the illustrations of 
Persian paintings in the gallery of the Aga Khan Museum pictured in figure 7. 
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incredibly – that the tiles were, in fact, looted from a ruined mosque and include 
inscriptions of “Allah” (153). It is noteworthy that “marginalized discourses” are in 
evidence in Brett’s statements, as he treats the looting and the religious significance of 
the items looted as inconsequential asides. 
Scholars writing about the second approach, ornament’s viewing, interpret it as, 
variously, a culturally specific mode of cognition through visual metaphors (Frame; 
Lizardo; Washburn); as pleasure, or a game of covering space (Grabar; Brett); 
psychologically as a symptom, or as dangerous (Hay, ‘Passage of the Other: Histories’; 
Gell, Art and Agency; Grabar; Gombrich, The Sense of Order; Graves, ‘On Seeing 
Through Pattern’; Graves, ‘Pattern: A Psychological Approach’); and, finally, as 
meaningless, “mere” decoration (Gombrich, The Sense of Order; Jespersen; Malraux, 
Musée imaginaire). From an anthropological perspective, Peter Roe attempts an analysis 
of geometric patterns on textiles from the Upper Amazon that uses a linguistic analogy: 
according to his system, a line is a letter, a shape is a word, and a pattern is a phrase or 
sentence. A paragraph is likened to the design field, where the wholistic meaning goes 
(‘At Play in the Fields of Symmetry’ 241). In my estimation, while Roe does the 
invaluable work of infusing meanings back into patterned objects that have been 
considered “merely” decorative, it does visual pattern no service to push the grammatical 
analogy this far.  
The third approach, ornament’s using, envisions it as the spiritual symbolism of 
“lost” cultures (Cammann, ‘Symbolic Meanings in Oriental Rug Patterns: Part I’; El-Said 
et al.); and even as talismanic protection (Cammann, ‘Symbolic Meanings in Oriental 
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Rug Patterns: Part I’; Gombrich, The Sense of Order; Meller and Kushner). Not all of 
these approaches to ornament are significant to me in my pursuit of patterns’ roles in 
perception and cognition. I am particularly interested in the interpretations that, first, set 
ornament up as dangerous or a symptom, because that works against the idea of pleasure, 
which seems to me to be an interpretive cul-de-sac; that, second, acknowledge patterns’ 
longstanding importance as protective devices in many cultures, including Islamic ones 
(Savage-Smith, Science, Tools & Magic. 59); and that, third, see nothing in ornament, 
which is to say that ornament is beneath interpretation. All of these readings of ornament 
further my argument of visual patterns as possessing logical depth, outside the notions of 
connoisseurship that drive so much museum practice. 
To complete this survey of historic approaches to ornament, I would like to turn 
now to three theorists whose ideas find a resonance with my own: Jonathan Hay, Graeme 
Were, and Gulru Necipoğlu. Writing about Chinese pattern, Hay adds a new term, 
surfacescape, to the debate, defining it as a way of seeing decoration topologically rather 
than exclusively as something that is added to a surface (‘Passage of the Other: Histories’ 
65). His aim by means of this term is to “reactivate decoration as a theoretically 
productive category” (Ibid. 69). One of the main hinges of his theory is the notion, 
recalling logical depth, of the ability of ornament to incorporate residues of doubt and 
anxiety as symptoms of “seduction by the enigmatic signifier that comes from elsewhere” 
(Ibid. 69). 
Hay has appeared in every section of this review so far, contributing his views on 
the semiotics of images, on the implications of materiality on the mediating work of art, 
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and on the intercultural as the space between cultures. Here I will add that his elegant 
blending of form and material into his concept of surfacescape makes possible a view of 
the object’s eloquence that is only hinted at by other writers (Luhmann; Wood). He 
pierces the fog of scholarly method that obscures understanding by prefacing his 
presentation at a conference on ornament with the following remarks:  
The last couple of days have shown that it is easy to have a discussion 
about ornament as if we all at least know what it is when we see it. 
Coming to the discussion from a non-Western field, though, I am leery of 
any unspoken consensus on theory or method. I prefer to see any 
assumptions out in the open (‘Passage of the Other: Conference’ 2).20  
Graeme Were sets out to explore pattern as a type of meta-media that transcends 
any of its instantiations while remaining inextricably bound to them (3). As an 
anthropologist of Pacific societies, he has kind words for Owen Jones thanks to the 
latter’s comments that patterns painted on bark cloth show “evidence of mind” that is 
absent from the work of Jones’ own “highly developed civilization” of Victorian England 
(O. Jones 12). Were also takes up Gell’s theory of pattern that sees the patterned object as 
thought-like in nature, rather than, as in Grabar and Washburn and Crowe, locating 
knowledge outside the patterned form so it merely represents ideas in society (10). 
 
20 The two citations for “The Passage of the Other” refer to two versions of the essay, one in the 
form of a presentation at a conference that I attended, and the other in a published collection of essays on 
ornament. 
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Were’s reformulating of Gell’s system strikes a chord; it makes me see for the first time 
what is the issue affect theorists may have with the word representation:  
Objects are like exuviae, or reptile skins, that shed, leaving traces here and 
there. These hollow skins (as representations) are gathered (as 
perceptions) and internalized (as memories) before later being 
reconstituted (as objects) . . . objects are the workings of the mind (11). 
This passage impels two thoughts to arise: first, in this view, representations are 
traces, so much dead skin as it were, but they are a necessary part of the cyclic processes 
of becoming undergone by patterns. Second, these morsels of dead skin may be seen as 
waste products, like the “unassimilable waste” in Rosalind Krauss’ and Yve Bois’ treatise 
on informe, to be “crushed like a spider or expectorated like mucus” (79). Or they may 
resemble the last classification of animals in Borges’ fictitious taxonomy, “those that 
from a long way off look like flies” (para.6). In just such ways do patterns as 
representations on objects lie hidden in plain sight, not meaningless, not waste – beneath 
interpretation. 
In her significant body of writing on ornament, Necipoğlu aims to remove it from 
the suffocating container of art historical approaches that envision ornament as purely 
decorative and thus essentialize and collapse it into “formal taxonomies of the timeless 
arabesque” (‘Early Modern Floral’ 132). She proposes a new framing that takes its non-
European histories into account. Unlike Owen Jones and, more recently, Fatemeh Ahani 
and David Brett, Necipoğlu makes no attempt to differentiate the terms ornament and 
decoration, and she opens up its interpretation to multiple approaches, including its 
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longstanding, multivalent involvements in artisanship and materiality, its transmediality, 
and its use as an artistic currency of exchange in global and local contexts (5). In a 
refutation of the popular view that “Islamic art is predominantly decorative and hence 
devoid of meaning or contextual specificity” (‘The Concept of Islamic Art’ 61), and by 
extension, that Islamic art has featured no theoretical discourse or system, she introduces 
the seven fundamental typologies of decorative design that were formulated in Safavid 
Iran: “islāmī (Islamic), khatā’ī (chinoiserie), farangī (Frankish, European), fassālī 
(compartmentalized), abr (cloudlike, marbled), dāq (human and animal heads), and girih 
(knotted, geometric interlace)” (‘Early Modern Floral’ 136). Through the revelation of 
this counter-history of ornament, Necipoğlu revitalizes the study of Islamic art as a 
“loosely connected, multifocal and multivocal arena of inquiry . . . a multicultural 
‘civilizational’ category, just like Western art” (‘The Concept of Islamic Art’ 64). 
Necipoğlu’s major opus, The Topkapi Scroll, examines the girih as a system of 
patterning that is not universal, but rather "a contextually circumscribed mode of design 
that emerged and spread in a particular conjuncture" (The Topkapi Scroll: Geometry and 
Ornament in Islamic Architecture x). Her approach to pattern accords with my own, with 
two caveats: first, I have already mentioned my working hypothesis that it is not fruitful 
to approach visual pattern as a language, corresponding its smaller and larger units to 
language’s phonemes and morphemes. I am moving toward viewing its communicative 
power more in the context of its role in a patterned object’s agency, or prehension, as I 
detailed in Chapter Two. Second, in an intellectual terrain that is littered with vexed 
terms bearing unsatisfactory definitions – for example, representation, interpretation, 
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decoration, and even “Islamic art” – I have a problem with “ornament,” a term in 
frequent use in Necipoğlu's oeuvre. In its general usage, the term implies that pattern is 
an add-on, a supplementary frill to make things prettier. I am interested in patterns as 
communication vehicles. I am also interested in patterns as deep structures, as they 
indeed are in textile media. How do patterns on the surfaces of such objects intermingle 
with, scaffold, support, or contradict the structures they overlie?  
Finally, Avinoam Shalem and Eva-Maria Troelenberg offer a persuasive 
interpretation of ornament in Islamic art, claiming for it a power and an agency that 
derives from “sa capacité d’agir comme un agent ou un médiateur d’idées et même 
d’émotions / its ability to act as an agent or mediator of ideas and even emotions” (72). In 
turn, the authors attribute this ability to a complex of factors that combine ornament’s 
evocation of the vital energy of nature with a distillation of that energy into more or less 
abstracted forms. I concur with their view, having sensed visual patterns’ function as 
nature’s mirror, but a mirror that is expanded, distorted, and graphicized. 
2. Patterns in Systems of Perception and Cognition 
I turn away now from pattern in ornament to take my inquiry in a different 
direction by asking the question, what is patterning’s implication in systems of perception 
and cognition? Here I review literature that does not take patterned art as its subject but 
that nevertheless has much to say about it that is relevant for my study. Is patterning, in 
itself, a system or systems? Perhaps the question can only be answered contextually, as 
in, which systems? Systems of visual art? Software systems? Biological systems? The 
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views of patterning expounded by the literature that I examine in this section encompass 
all three, interchangeably and sometimes all at once. 
In the Introductory Chapter, I introduced the reader to Gregory Bateson’s 
important ideas about pattern, “the difference that makes a difference” (‘Form, 
Substance, and Difference’ 459). In his quest to map a theory of culture and art, Bateson 
is more interested in the manner of transmission − the code − than the content of the 
artwork (‘Style, Grace, and Information’ 129). For him, art is communication, and pattern 
allows some of the information to be unconscious, as an economy. In his study of the 
relationship between form and material, he defines the study of mind in cybernetics as a 
circuitry of differences (‘Form, Substance, and Difference’ 465). Peter Harries-Jones 
connects Bateson's ideas about difference even more strongly to patterning and details 
how during his life Bateson resisted the pigeonholing of his work into the intellectual 
trends of the day – including Darwinism, which he saw as reworking the old metaphors 
of power (A Recursive Vision 28) – but also systems theory and mysticism. Some of the 
foundations for Bateson’s theories can be found in the writings of Charles Sanders Peirce 
– another intellectual maverick whom I have named for his influence on Gell. In Mind 
and Nature, Bateson uses Peirce’s idea of abduction as a method to explain evolution, 
which he characterizes as “the pattern which connects” (Mind and Nature 8). In addition, 
Bateson’s theories of organism and its environment as forming a unit of being and doing 
(‘Form, Substance, and Difference’ 465) come straight from the writing of Alfred North 
Whitehead, a nineteenth-century philosopher who opposed the separation of mind and 
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body, “the dualism which gradually developed in European thought in respect to mind 
and nature,” that has shaped philosophical thought since Descartes (Whitehead 149).  
In Chapter Two, I noted how affect theory arose out of Gilles Deleuze’s concepts 
of virtual and actual states of being. I return to Deleuze now to develop a fuller 
assessment of his writing in relation to pattern thinking. The key works that I am 
interested in are Difference and Repetition and The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. In 
these works, he presents a vision of the world activated by principles of multiplicity – 
ideas are potentialities with multiple different relations (Difference and Repetition 183) – 
and immanence – ideas are not fixed but always in a state of becoming that recalls 
Frederick Nietzsche’s notion of eternal return (Difference and Repetition 41). In 
Difference and Repetition, he describes how the world is continually coming into being – 
“Every body, every thing, thinks and is a thought to the extent that, reduced to its 
intensive reasons, it expresses an Idea the actualization of which it determines” 
(Difference and Repetition 254) – and the larval subject unfolds in an asymmetrical 
evolutionary process (Ibid. 215). There is an element of the game in this, a “throw of the 
dice” (Ibid. 197) which moves difference and repetition out of the realm of rigidly 
repeating causality and toward an unfolding in a spatiotemporal dynamism (Ibid. 214).  
Deleuze’s concept of centres of envelopment as necessary to the larval state 
anticipates The Fold. There, he critiques and reinterprets Gottfried Leibniz's picturing of 
the universe as an infinite series of folds, with the European Baroque period (ca 1600-
1750) as its guiding trope. Leibniz works against René Descartes’ idea of a rectilinear 
world organised along x and y-axes, with clear separability. He takes the monad – a unity 
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that envelops a multiplicity − as a fundamental unit that cannot be divided further. All 
organisms, organic or inorganic, are composed of monads (The Fold 27). Deleuze 
develops this idea into a vision of the world in accordance with twentieth-century 
mathematical and scientific discoveries in fractal geometry like Helge von Koch’s curve 
and Benoit Mandelbrot's Julia set (Ibid. 16). The world is an event of folding and 
unfolding. It is on two floors, the lower floor being matter and the upper floor the soul. 
The upper floor folds over the lower floor (Ibid. 104). Deleuze ties this model to quantum 
mechanics and logical depth by designating a world comprised not only of what happens 
but of all the possibilities that may happen, only one of which can happen. His distinction 
between the terms “actual” and “virtual” captures the idea of a possibility space. Both 
actual and virtual are real, but an actual event is one that is actualized and therefore 
visible, while a virtual event, while no less real, remains a possibility (Difference and 
Repetition 183). He ties this distinction to ethics by positing a more desirable, indeed a 
more spacious world by introducing the possibility space in which Adam does not sin and 
Sextus does not rape Lucretia (The Fold 61). In both works, his vision is intensely visual, 
graphic, and mathematical, and full of productive ideas about patterning as a system of 
perception and cognition.  
In a third work, Deleuze adopts the phrase “crystal-image” to address the way 
time works in postwar twentieth-century cinema. He posits the crystal image as a 
reflection in a mirror, “perception on the one side and recollection on the other” (Cinema 
2 79), maintaining that the actual image is the present and its reflected image is the past. 
Deleuze’s use of a crystal as a metaphor for time recalls Benjamin’s, Arendt’s, and 
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Stafford’s use of it, especially when he likens it to a polygon with growing sides, as in a 
prismatic reflection in a jewel– a multiplicity (Cinema 2 70). Visual pattern has just this 
property of multiplicity, like Deleuze’s crystal image, and it too is an image of time, a 
time-image, in the same way Benjamin’s crystal – as evoked by Arendt – crystallizes 
time.  
Just as Harries-Jones helps me understand Bateson's ideas, I am aided in 
deciphering Deleuze by the interlocution of Manuel DeLanda. In an attempt to 
reconstruct Deleuze's world and make it more understandable to philosophers of science, 
DeLanda offers a theory of morphogenesis based on the notion of the different (Intensive 
Science and Virtual Philosophy xiv). In the process, he explicates many of Deleuze's 
difficult terms, including his use of the virtual – the notion of possibilities that exist prior 
to what actually happens. This idea is one that links to patterning through the related 
concepts of hiddenness and logical depth, which I mentioned in the Digital Humanities 
section as key elements in the perception and cognition of visual patterns.  
During their lifetimes, Deleuze and Bateson were aware of each other's work. 
Both writers make inventive use of the term difference, and both argue in favour of 
principles of multiplicity rather than dualism in shaping their versions of perception and 
cognition (Harries-Jones, Upside-down Gods 136). Deleuze and Felix Guattari include 
references to Bateson's theories of the double bind in their writing (88), and Guattari 
tackles Bateson's theories directly in The Three Ecologies (54). Deleuze's concept of the 
virtual is allied for me with affect and in turn with logical depth and hiddenness, through 
its designation according to DeLanda as "unactualized capacity to affect and be affected" 
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(Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy 65). These terms, logical depth and affect, are 
allied to pattern through pattern's predilection for being in the background, beneath 
interpretation, and they are allied to embodied cognition through Deleuze’s notion of the 
possibility space, a plane of being which is real but not actualized, which nevertheless is 
experienced bodily (Rose 9).  
Another way besides those of Bateson and Deleuze to view patterns’ roles in 
systems of perception and cognition is to examine how they operate as devices. Inventive 
Methods: The Happening of the Social is a collection of essays examining “devices” for 
social and cultural research. The definition of devices includes types of objects, for 
example a tape recorder, but also types of concepts or metaconcepts, such as a list or a 
pattern. Each device is investigated as an agent of transformation in a sociocultural arena 
(“A Perpetual Inventory” 9). The collection is similar in format to Fuller’s Software 
Studies in that it consists of several short postings on specific topics rather than article-
length essays. The postings most relevant to my project are “Pattern, Patterning” by Janis 
Jefferies, and “Pattern” by Paul Stenner. By offering a view of pattern as physical 
evidence of abstract knowledge, Jefferies focuses on what can be seen or otherwise 
physically experienced, but she also mentions patterning’s game-like qualities and 
destabilizing potential (129). Overall she views pattern as a device for making sense of 
the phenomenal world, while Stenner is more interested in patterning as a social figure, 
like a dance, that continues even when the performance is complete and the performers 
are gone (140). 
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As I mentioned in Chapter One, Dan Dixon reflects on the use of the word 
“pattern” as a substitute for “structure,” a term that has acquired a negative cast in recent 
Humanities writing (191). Dixon sees pattern as a process, a method, or a device (Ibid. 
201). What it is a method of depends very much on the context. In software, pattern is 
inherent in repetitions of zeroes and ones at the basic machine level, while additional 
layers with different patterns render the software readable by a human. Dixon’s concern 
is with patterns as devices for knowledge production. He cites Bateson’s work with 
biological and cybernetic patterns as support for his notion that “patterns are repeated 
shapes and structures which are the observable features of an underlying system” (Ibid. 
195)  
I have already referred to the category of magic as a system of perception and 
cognition: in my review of digital humanities literature, I quote Cramer’s view that “the 
technical principle of magic, controlling matter through manipulation of symbols, is the 
technical principle of computer software as well” (15). In referring to magic, I must 
remind the reader that I refer, borrowing Necipoğlu’s terms, to a “multifocal and 
multivocal” cultural tradition in world history, which I can only touch upon for the 
purposes of this study. The way in which objects affect subjects – and vice versa – has 
long been studied from diverse perspectives, and one of the most important perspectives 
comes from anthropology’s documentation of traditions of magic in different societies. 
The investigations of Alfred Gell (‘Technology and Magic’ 8), Susan Greenwood (151), 
Constant Hamès and Alain Epelboin (170), and Victor Turner (207) are of importance to 
my study, since all these anthropologists contribute insights about visual pattern’s 
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relationship with ritual and magic. In addition, art historians writing about pattern have 
attributed the origin of certain motifs and patterns to apotropaic functions of protection 
(Cavallaro; Cammann, ‘Symbolic Meanings in Oriental Rug Patterns: Part I’; Grabar; 
Meller and Kushner). Like pattern, the word “magic” is used in contemporary parlance to 
describe many kinds of phenomena, from Disney to Wicca. I am dealing here only with 
the kind of magic defined as “talismanic,” for this is the kind that is associated with the 
visual motifs and patterns portrayed on objects that are the focus of my study.21  
I am interested in talismanic magic as the logical depth of certain visual patterns, 
evidenced by some of the scholarship that has been done on symbolism appearing in 
Islamic material cultures. I have already mentioned Hamès, Epelboin and Camman in the 
Introductory Chapter, for their writing on this aspect of magic squares’ symbolism was 
useful to my study of West African patterned textiles. In addition, Camman has made 
attempts to interpret the enigmatic symbolism of oriental carpets, which are considered 
by dealers and most scholars as purely decorative (‘Symbolic Meanings in Oriental Rug 
Patterns: Part I’ 6). He contends that the patterns are rooted in systems of faith among the 
people who made them, and functioned as a symbolic language whose purpose was 
bound up in obvious and subtle ways with talismanic protection (‘Symbolic Meanings in 
Oriental Rug Patterns: Part I’ 17). By the same token, Susan Meller writes about Central 
Asian robes that their patterns derive from symbols of protection, especially of mothers 
 
21 For more information on talismanic magic in the Islamic context, see Magic and Divination in 
Early Islam and Epistles of the Brethren of Purity: On Magic (Savage-Smith, Magic and Divination in 
Early Islam; Callatay and Halflants). 
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and children (115). I will return to Meller’s writing in the next chapter, in my discussion 
of the Central Asian textiles that I used in the AKM interviews. 
Like pattern, and indeed like language (Derrida, Voice and Phenomenon 74), 
magic in this context can be viewed as essentially performative; for example, Constant 
Hames defines it as “un ensemble d’idées et d’actions qui modifient le cours naturel 
d’événements / a set of ideas and actions which affect the natural course of events” 
(Brenner 7). My position on magic as a form of communication, developed from research 
into both its European and its Islamic expressions, is that it entails an alternative 
paradigm or worldview to the logical positivism and subject/object, nature/culture 
binaries of modern science. According to Randall Styers (7) and Morris Berman (83) on 
the Western European history of magic, and Michael Muhammad Knight (61) and Emilie 
Savage-Smith (Magic and Divination in Early Islam xxii) on its place in Islam, magic has 
a history of operating for humans as “another form of rationality, just as astrology and 
alchemy were logical systems of explanation” (Savage-Smith, Science, Tools & Magic. 
10). Magic has been discarded, refuted, and even ridiculed, but it is still with us as logical 
depth, partly because, as Styers puts it, “magic maintains remarkable potency as the 
‘unthought’ of modernity” (170).  
The last system I wish to examine in this section is the Actor-Network theory 
(ANT) of Bruno Latour. This is a theory that is not on its face about pattern at all, and 
especially not about patterned art objects, but it contains a great deal of “pattern 
thinking.” In laying out his theory, Latour starts by describing networks which redefine 
space as “neither social nor ‘real’ space, but associations” (‘On Actor-Network Theory’ 
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371). His claim that a network is not a thing, but the recorded movement of a thing (‘On 
Actor-Network Theory’ 378), can be taken word-for-word to define what a pattern is. In 
the same vein, his account of networks as possessing no inside/outside or 
foreground/background is a characteristic of many geometric patterns. Latour even asks, 
“What happens when a circulating object leaves the boundary of a text” (‘On Actor-
Network Theory’ 379)? This is exactly what happens in museum exhibitions when the 
subject and the object negotiate their own meanings, irrespective of all institutional 
means of interpretation, and it goes on happening as Latour describes: “The circulating 
object goes on circulating and goes on getting its isotopy from what other actors do to it” 
(‘On Actor-Network Theory’ 379). 
3. Patterns Communicate, Viewers Respond 
Having come this far in my pursuit of how patterns communicate, I now feel 
prepared to ask the question, what do they communicate? Are they meant as puzzles, are 
they meant to be pleasing, are they meant as sanctifying, are they protective, are they 
lucky? As Necipoğlu argues,  
Just as there is no single universally accepted symbolic meaning for the 
girih [star-and-polygon pattern], a total absence of meaning simply would 
have been unlikely . . . far from embodying an imagined horror vacui of 
the Islamic psyche, the covering of surfaces with variegated patterns 
reflected a desire to create densely charged semiotic environments (The 
Topkapi Scroll: Geometry and Ornament in Islamic Architecture 222). 
140 
 
Necipoğlu’s pronouncement about the meanings of Islamic geometric patterns as 
densely charged semiotic environments contributes to my growing sense that where 
patterns are concerned, I must look, following Bateson, not for the content but for the 
message. Reflecting on Whitehead, Bateson wrote,  
One of the roots of cybernetics goes back to Whitehead and Russell [in the 
Principia Mathematica] and what is called the Theory of Logical Types. 
In principle, the name is not the thing named . . . the message “let’s play 
chess” is not a move in the game of chess (‘Form, Substance, and 
Difference’ 483). 
“Not the content but the message” explains why the concept of representation is 
essential to the interpretation of works of art: a thing represented is not a thing; it is the 
interpretation, the message about the thing. Patterns are full of information but it is in the 
form of crystals, in the same sense that Benjamin describes history’s crystallization 
(Benjamin and Arendt 51) and that Deleuze attributes crystalline properties to time 
(Cinema 2 80). The densely packed, complexly interlaced surfaces are communicative 
but not linguistic, and attempting to make them so is, as Diawara puts it, a category 
mistake. Perhaps the information that they communicate is mathematical, and in 
particular, geometrical and topological: Necipoğlu’s words recall Bier’s interpretation 
that Islamic geometric patterns represent a visualization of mathematical knowledge and 
thus of humankind’s place in the cosmos (‘Number, Shape, and the Nature of Space’ 5).  
How do viewers respond to these densely charged environments? My report on 
the findings of my interviews at the Aga Khan Museum in Chapter Four will reveal more, 
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but at this point the literature suggests that there is a difference in the way a viewer 
experiences a patterned or a figurative image. Visual pattern speaks in a different 
language from figuration: it speaks through materials and techniques as well as through 
symbolism and semiotics. This is where affect comes in as a vector of communication, 
through the experiencer’s felt responses to a patterned object.  
Report on Findings and Conceptual Framework 
My conceptual framework is a synthesis of my investigations into the five 
research fields I have examined in Chapters Two and Three. My starting point was to 
make a grouping into these fields of the scholarly literature that I chose as germane to my 
topic, and to perform a coding exercise using NVivo to track what the literature mentions 
about the mediating works of art in a museum exhibition. I describe my process in detail 
in Chapter One; figures 13 to 17 show my initial maps of codes. As the review 
progressed and I noted the larger themes in the literature, my thinking began to coalesce 
around four theoretical relationships that recurred throughout and that seemed to form 
networks of interpenetrating meanings: pattern and visuality, pattern and materiality, 
pattern and virtuality, and pattern and narrative. I used NVivo’s map-making 
functionality to make a concept map (figure 21) that visualizes the ways that major 
themes – “sensitizing concepts” – have emerged from my review of the literature. 
Expressed as findings, they align with my four theoretical relationships. 
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1. Pattern and visuality: Gell’s and Necipoğlu’s move away from the binary 
divides of the “Western” art canon creates space for envisioning patterned art 
as, not inferior to figurative art, but different. 
2. Pattern and materiality: the move toward embodied cognition by Kuchler and 
Ingold revisions patterned art objects in terms of their inherent intelligences.  
3. Pattern and virtuality: in software, pattern enacts Robinson’s, Chun’s, 
Cramer’s, and Frabetti’s expositions of computable code as nonvisual, hidden, 
and full of cultural meanings. 
4. Pattern and narrative: the fact that museum objects are increasingly seen as 
sites of knowledge generation, as articulated by Dudley and Witcomb, changes 
the focus of their interpretation away from narrative – using text to convey 
meaning, and toward nondiscursivity – using objects or images to convey 
meaning.  
My third finding concerning pattern and virtuality requires an explanation of my 
rationale in using the term “virtual.” On one hand, virtual is often used as a synonym for 
“digital” in discussions of computerized experiences: for example, according to the 
Virtual Reality Society, virtual reality is  
a three-dimensional, computer generated environment which can be 
explored and interacted with by a person. That person becomes part of this 
virtual world or is immersed within this environment and whilst there, is 
able to manipulate objects or perform a series of actions (‘What Is Virtual 
Reality?’, para.5). 
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In addition to this meaning, virtual is the term used by Deleuze to refer to a state 
of reality which is opposed to an actual state. Deleuze theorises that these two states 
comprise reality and that life is in a constant state of becoming, moving from virtual to 
actual and back again (DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy 9). While 
these two definitions are not identical, my adoption of the term allows me to include both 
kinds of phenomena – the virtual as digital experiences and the virtual as a possibility 
space – in my framework. What brings them into alignment with each other, I argue, is 
their implication in imagination. In each kind of virtuality, the viewer’s experience is 
freed from obedience to actuality while being bound to it, just as Derrida wrote of the 
interplay of text and its meaning,  
. . . chacune des deux opérations étant toujours hantée par le sens de 
l’autre, qui s’y annonce déja ou s’y retient encore / Each of these two 
operations is always haunted by the sense of the other; each operation is 
already announced in the other or still retained in it (Husserl 87; Derrida, 
Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry 89). 
My conceptual framework, then, emerges out of my reflections on these four 
relationships of pattern to visuality, materiality, narrative, and virtuality. Figure 30 is a 
visualization of the framework that makes clear where the fields of Museology and 
Patterns that I used in my literature review have gone: all four relationships are within the 
sphere of the Museum, and pattern links to each of them. I call the framework “pattern 
thinking.” According to pattern thinking, the perceptual forms of patterning, of which 
patterns on objects are traces or records, are intensely relational, nonlinguistic yet 
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communicative; embodied yet imaginative; and often in the background or the borders – 
of artworks and also of perception – yet always in movement, constantly flickering in and 
out of visibility and perceptibility, just as if they are crossing and re-crossing the 
actual/virtual divide.  
Pattern thinking is a way of conceptualizing and theorizing – and pulling apart 
and examining – the networks formed by pattern’s roles in visuality, materiality, 
narrative, and virtuality. In particular, the networks feature some specific actions that I 
have marked in this review as patternlike: Deleuze’s folding and unfolding, Chun’s 
revealing and concealing, Elkin’s figure and ground, and Latour’s networks. My desire to 
visualize these actions drove me to make a prototype in paper. I was inspired to do this by 
Deleuze’s description of actual and virtual states of being as mirror-images (Cinema 2 
79), and by Delanda’s comment in reference to Deleuze that the actual and the virtual 
states are “a single flat ontology with two sides, one side populated by virtual problems 
and the other by a divergent set of actual solutions to those problems” (Deleuze: History 
and Science 104). I made a diagram to be printed two-sided on a sheet of paper. The 
diagram is a geometric pattern of four squares; each square is divided with vertical, 
horizontal, and diagonal lines into eight right-angled triangles. Figure 31 shows one of 
the four squares, blank on the left and with labels and colours on the right. Note the 
bright colours diagonally on one side and the pale colours on the other side which 
indicate actual and virtual states of the terms. The blank version has reflectional 
symmetry, but the addition of my four terms, each term repeated twice, turns the square 
into a pinwheel with rotational symmetry. The four-square version is illustrated in figure 
145 
 
32. After folding, only the brightly coloured triangles will be visible. Once I had printed 
the diagram and affixed the two sides, I folded it into a “fortune teller” puzzle, an origami 
game often played by children to test each other’s preferences by putting different words, 
numbers, or images on the triangles, then manipulating the puzzle with their fingers to 
show different combinations. An example of a folded puzzle is in figures 33 and 34. 
My paper prototype illustrates four things for me: first, it reminds me how 
magnitudes of complexity can develop in even a relatively simple pattern of the 
geometric type that my puzzle is: each unit square has rotational symmetry, but the 
square in the centre of the puzzle has to have a different arrangement for the puzzle, 
when it is folded and manipulated, to always reveal three out of four different terms on its 
face. When I flatten it out to follow the logical path of the pattern, I have difficulty 
finding it. My eye is dazzled, takes a wrong turn, and I have to go back and start again. 
Metaphorically, the puzzle is a labyrinth, trapping me in its twists and cul-de-sacs.  
Second, philosophically, the puzzle makes concrete the way the virtual and the 
actual can coexist in the real: in my model, the surface area covered by the paler shades 
of colour, representing virtual states, is much larger than that covered by the actual states 
in bright colours. Third, the puzzle demonstrates the folding of the actual states of being 
over the virtual states so that the virtual is never seen but is nevertheless necessary. If the 
pale coloured triangles are removed, the puzzle falls apart into fragments. The virtual and 
the actual triangles do not change places but the terms of visuality, materiality, virtuality 
and narrative – the problems and solutions, as Delanda calls them – appear and disappear 
by the actions of folding and unfolding of the puzzle operator. Finally, by making a 
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material representation of my conceptual framework as a fortune teller puzzle, I invoke 
pattern’s playful side: that it is, as Grabar writes, “a game of covering space” (152). 
In the next chapter, I apply my framework of patterns as vectors of 
communication that operate according to the forces of difference in a flat ontology to the 
museum visitor experience, where visitors enter with their own agendas and construct 
their own meanings from the physical and digital offerings. I pay particular attention to 
the “sensitizing concepts” (Clarke et al. 33) that have come out of the literature review, 
pointing to what is missing: the “marginalized discourses” (Clarke et al. 238) which, I 
suggest, track back to the form/material divide that has permeated European schools of 
thought. An analysis of this and other key issues raised in this review must wait for my 
discussion in Chapter Five, when I compare my findings from the two research sites in 
my study. 
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Interlude: The Code Beneath the Skin 
“Geschichte zerfällt in Bilder, nicht in Geschichten / History decays into images, not into 
stories” (Benjamin, Das Passagen-Werk 594; Benjamin, The Arcades Project 476). 
 
“What guides this [Benjamin's] thinking is the conviction that although the living is 
subject to the ruin of time, the process of decay is at the same time a process of 
crystallization, that in the depth of the sea, into which sinks and is dissolved what once 
was alive, some things "suffer a sea-change" and survive in new crystallized forms and 
shapes that remain immune to the elements, as though they waited only for the pearl diver 
who one day will come down to them and bring them up into the world of the living” 
(Arendt as quoted in Schwartz 51). 
 
“Quand l'image virtuelle devient actuelle, elle est alors visible et limpide, comme dans le 
miroir ou la solidité du cristal achevé. Mais l'image actuelle devient virtuelle pour son 
compte, renvoyée ailleurs, invisible, opaque et ténébreuse, comme un cristal à peine 
dégagé de la terre / When the virtual image becomes actual, it is then visible and limpid, 
as in the mirror or the solidity of finished crystal. But the actual image becomes virtual in 
its turn, referred elsewhere, invisible, opaque, and shadowy, like a crystal barely 
dislodged from the earth” (Deleuze, Cinéma 2, l’image-Temps 95; Deleuze, Cinema 2 
70). 
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When history decays into images – this is memory, this is also art – the images 
reveal their crystal shapes. The decay has removed all the extraneous matter, the flesh, 
revealing the skeletons, and these skeletons are crystalline in shape – patterned, in other 
words. They are the code beneath the skin. 
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Figure 29: Timeline of writers 
150 
 
 
Figure 30: Emergent conceptual framework for the study 
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Figure 31: Unit for the paper puzzle prototype 
 
Figure 32: The paper puzzle before folding  
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Figure 33: The paper puzzle prototype, actual side (outside) 
 
Figure 34: The paper puzzle prototype, virtual side (inside) 
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Chapter Four, The Experiential Site 
My aim in conducting interviews with gallery visitors was to collect their 
responses and insights to works of patterned art in the Permanent Gallery so I could 
compare these responses and insights to the theoretical thinking in the literature. In this 
chapter, I give a detailed account of the gallery interviews at the Aga Khan Museum. As I 
laid out in the Introductory Chapter, my working hypothesis is that, when figuration is 
present in an object, it tends to draw viewers’ attention away from any visual pattern that 
may also be there.22 I also posit that it is not fruitful to approach pattern as a language – 
corresponding its smaller and larger units to language’s phonemes and morphemes – 
because that is not how viewers think about it when they come upon it in a gallery object. 
I have cited how pattern’s transcultural and transmedial nature makes it a meta-medium 
according to Were (3), or, in Epelboin’s terminology, “un métalangage non-verbal 
transculturel” (150), but I do not find it useful to attach “meta” to pattern or its 
descriptors, for this puts it at one remove from its materiality. I want to keep pattern in 
this study firmly grounded and entwined with its material manifestations, its objects. I 
hypothesize that this more holistic view of pattern is closer to viewers’ actual experience. 
In order to give credence to my two hypotheses, I have needed to see if there was any 
evidence of them in peoples’ actual responses to the art on display in the gallery. The 
Aga Khan Museum Permanent Gallery has proved to be a rich source of these responses.  
 
22 This hypothesis stems from my extensive experience in studying patterns plus my observations 
of peoples’ responses to works of art in museum galleries. 
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I begin the chapter with a description of the Aga Khan Museum as the research 
site, followed by a discussion of my subjectivity in the situation. I outline the typical 
gallery experience, then pick out the three main object types – textiles, paintings, and 
digital objects, and their examples – and my reasons for choosing them as the objects I 
would ask people about. Then I take the reader through my research sample for the 
interviews I conducted, my findings from the interviews, and my analysis and 
interpretation of the data I collected. Where it is relevant, I direct the reader’s attention to 
my application of grounded theory and situational analysis methodologies, and point out 
the coding, memoing, and mapmaking activities I have undertaken in NVivo to help me 
with my analysis. 
The Aga Khan Museum 
In Chapter One, I conceptualized the Aga Khan Museum as a prototype and asked 
what it may be a prototype of. My social worlds map (figure 23) pictures the actors in the 
Museum situation as a diagrammatic response to that question. I omit the large numbers 
of schoolchildren who come to the site regularly, since I did not include them in my 
study. On the map, the Museum is both a material actor – as the physical building –and a 
conceptual actor – as the repository for all the beliefs, plans, and designs of all the actors 
who contributed to its making and contribute to its acting in the world today. I note here 
that the two Museums I portray are really one – that is, how the building is constructed 
and laid out has a powerful magnetic pull on the actors who come in and out of it. This is 
in line with my positioning of situational analysis as incorporating both theory and 
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method, and with my philosophical view of form and material as not separate from each 
other but rather interacting in a field of forces. Conversely, in a series of deeply 
reciprocal relationships, the beliefs, plans, and designs of the Museum’s actors are 
incarnated within the building and steeped into its very walls.  
If I were able to represent the social worlds map as three-dimensional and 
animated, it would be continually moving, with the circles of actors, human and 
otherwise, moving into, through, and out of the blue sphere representing the Museum. 
The circles move farther in and farther out corresponding to their function: curatorial and 
administrative staff are more invested in the Museum, for example, than independent 
contractors, and casual visitors are the least invested of all agents represented on the map. 
As well, there are important conceptual actors that touch the human actors in varying 
degrees of influence: the Museum was conceived of and built under the aegis of the Aga 
Khan, the hereditary leader of the Ismaili Muslims, to house his family’s art collection 
and to provide an important cultural centre for the Canadian people. The Museum 
building is sited on a tract of land in Toronto, Canada that also contains the Ismaili 
Centre and the Aga Khan Park. Therefore, Islam is a conceptual actor that touches some 
of the circles, and Ismailism is within it, moving with it, and touching many of the same 
actors. However, it must be noted that the Aga Khan Museum is a museum of Islamic, 
not Ismaili, art, and that visitors and invested actors may be Ismaili, Muslim, of another 
faith group, or of no faith group. 
I have referred to “thing theory” as a way of envisioning objects as constituting 
knowledge in addition to reflecting it. In this sense, the objects on the social worlds map 
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are material actors that touch human actors, again in varying degrees. Some actors, for 
example the front-of-house volunteers and staff, have no or minimal interaction with the 
objects in the galleries. For other actors in the Museum the interaction with the objects is 
constant and sustained. This kind of interaction characterizes the casual visitors whom I 
interviewed: they come to see the objects, they seek them out, and they pay close 
attention to them. 
Researcher Subjectivity 
I count myself as one of the human actors who had a small part in the realization 
of the Museum, having acted as its first Education Manager for four years before its 
opening to the public. In addition, I am on the social worlds map as the researcher and 
interviewer, since, as I wrote in the Introductory Chapter, I am a co-producer of the views 
expressed by the interview respondents. My role is accurately defined in the following 
statement by Clarke et al, “The researcher is designer, actor, interviewer, observer, 
interpreter, co-constructor of data, writer, ultimate arbiter of the accounts proffered, and 
to be held accountable for those accounts” (35). I view my subjectivity or reflexivity in 
the study as an analytic resource rather than a complication of my point of view; 
everything that has made me is what I can bring, as participant and researcher, to the 
study.  
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The Gallery Experience 
I embarked upon the interviews with certain assumptions about how visitors 
perceive and make sense of pattern on or in the objects in the gallery. The museum space 
is highly structured and mediated by several factors: first, technologies of display – for 
example, where to walk, stand, or sit, the casework, the lighting, and viewers’ proximity 
to the object – have a pronounced effect on the perception and cognition of patterns; 
second, technologies of interpretation accompanying objects – for example text and 
digital interactives – enhance or confound visitors’ responses. As evidenced by my 
recounting below of a “typical” gallery experience, I view this gallery as evincing an 
atmosphere of solemnity, verging on sacredness, from the low light levels, the fact that 
the space is set apart from the rest of the museum, and from the mostly precious nature of 
the objects themselves. This specialness then attaches to all the objects, including the 
patterned ones, even if they had mundane functions in their original lives. Of course, 
visitors’ own level of pattern literacy – their knowledge of cultural histories – also has an 
effect on how they receive the patterns that they see. 
When a gallery visitor comes into the Permanent Collection Gallery, she opens 
double doors and turns left into a darkened corridor with a giant animation playing in a 
loop against one long wall. The eight-and-a-half-minute animation (figures 2 and 3) is a 
series of vectorized renderings of gallery objects that seem to redraw them in real time. 
An invisible artist’s pen draws and writes lines, patterns, and inscriptions, and fills shapes 
with colours. Many geometric designs are recomposed from scratch and then fade into 
photographs of the objects that they are on, mostly architectural fragments or painted 
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manuscript illustrations. As she walks down the corridor, the viewer can see 
demonstrated on the wall how a particular design, pattern, figurative scene, or 
calligraphic panel is structured. In addition, she can see it in hugely enhanced scale – the 
animation makes it possible to see clearly details that would be very hard to see in the 
dimly lit gallery. 
Having traversed the animation corridor, the visitor emerges into the gallery 
proper (see figure 12, the gallery floor plan), and sees on the north wall a large world 
map with spots of light going on and off in different regions to indicate successive 
dynastic periods in Islamic history. The gallery is structured along roughly chronological 
lines, so the earliest Qur’an folios and manuscripts are in cases directly in front of the 
map. Other objects of glass, metalwork, textile, and wood are arranged in cases, 
interspersed with cases holding different kinds of manuscripts. The layout of the gallery 
guides the visitor to walk in one direction, spending relatively more or less time perusing 
the cases of objects as she walks, and reading the text panels and labels. In time, she 
comes to a right turn and follows it, as the panels, texts, and objects proceed 
chronologically through successive regions and civilizations, to end with objects and 
paintings from eighteenth-century India and nineteenth-century Iran. Finally, she exits the 
gallery through double doors, walking back out into the main atrium.  
The Three Main Object Types and Examples  
In the large, L-shaped gallery which I have just described, there are some key 
object types that I selected to concentrate on for the interviews: these are textiles, 
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paintings, an architectural fragment, and some virtual objects, including the introductory 
animation. The exact objects differed in the two periods of my interviews (see table 1), 
mainly due to regular gallery rotations. I have already introduced the objects and the 
gallery floor plan in Chapter One (figures 4-12) and made a case for giving a general 
precedence to textiles in the objects I chose to ask interview respondents about. Here I 
would also note that the transmediality of patterns is strongly evidenced in textiles from 
Islamic visual and material cultures. In fact, in a highly influential essay titled “The 
Draped Universe of Islam,” Lisa Golombek maintains that “textiles in Islamic society 
fulfilled more than the functions normally expected of them in other societies. This 
obsession with textiles, if one may call it so, can account for some of the major 
characteristics of Islamic art in general” (25). Golombek goes on to substantiate her thesis 
by presenting six proofs, all of which are abundantly in evidence in the objects of the 
AKM Permanent Gallery. While she does not use the term “transmediality,” her proofs 
all illustrate it: whether shown in linguistic or visual ways, whether the patterns are lacy 
or interlaced, she argues for a “textile mentality” in which “bookbindings, wood carving, 
architectural faience, and Koran pages all look like carpets” (36).  
The gallery objects in the context of their display are, in situational analysis 
terms, my visual discourse materials. I undertake here to provide short descriptions of 
them and to rationalise my choices. For reference, the gallery label texts are in Appendix 
A. First, the Central Asian robes on a platform in the middle of the gallery (figure 4) are 
examples of woven, ikat-dyed, and embroidered garments made in Central Asia in the 
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nineteenth century.23 In a catalogue of the Marshall and Marilyn J. Wolf collection from 
which the robes were borrowed, Ernst J. Grube explains that they were made for special 
occasions, “like wedding dowries and furnishings for the bridal bed, fittings for horsemen 
and their horses, and the general embellishment of reception rooms and places where 
rulers and their court, or the women or the elders of a clan gathered” (3) but gives no 
more details about their use or symbolic significance, preferring to focus on aesthetics 
and historic details. Susan Meller fills in Grube’s sketch, indicating the talismanic nature 
of much of the robes’ patterns, especially of the triangles or tumars that appeared on 
many of them, echoing motifs on the women’s jewelry (123).  
The embroidered hangings called suzanis that replaced the robes in 2018 (figures 
6 and 7) are from roughly the same time and place, nineteenth-century Central Asia. Like 
the robes, they are used for special occasions such as weddings, and like the robes, their 
surfaces are embroidered or woven with auspicious embroidered motifs. According to 
Meller, 
One small area was often left unfinished . . . Central Asian women were loathe to 
arouse the jealousy of the evil eye. Auspicious symbols, each bearing various 
meanings – such as pomegranates (fertility), birds (happiness), water vessels 
(purity), teapots (hospitality), and tumars (protective amulets) – were often 
integrated into the patterns. The borders themselves served as protective devices 
to keep out jinns (165).  
 
23 For more information about the robes, I direct the reader to an online exhibition I created at 
http://omeka.library.yorku.ca/exhibits/show/like-a-butterflys-wing 
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In another passage, Meller writes more specifically about the borders and fringes, 
“Evil spirits were thought to gain access to a person through the opening of their clothes, 
so trimming was sewn around all the edges as a preventative measure” (105). In the 
gallery text for the robes, there is no mention of their talismanic aspects, although all of 
them feature fringe and intricately woven border trims. 
The second object type that I chose was exemplified in the first interview period 
(2017) by a large oil painting on the west wall of the gallery. It is a painting of Fath Ali 
Shah, a ruler in nineteenth-century Iran (figure 5). The figure of the Shah is realistic, 
although there is a striking distortion of perspective in his position and that of the throne 
upon which he is seated. The background is minimal, but the figure’s robe and 
accessories and the throne are intricately patterned, to the extent that the figure seems 
indistinguishable from the throne. In my second interview period (2018) the painting had 
been removed from the west wall, and I replaced it in my object list with a case of 15th- 
and 16th-century Persian manuscripts of stories and poems whose illustrations, again, 
feature patterned and figurative elements in combination (figures 8 and 9). 
Third, the mosaic panel (figure 11) was an addition in the second interview 
period. Including it in my questions entailed walking with interview respondents back 
through the gallery to an earlier section, an intervention that I was hesitant to make at 
first, but one to which respondents readily agreed.  
The fourth object type is digital, exemplified mainly by the large, immersive 
introductory animation at the entrance to the gallery (figures 2 and 3). In 2018 an iPad 
had been added to the alcove of sixteenth- and seventeenth- century manuscript 
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illustrations of the Persian epic The Shahnameh (figure 10). The iPad shows a selection 
of the illustrations overlaid by a virtual magnifying glass which can be moved by the user 
over different areas to highlight details. Neither the animation not the iPad have label 
texts. 
In summary, why did I choose these particular objects as my discourse materials? 
My rationale stems from my attempts to find relationships among them, whether through 
materials, designs, or stories – to find their transmediality, in other words. My attempts 
raised questions and I looked to the interview respondents for answers. I already had 
tentative answers to my questions, supported by the literature I had surveyed: in the first 
interview period, I saw a clear relationship between the Central Asian robes and the large 
painting on the west wall, since both are richly patterned and both feature items of 
clothing. It also helped that both robes and painting were prominent and colourful, real 
attention-getters – and big things, in a gallery filled with small things. In the second 
interview period, the switch on the central platform from robes to suzanis was a positive 
one for my study, since the suzanis are from the same cultural milieu as the robes, but 
their function is not as clothing; therefore, they are arguably more abstract in nature. A 
viewer cannot use the category “clothing” as a means by which to understand them, and 
the gallery text (Appendix A) mentions nothing about the suzanis’ function. What 
alternate category might the viewer refer to as a substitute? 
By the same token, the mosaic panel (figure 11) looks like nothing other than a 
piece of pattern. Like so much in the gallery, it is a fragment of something bigger. What 
is the hook, or, channeling Gell, the barb or spike that would pull the viewer in? In this 
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case, the label (Appendix A) prompts the viewer to look for similarities to the fountain 
nearby. 
As for the digital objects, the animation is an impressionistic sequence of images 
that slowly transform into objects as they appear to be drawn by an invisible hand. The 
images appear and disappear on one side of a darkened corridor that visitors must 
traverse in order to reach the main gallery. How do these dreamlike visions affect them? 
I interject here a general comment about object labelling in the Permanent 
Gallery: as is the common practice in art and ethnographic museums, text labels for 
material objects vary from the minimal listing of place, period, materials, and techniques, 
to a few paragraphs of commentary about the objects. The label form can be regarded as 
a kind of paratext, used to fill in important details about an object that would not be 
apparent from looking at it. In the AKM permanent gallery the labelling tends toward the 
minimally informative with an emphasis on aesthetics and historiography rather than 
insightful interpretation or narratology. Since the animation and the iPad are given no 
labels at all, they could be considered paratexts themselves, since they contain 
interpretive information about the objects, albeit not in textual format. I have approached 
them as objects and gathered respondents’ views of them, but their stance as paratexts – 
as supplementary and interpretive devices – increases their complexity, for it pushes them 
into the realm of the possibility space where the user is confronted by the objects in 
virtual, not actual, space.   
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Research Sample 
Chapter One contains a brief description of my research sample for the Aga Khan 
Museum interviews and my method of approaching visitors to the Permanent Gallery. 
Here, I add some demographic information about the forty-eight respondents, and 
thoughts about the differences and similarities between the three groups I interviewed: 
thirty-seven casual visitors, six contract teachers, and five volunteer tour guides. Figures 
35 and 36 are charts of demographic information about the respondents. Figure 35 shows 
the relative ages of respondents and figure 36 shows where they currently live. A young 
person is reckoned as under forty-five years of age, middle age is from forty-five to sixty-
five, and old age is over sixty-five. The charts demonstrate that the respondents’ genders 
– thirteen men compared to thirty-three women – and their places of habitation – 
overwhelmingly in Canada, with half the respondents living in Toronto – are strongly 
weighted in favour of women who live locally.  
The chart in figure 35 and my ongoing observations in the gallery concur with my 
overall impression that visitors to the Aga Khan Museum Permanent Gallery tend to be 
more women than men; however, recent tourism studies in Spain and Greece indicate that 
the percentage of men to women is more evenly balanced, although women still 
predominate (Antón et al. 1414; Mavragani 42). The findings in figure 36 can be partly 
explained by the fact that I asked respondents only where they are currently living, not 
their place of birth or ethnicity; however, I was surprised that in the summer, a high 
tourist season in Ontario, there were not more visitors from afar. In the context of my 
own study, I note here that I make no claim to universality or impartiality: the interview 
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demographics reflect who was in the gallery on those days, whom I decided to approach, 
and who agreed to talk to me. 
In addition to differences among the casual visitors, I encountered differences 
between the casual visitors and the contract teachers and tour guides. These differences 
arise from the fact that both latter groups are trained in what to include in the tours and 
programs they deliver to the public. As a result, over half of the teachers and tour guides I 
interviewed mentioned the “arabesque:”  
Well what are the themes in the gallery? To exhibit the art through the 
Muslim art but interacting with the regions they crossed through, 
especially the silk route. And adding on to that if you look at the books of 
Mansour and Ibn Sina for example, even books on geometry or medicine 
have this kind of iconography and they relate to the geometric patterns that 
you find in the Muslim art. So they kind of intertwine and they're very 
much related, the arts and what it is they are representing. So we are 
coming back to the first visual feast [the introductory animation], to the 
iconography, the calligraphy, the arabesque, and the geometric patterns 
(0021, AKM tour guide, older woman). 
“Arabesque” is a term invented by European writers such as Jones and Riegl in 
the nineteenth century to describe the vegetal repeat patterns they were seeing in Islamic 
art. As a word that belongs to a body of theorizing that is now regarded by Necipoğlu and 
other contemporary scholars as orientalist and reductive (‘Early Modern Floral’ 132), it is 
generally avoided by contemporary writers on pattern. It is for this reason that I did not 
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interview any more teachers and tour guides in my second round. I am happy to include 
them as respondents in my findings, since they spoke to me sincerely and often 
spontaneously of their responses to the gallery objects, but I realized that I was much 
more interested in the responses of the general public, who had not necessarily been told 
how to categorize the art, or at least not in the form of a script to use for gallery tours. 
Research Findings 
This section presents the findings that resulted from my process of interrogating 
and reflecting upon the interview data, aided by the codes, memos and maps I made in 
NVivo. The initial mind maps, “What viewers mention about the objects,” “What viewers 
mention about the animation,” and “Perceptions of the gallery experience” (figures 18-
20), provided the initial codes that I used to categorize the interview data. After my first 
pass through the transcriptions, I went back and read them a second time, and this time I 
opened the analysis up to include the set of codes I had used for the data in the literature 
(figures 13-17). By doing so, I began the process of comparison and evaluation that will 
be my concern in Chapter Five – although my focus here is the interview findings, the 
points of confluence are already apparent in the data. Appendix B has the results of an 
NVivo search of all codes that I applied to the interview texts in the study.  
By categorizing the data in terms of these codes, I have seen four larger themes 
emerge – or, following Clarke et al, sensitizing concepts – that clearly relate to the four 
relationships in the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter Three: pattern and 
visuality, pattern and materiality, pattern and virtuality, and pattern and narrative.  
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1. Pattern and visuality: the respondents mentioned the visual beauty of the 
objects they were asked about, relating this quality closely to colour and to 
pattern. 
2. Pattern and materiality: the respondents persistently related to the objects in 
terms of their materiality – the patterns were mentioned as being in and on 
objects. In other words, the object provides the portal to the patterns by 
making them visual and actual. 
3. Pattern and virtuality: a sense of fluidity and “coming into being” in 
relationships among objects was a recurring theme in the interview responses, 
especially in responses to the animation.  
4. Pattern and narrative: respondents expressed an awareness of objects’ 
histories and how it connects to their own histories through stories – the 
objects’ stories and the viewers’ stories. 
Table 2 shows the thirty most frequently used codes in my data analysis. It is 
colour-coded: codes that highlight visuality are in purple, materiality in blue, virtuality in 
red, and narrative in green. Thus, the conceptual framework that I articulate in Chapter 
Three also underpins my findings from the interviews; this framework is diagrammed in 
the concept map, “What matters most about patterns to respondents” (figure 22).  
What follows is a discussion of each finding accompanied by passages from the 
interviews. I will use the chart in table 2 as a guide in my discussion.  
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Code # Mentions coded 
Artist's process in the animation 10 
Relationship among objects through patterns 10 
Semiosis, symbolism, meaning 10 
Imagescape versus surfacescape 10 
Tile 10 
How the object is_was used 11 
Movement in the animation 11 
Labels 12 
Islamic art 12 
Spatial aspects 15 
Embodied cognition in a museum exhibition 15 
Viewer histories and narratives 17 
Calligraphy 17 
How the object might feel 17 
Object motif 18 
Folding and unfolding 18 
Clothing 19 
Object design elements 20 
Ceramic 22 
Geometric pattern 23 
Figuration in objects 24 
Textile 25 
Object histories 32 
Gallery themes 34 
Object colour 37 
Narrative elements in objects 38 
Object pattern 38 
Relationship among objects through design 40 
How the object was made 40 
Beauty 43 
Table 2: The top thirty codes from an NVivo search run on interview texts, in order from 
smaller to larger number of mentions.  
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First, I report on my findings in each theme with the help of NVivo queries and 
then I reflect on what the finding might mean for this research situation. By giving a 
voice to the respondents in their own words, I seek to illuminate aspects of the 
subject/object encounter that I have identified as my concern in the study. By including at 
times my questions as the interviewer, I establish the interview process as a conversation, 
an exchange of ideas and impressions that is always bidirectional.  
Theme One: Visuality 
Of the forty-seven respondents, thirty-three mentioned the beauty of the objects; 
fifteen mentioned both beauty and pattern. In a similar numerical comparison of object 
beauty and colour, nineteen mentioned both beauty and colour.  
Code # Mentions 
Islamic art 12 
Object motif 18 
Object design elements 20 
Geometric pattern 23 
Object colour 37 
Object pattern 38 
Beauty 43 
Table 3: Frequent codes related to visuality in the interview texts. 
As well as tabulating numbers of respondents who mentioned certain terms or 
concepts, it is possible in NVivo to discover how many mentions there are of a term or 
concept, sometimes multiple times in one interview. For clarity, the chart in table 3 lists 
the number of mentions coded to terms that I selected as noteworthy for pattern’s 
relationship to visuality because of the way they are linked in the interviews, sometimes 
in the same breath. The following passage expresses the closeness of these terms: 
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Interviewer: my focus is how people are making sense of the art, how 
they’re responding to it, so really its very open-ended – but one thing I’ve 
been asking is if the [Central Asian] robes could talk what would they be 
saying, what would they be talking about? 
Respondent: Singly, or –  
Interviewer: Or in a group. 
Respondent: The history is fairly murky, because of the age, the time, 
some of the violence that would have existed. But these are colourful 
beautiful patterns. They have a sense of tranquillity, not like the violence 
that was all around them. So it was almost that you could wrap yourself up 
in it and it would keep you warm but maybe also mentally there’s a sense 
of protection there. (0010, older man).  
This comment is striking not only by the way the visitor puts beauty, colour, and 
pattern together, but also for his attempt to link these qualities to the purpose of such 
patterns: that they are meant for protection in a violent time. A similar combining of 
themes in a response is typical of many of the interviewees’ comments, as seen in the 
following passage: 
Interviewer: These robes, what are your impressions of them? 
Respondent: What I'm struck by is the colours, what good condition 
they're in. It's such a fragile material yet they're in such fabulous 
condition. This one for example is almost contemporary. You can picture 
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someone walking down the street wearing that robe. Their aesthetic 
beauty. 
Interviewer: If they could speak, what do you think they would speak of? 
Or what is doing the expressing in them? 
Respondent: I find the patterns are doing the expressing. Even the wear 
that you find on them can be doing the expressing. Particularly with the 
older ones, they always have this wearing on the back of the robe. We 
don't really know why it's destroyed on the back versus the front. Maybe 
they were buried in it, so you see the wearing on the back. It’s cut for a 
person who’s a horseback rider, so maybe they were thrown off the horse. 
Or maybe it's the way it was stored. 
Interviewer: They were stored in such a way that only one part hit the 
light.  
Respondent: They speak about experiences, many different types of 
experiences. (0017, AKM teacher, young woman) 
In this comment, the respondent moves from the robes’ beauty to their materiality 
as she imagines the life of a robe, its stresses and wear marks, and later, its life as an item 
in a storage closet or a museum vault. This passage thus can be read as an observation on 
the object’s visuality entwined with its materiality, and their relationship to pattern. It 
highlights the expressive force of the surface of an object: its surfacescape, to borrow a 
term from Hay (Sensuous Surfaces 67). Its expressive force can come from pattern, but it 
can also come from wear.  
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Theme Two: Materiality 
Of the forty-seven respondents, thirty-two made some mention of the objects’ 
materiality, with a comment about how the object was made or used, or about its physical 
attributes and its materials, or with a combination of these comments. The chart in table 4 
isolates only those codes related to the materiality of the objects. 
Code # Mentions 
Tile 10 
How the object is_was used 11 
Spatial aspects 15 
Embodied cognition in a museum exhibition 15 
How the object might feel 17 
Clothing 19 
Ceramic 22 
Textile 25 
How the object was made 40 
Table 4: Frequent codes related to materiality in the interview texts. 
The codes in table 4 show respondents’ fascination with making, especially in the 
absence of any figuration depicted on objects. In the case of the robes, for example, their 
fabrication was raised in many interviews. The following passage illustrates this 
fascination: 
Interviewer: Is there anything you see in them [the suzanis (figure 6)] 
that’s familiar to you from what you see in the gallery? Any bigger 
themes? 
Respondent: I do see the patterns, I’ve seen tiles with these. 
Interviewer: Anything else you’re curious about, wish you knew more 
about? 
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Respondent: I'd be really interested in knowing how they made these types 
of things. Nowadays we have like machines and everything, but back then 
many years ago you’d have to be very skilled, how many years would you 
have to practice to produce something like this, how expensive are these 
things, I’d be interested to know (0039, young man, 2018). 
Other codes in the table indicate the concrete nature of respondents’ observations. 
Tiles, ceramics, clothing and textiles are frequently mentioned. The latter types can no 
doubt be accounted for by the fact that I specifically asked them for their thoughts about 
items of clothing, but when I asked them what other objects they were reminded of, they 
were free to note anything they had encountered, and frequently connected the object 
they were looking at to ceramics, whether tiles or crockery, or to architectural pieces. In 
the following excerpt, a three-way conversation ensues about the painting of Fath Ali 
Shah (figure 5):  
Respondent one: I love it. It’s very stylized, you know that it has been 
done according to rules. There is no freedom of the artist who painted it, 
he has done it according to predetermined rules. But within that 
predetermination is fantastic style. But the background doesn’t go at all 
with this ornate chair and costume. It’s another style, different colours, 
another era. So I cannot integrate – you know, there’s three things here: 
the background, the costume and chair, and the beard. And I can’t 
integrate the three of them. 
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Interviewer: That is fantastic. Thank you. Do you see anything in this 
painting in the rest of the gallery? Are you making connections between 
what you see here and what is all around you in the galleries? Are there 
any things that join up for you? 
Respondent one: Um no. Nataley? 
Respondent two: I’m struck by the similarity of the patterns on his clothes 
and the chair. The chair looks like the inlay in some of the boxes earlier, 
and tilework, the fountain back there…. 
Interviewer: there is this thread that’s running through all of the artworks 
and even in the screens I just noticed as I was looking, as I was asking 
you, I looked over at the screens and thought, yeah, it’s there too. 
Respondent two: The geometry. 
Respondent one: The geometry, the patterns. I find this painting really 
interesting because as I said, there are these three things going on and 
they’re not really integrated (0005, older woman and young woman). 
In a sense, every moment of every interview is an instance of the code “embodied 
cognition in a museum exhibition,” since one needs to be an incarnated being to be in the 
gallery at all, feeling and seeing and having an experience. Therefore, I narrowed the 
parameters of this code to include what I call “active looking,” where a respondent 
mentions using their body to maneuver into a better position for viewing the object, as in 
this excerpt about the Fath Ali Shah painting: 
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If I wasn’t up close I would not be able to tell that it was special, I would 
think it was just regular clothing, but when I move closer I see that it was 
thoughtfully done, every piece was thoughtfully put in there (0009, young 
man). 
In considering how interviewees respond to patterned objects’ materiality, it is 
noteworthy that they are also responding to the space they are in, a space which is itself 
an enormous, walkable patterned object. Moreover, this particular one is embellished 
with patterns like the ones they are seeing in the art. Some respondents make comments 
about this, for example in the following passage:  
Respondent: I also think lighting in the museum is very interesting. I was 
reading about the concept of nour, emulating the concept of light, looking 
at the building from afar it expresses that, but going into the gallery it is 
very dim, obviously because you don’t want to damage the art, these little 
punctures in the wall [referring to the punctured skylights] – I think it 
would be really interesting to see how it changes throughout the day. I'm 
used to the dim lighting in museums that depict non-Western art, with a 
kind of exoticism, orientalism, and this museum doesn’t have that feeling.  
Interviewer: I'm interested because I get that impression too. It is a 
modernist building. What do think about the space outside the gallery? 
Respondent: I like the idea of the courtyard which is an Islamic 
characteristic combined with a modernist building. The combination of the 
176 
 
old and the new. Islamic art is often relegated to the past, so the fact that it 
is in a modernist building that’s amazing. 
Respondents’ attention to the objects’ materiality is illustrated by another code, 
“How the object is / was used.” Assumptions about the object are strongly affected by 
display strategies, including placement, orientation, space around objects, and orientation. 
One respondent was misled by the way the suzanis were arranged on a low incline into 
thinking they were carpets: 
I don’t know if they are carpets, at first I thought so, but then looking 
closer, are they bedspreads, or textiles that should be on the wall? My 
initial reaction from the cue of the natural light was that they were 
something to lounge on (0035, Middle-aged woman, 2018). 
Theme Three: Virtuality 
As I outlined earlier, my pattern of questions emphasized relationships among 
objects in the gallery. Many interviewees responded with depictions of these 
relationships, and their depictions were based mainly on relationships through design. 
Code # Mentions  
Artist's process in the animation 10 
Relationship among objects through patterns 10 
Movement in the animation 11 
Folding and unfolding 18 
Relationship among objects through design 40 
Table 5: Frequent codes related to virtuality in the interview texts. 
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Table 5 lists forty responses, the third highest number in the list of the top thirty 
responses (table 2), compared to ten responses specifying relationships through pattern, 
and seven responses for relationships through narrative. 
Thus, the notion of relationship among objects is a strong theme in the interviews – 
actively promoted, I have to say, by my questioning. In the literature, this kind of 
relationship is termed transmediality by Dewdney, Kidd, and Necipoğlu among 
others, because the evidence of the relationship is its appearance on a specific 
medium. Pattern is cited as an important vector of transmediality. In the interview 
exchanges, pattern is mentioned as moving through and among objects in a 
transmedial way, although the specific term is not used by respondents.  
In this theme, I focus on the animation and the iPad as virtual elements in the sense 
that they are digital technologies. As I mentioned in Chapter Three, in this study I am 
always working with a double meaning for virtual: first, Deleuze’s meaning and 
second, “virtual” as another term for “digital.” In my view, they both exemplify the 
possibility space, the space of folding and unfolding, of shifting in and out of 
becoming, as this excerpt illustrates: 
Interviewer: Did you notice the animation when you came in? What did 
you think of it?  
Respondent: It was interesting, it was cool, especially the way the colours 
were spreading. You mean the reflection, the projection, right? It was nice. 
Interviewer: Did you feel that it was a good introduction to the gallery? 
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Respondent: Kind of. I really didn’t thought [sic] about anything else, I 
was just walking – it was cool, like it comes from nothing to something 
like within minutes. 
Interviewer: That’s a nice way to put it. 
Respondent: I didn’t stay there for too long, just walked by it (0027, older 
woman). 
With the code “folding and unfolding,” I captured all the comments in the 
interviews about the phenomenon of “becoming” in the animation. Just as, in Theme 
Two: Materiality, every comment comes out of embodied cognition, in this theme every 
comment on the artist’s process, relationships, or movement could be interpreted as a 
comment about folding and unfolding, manifesting and disappearing from sight, for this 
is what the animation appears to do. More than one visitor was taken aback by this, as the 
next passage shows:  
That was beautiful. I found it quite dizzying though. It was as though 
someone was sketching it as you were watching it, and the colours and 
how all the flowers and the animals came up, but I found I couldn’t stand 
and watch it for too long. It was dizzying (0018, Older woman). 
Theme Four: Narrative 
Theme four addresses the role of narrative in the subject / patterned museum 
object encounter. Table 6 lists the codes related to narrative in the interview texts. 
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Code # Mentions 
Semiosis, symbolism, meaning 10 
Imagescape versus surfacescape 10 
Labels 12 
Viewer histories and narratives 17 
Calligraphy 17 
Figuration in objects 24 
Object histories 32 
Gallery themes 34 
Narrative elements in objects 38 
Table 6: Frequent codes related to narrative in the interview texts. 
I assumed going into the interviews that the theme of the objects and respondents’ 
histories would be the most strongly related of the four themes to figuration. To be sure, 
figuration in the objects seems to draw out stories, and when figuration is present, 
respondents go straight to the narrative – the imagescape, to use Hay’s term, as opposed 
to the surfacescape or material and design elements of the object. However, my findings 
indicate that visual patterns on objects also inspire respondents’ stories, as I will make 
clear in this section. 
The effect that figuration has on what viewers notice is most pronounced in the 
responses to the Fath Ali Shah painting, perhaps because the figure in that painting is so 
arresting. Most respondents do not comment on the painting’s materiality – unlike the 
comments about the robes, no one mentions what a lot of work it must have been to paint 
it – and the responses focus on the power of the figure and the richness of the jewels 
surrounding him, regardless of the fact that the canvas is packed, not with jewels, but 
with abstract mosaic patterns painted in oil paint with a brush. The perspective changes 
when a respondent moves in to look at it closely: 
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Interviewer: Looking at it strictly visually, is there anything about it that 
strikes you? 
Respondent: I'm struck by the amount of adornment. The jewelry, the 
headpiece, the chair. He must have meant so much to the people. 
Interviewer: How does the painting change up close? 
Respondent: Now my viewpoint is shifted from focusing on the jewels and 
the adornment, to the fabrication of the patterns, the intricacies, they're 
probably symbolic too, why that flower was designed like that and placed 
in that position (0026, Young woman). 
The effect of figuration in an object thus appears to take away the sense of its 
presence as an object, to take the focus of attention away from its surfacescape – the 
resonances of its sensory aspects– in favour of its imagescape – the history and the story. 
In the process, patterns are perceived, not as patterns, but as what they might depict. The 
patterns in the painting are perceived as jewels, with all that they suggest of opulence, 
wealth, and power – the viewer makes that leap. 
Many respondents were moved by the figuration to cite their cultural background 
as a response to the objects, as in this passage: 
Respondent: This is the one I came to look for.  
Interviewer: Really, why? 
Respondent: I don’t know if you’ve heard of our diamond jubilee 
celebrations, for the Ismaili Muslims. When we were being addressed by 
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our Imam, he had this exact same painting in his house, and it was one of 
the pieces that were being displayed when we were watching it live. 
Interviewer: I think this Shah is an ancestor of his.  
Respondent: This is Fathi Ali Shah. This Shah is the one who got the title 
Aga Khan and it has continued through the four Imams that came after 
him (0026, Young woman). 
However, as I maintained earlier, just as many respondents spoke about their own 
histories in relation to the robes, mentioning their colours and their patterns. One 
respondent used pattern as opposed to figuration as a way of understanding an object, in 
this case the mosaic panel: 
Respondent: Well the architect in me is automatically drawn to all these 
pieces here, my heritage, my dad was from Hyderabad, India, so we've got 
a Mughal empire kind of in our background, so growing up we had 
snippets of that, so this kind of architectural element combined with my 
background, plus my British mother’s interest in geometric pattern, all 
these other outside influences draw my eye to the more architectural 
pieces in the room. So this piece specifically, I was appreciating it because 
of the fact that there are three arches, I don’t even know what this is 
particularly. 
Interviewer: It's not known, I don’t think. 
Respondent: The combination of the pieces, the colours, the geometric 
pattern, then I would probably want to know where is it from, so I would 
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go to the label then stand back here again (0035, Middle-aged woman, 
2018). 
One respondent was even moved by the mosaic panel to give a detailed 
interpretation of its relation to the ancient religion of Mithraism: 
Interviewer: So if art is communication, what is this piece saying to you? 
Respondent: if it was in an Iranian mosque, this type of design shows what 
we call shamseh, lights of the sun. Lights of the sun have the rays. If you 
go to a mosque, I could show you. But if the prayer goes here, if you go to 
the mihrab –  
Interviewer: Yes, on the qibla wall. 
Respondent: the leader of the prayer stands there and the other people 
follow him. The mihrab shows the light of creation. Mihrabs come from 
an older religion than Islam. It goes to Mithraism. Mirthra means sun. it is 
an old religion. In Islamic art you can see the shamseh. In old Persian it 
means sun. 
Interviewer: does Mithraism predate Zoroastrianism? 
Respondent: Zoroastrianism doesn’t have a specific time because some 
scientists believe 8,000 years. Very different timing, but for Mithraism the 
timing is more fixed: 290 years before Jesus. Mithra is an Iranian prophet. 
Most temples are in Iran. Even the last supper is a Mithraism tradition, not 
a Jesus tradition. 
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Interviewer: you’re talking about the symbolism here, so what about these 
stars? Do they figure into the symbolism as well? 
Respondent: this is shamseh, rays of sun, this is a Mithraism symbol that 
entered Islam and the Muslims think they developed this symbol, but they 
did not (0042, Older man, 2018). 
Besides the figuration and the pattern, there are other vectors of communication in 
the gallery that visitors look to for information and insights: gallery texts and the 
inscriptions and writing on some of the objects. There are two codes in table 6 that refer 
to the textual aspects of stories: “labels” and “calligraphy.” In these codes I categorized 
interviewees comments about the texts they encountered in the gallery. In the code 
“labels” I collected interviewees’ responses to the gallery didactics and object labels they 
encountered. My purpose was not to evaluate the texts as interpretive devices, but to 
understand viewers’ responses to them as paratexts in support of the visual, material, 
virtual, and narrative qualities of the objects themselves. Because of the particular style 
of the gallery texts in the Permanent Gallery – more concerned, as I have noted, with 
aesthetics and historiography than interpretation – I found that visitors’ curiosity about 
the objects tended to be deflected by the label writing. One respondent, a tour guide, 
expresses it this way, 
Interviewer: Do you find visitors are picking up on the themes in the 
gallery? 
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Respondent: I think there's a huge difference between a tour and someone 
who’s just walking through on their own. We don’t know because we 
don’t engage with just people. 
Interviewer: That’s what I've been doing, and I’ll share my results with the 
Museum. 
Respondent: People after the tour say they never would have known by 
reading the labels (0032, AKM tour guide, middle-aged woman). 
My analysis of the second code, calligraphy, is more fruitful. Calligraphy is one 
of the highest art forms of Islamic societies, and there is quite a lot of it on objects in the 
gallery. Respondents commented on it in various ways – although none of them 
mentioned that they were able to read the Arabic and Persian scripts, they noticed the 
calligraphy as a significant feature of the art on display. In Chapter Two I made note of 
Elkin’s comments on the interrelationship of calligraphy and pattern, and although I do 
not have the expertise to analyze the relationship in detail for this study, I am aware that 
the closeness of these two forms is in evidence in many objects in the gallery, with script 
accompanying pattern and even sometimes acting as pattern.24 Indeed, as I continued to 
code, memo, and map my interview data, it struck me that when I am referring to 
“language,” I really mean “writing.” In light of this new insight, the respondents’ 
 
24 There is a vast literature addressing the relationship between calligraphy and ornament. For 
example, the reader is directed to the edited collection of essays, Word of God, Art of Man: The Qur’an and 
its Creative Expressions (Suleman), The Mediation of Ornament (Grabar), and “Inscription: On the Surface 
of Exchange Between Writing, Ornament, and Tectonics” (Sarkis). 
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comments about the presence of calligraphy on the objects comes more sharply into 
focus. 
The gallery objects are full of writing; the visitor meets it first in the animation. If 
a viewer does not understand the languages, the tendency is to view the writing, 
especially the many short inscriptions, as patterns, for the similarities are many. Border 
patterns are linear, and so are border inscriptions. One respondent points this out: 
Interviewer: Did you pick up anything that reminded you of that animation 
as you were going through the gallery? 
Respondent: Now that you say, yes. So the idea of the beams and the 
motifs on the beams, and things in a linear fashion, things would be like 
that.  
Interviewer: So you noticed some similarities between what was on the 
animation and what was on the beams.  
Respondent: Yeah. And what was on the tiles. 
Interviewer: So when you say designs, what kind of designs do you mean? 
Respondent: So ok what I noticed walking in, it wasn’t any scripts, it was, 
not a star per se, it looked like a beetlenut leaf, and for instance like that 
idea (0004, Young woman). 
Summary 
I return now to the hypotheses I set out in the beginning of the chapter to reflect 
on their validity in light of my findings. Articulating them as questions provides a 
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framework for my interrogation of the data I collected in the gallery. First, is figuration 
indeed given more attention than pattern by viewers? Second, is there any evidence in the 
interview data that visual patterns are indeed communicating meanings, and is it therefore 
valid to use words like “discursivity” and “transmedial” to describe their method of 
communication?  
The first question is easier to formulate an answer to than the second. My finding 
is that the respondents do not talk about theories and concepts; they make concrete 
observations. When they look at patterned objects, they talk of them as objects – their 
beauty, their colour, and their making. When they look at figurative works, even if those 
works feature significant patterns as well, they go immediately to the stories they 
perceive in them, either real or imagined. Therefore, I posit in answer to this question that 
I have found a tendency in respondents’ perceptions for visual pattern to take a 
background position if there is any figuration in the object. If there is no figuration, as is 
the case with the robes, suzanis, and the mosaic panel, respondents come up with a 
different story about them. Their speculations about how the object was made or used 
may be regarded as kinds of stories, but they are always grounded in the objects qua 
objects. The robes have no figuration, but they are items of clothing, so that is what was 
noticed and remarked upon. The suzanis are not clothing but their display was on a 
platform with a low incline, so they were called carpets. In contrast, figuration has a story 
that is not connected to its housing – the tiny, intricately painted daubs in the Fath Ali 
Shah painting are seen as jewels, not paint.   
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My answer to the second question must be tempered by my understanding that of 
the gallery visitors I interviewed, while all were intelligent and no doubt many were 
pursuing intellectually demanding careers, none were theoreticians of art, galleries, or 
history, and none would be inclined to use specialized terms in their conversations with 
me. The clues I found suggesting a response to visual pattern in these terms are therefore 
my conjectures only.  
In the Introductory Chapter, I characterized visual patterns as types of transmedial 
guides for thinking/action. In this chapter, I have reported that interviewees responded 
positively to my questions about relationships among gallery objects, linking them 
predominantly through design elements. I take this to be evidence of their recognition of 
the transmediality of visual patterns as they jump categories fluidly and continually from 
textiles to tiles to architectural revetments, to the gallery structure itself. The effect of all 
this jumping, I would argue, is to situate pattern as constantly moving from virtual to 
actual space – it manifests in this or this object, always recognizably itself in any of its 
manifestations, while also being something more. I call that something more its 
transmediality, whose native state is not one of being instantiated in this or this object, 
but one of becoming, and whose place of residence is thus the possibility space of the 
virtual. The animation performs this condition of pattern by drawing it, by bringing it into 
being over and over again, and there are many mentions of this phenomenon in the 
interviews. 
Finally, I come back to the questions from Chapter One about the subject / 
patterned museum object encounter that is the topic of my study: what is the object 
188 
 
telling the subject to do or think or be? What is the subject telling the object to do or 
think or be? As Bal and Bryson write,  
Standing somewhat to one side of the work of interpretations, semiotics 
has as its object to describe the conventions and conceptual operations that 
shape what viewers do – whether those viewers are art historians, art 
critics, or the crowd of spectators attending an exhibition (184). 
In other words, semiotics is not interpretation exactly, but the work of assigning 
meanings according to societal and cultural norms of meaning. Viewing the encounter 
this way, what meanings are assigned and what meanings are not assigned? In the next 
chapter, I investigate possible answers to this and other questions. 
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Interlude: The Silent and Silenced Actor   
“Inspired by feminism, pragmatism, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari, situational 
analysis intentionally seeks to represent all the social worlds and discourses in an arena, 
amplifying the silent and silenced, specifying implicated actors and actants, and seeking 
out their (possibly quite marginalized) discourses” (Clarke et al. 238). 
 
“Art does not reproduce the visible. Rather, it makes visible” (Klee). 
 
“If you wish to get hold of the invisible, you must penetrate as deeply as possible into the 
visible” (Beckmann). 
 
In this mass of data that I have collected from my two sites with their social 
worlds and discourses, what is given a voice? What is silenced? What is visible? What is 
invisible? There is one marginalized discourse that keeps nagging at me. When I go 
looking for it, I find it peeking out at me from where it sits, quivering slightly, on its 
perch in the possibility space – on top of the box wherein pattern stores its meanings. It is 
magic, the silent and silenced actor in both arenas. 
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Figure 35: Chart indicating interview respondents’ ages 
 
Figure 36: Chart indicating interview respondents’ current place of residence 
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Chapter Five, The Twisted Cord 
In this chapter, I undertake to fashion from my findings a twisted cord of related 
concerns. Each ply of the cord is spun from the main themes that I have found in my two 
research situations. In the scholarly literature about visual patterns, I found an overriding 
concern with patterns’ transculturality and transmediality, with their roles in the digital 
realm, and with their communicative qualities. In gallery visitors’ responses to patterns, I 
found significant attention to patterns’ beauty, to how they were made in objects and how 
this is represented digitally, and to patterns as vectors of objects’ histories.   
What emerges out of this process of coaxing the two plies to twine together will 
form the basis of my meaning-making of the study: my formulation of pattern thinking, a 
new way of thinking about patterns in relation to their visuality, materiality, virtuality, 
and narrativity. My methodology continues to be informed by the tools of grounded 
theory and situational analysis and facilitated by means of NVivo’s coding, memoing, 
and mapping affordances.  
The comparison begins with a restatement of my research questions. Following 
this is an appraisal of the findings in each research situation, guided by the questions 
adapted from Clarke et al’s depiction of comparative mapping as a form of discourse 
analysis (236). The comparison is structured by the headings of my four theoretical 
relationships. The chapter culminates with a summative statement articulating the results 
of the comparison and their implications. As I have made clear in the previous chapters, I 
am looking for sensitizing concepts and marginalized discourses, this time in comparing 
the two sets of findings from my data. In a sense, these two terms are on opposite ends of 
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a continuum of responses to patterns: the former term delineates what people, whether 
scholars or visitors, are sensitive to, what they notice, wonder about and theorize about – 
and importantly, what they value. The latter term describes what they do not notice, what 
escapes their attention, and what they do not value. 
I start by restating the research questions I listed in the Introductory Chapter: 
1. How do systems of visual pattern on objects operate in the interpretive space of a 
contemporary museum of Islamic arts? a) Is pattern like a language in this context? b) 
What is the nature of the effect a patterned museum object has upon a viewing 
subject? What is the nature of the effect a viewing subject has upon a patterned 
museum object?  
2. What matters most about visual patterns to scholarly writers? What does the research 
emphasize? What does it elide?  
As my aim in this chapter is to weigh the differences and similarities in my two 
research situations, I find that it is appropriate at this point to combine the two questions, 
and to ask simply, what channels does the communication between viewing subject and 
patterned museum object run along? Are the communication channels language-like? Are 
they image-like? Are they, to use Benjamin’s and Arendt’s terms, crystal-like? I 
embarked upon the research with assumptions about how the channels run: first, that they 
are obscured by figuration, that the presence of any figurative imagery in an object or an 
image causes the patterned elements to slide into the background. My second assumption 
was that it is not useful to liken visual patterns to language in large part because patterns 
are nondiscursive. I took this position in the Introductory Chapter when I wondered if it 
193 
 
was productive to connect figurative art to storytelling and patterned art to affective 
sensory functions. In the course of this chapter I will trace my discovery that the research 
findings confirm my first assumption, but that my second assumption is not validated. In 
a way, I may have been asking the wrong question, as the section on narrative will make 
clear. 
With these questions in mind, I embark upon a comparative mapping and analysis 
of the data I have gathered in both of my research situations, the scholarly literature about 
pattern and the interviewees’ responses to pattern – what scholars articulate compared to 
what people going through a gallery articulate. In my analysis I am at pains to avoid 
setting up yet another binary, that of scholars “theorizing” and visitors “experiencing.” In 
the interviews I conducted, visitors theorize about their experiences, but in a different 
way from scholars: their discourse is less formal and structured and less in academic 
parlance – and it is more direct, as befits the circumstances of the interviews’ 
conversational style. In essence, I am using the interview responses as a testing ground 
for the scholarly theories. How close are they to each other? Where do they diverge? 
Comparing the Findings 
My evaluative tools are the guiding questions I mentioned in the Introductory 
Chapter, taken from Clarke et al: 
• What discourse topics are in all datasets? What topics are present in some and not 
in others? 
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• What similar positions on these topics are articulated across datasets? What 
different positions are articulated? 
• What do the consequences of these differences seem to be? (236) 
I will address these questions in turn in each of the following sections, using as an 
organizing rubric my conceptual framework of relationships (figure 30). 
Following the findings comparison, I add an additional evaluative question that 
highlights the Museum as the social world of the study. As I stated in Chapter Three, the 
five fields I started out with metamorphosed into the four categories of my conceptual 
framework. The field of museology became the social world of the museum in which I 
was examining patterns’ relationships to visuality, materiality, virtuality, and narrative 
and therefore, like pattern, it was present in all of them. However, it is important to be 
mindful of my findings in the scholarly writing about museums and to compare it to my 
findings in the interviews in order to develop my picture in Chapter Six of the museum 
imaginary. Therefore, I end the comparison with this discussion. 
1. Visuality 
This section compares theoretical writing about patterns and visuality to visitors’ 
experiences of seeing patterns in a museum gallery. I examine similarities and differences 
in these two approaches according to three sensitizing concepts that arise out of both 
situations: beauty, transculturality, and semiosis or symbolism – the meanings people 
attach to what they are seeing. Following this, I discuss the phenomenon of the optical 
unconscious – literally, what is not noticed – as it pertains to my findings.  
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First, I find that gallery visitors’ remarks about the objects’ beauty are simple and 
straightforward; for example, one interview respondent says, “It was beautiful. Because 
they made art through geometry. I really liked the fact that through patterns they made 
beauty” (0009, young woman). In contrast, approaches to patterns’ visual beauty in the 
scholarly literature are more various and vexed. The visual beauty of patterns is used as a 
metric to measure worth, as Owen Jones formulates in The Grammar of Ornament: “True 
beauty results from that repose which the mind feels when the eye, the intellect, and the 
affections are satisfied from the absence of any want” and “Beauty of form is produced 
by lines growing out one from the other in gradual undulations” (5). Writing a hundred 
and fifty-six years later, Stephan Weber connects beauty to “taste,” which he frames as 
“the correct classification of objects in an established system of beauty and meaning” 
(46), noting the capacity of taste to build bridges to the past (43). Oleg Grabar attempts to 
define ornament’s function with his statement:  
All that is reasonable to conclude is that decorative forms can sometimes 
be identified or described in terms of qualifying attributes like symmetry 
or simplification independent of their motifs, that more complex meanings 
may or may not be found in them, but that they definitely do (or at least 
are meant to) carry beauty and provide pleasure. To say this, however, is 
hardly helpful without knowing what beauty or pleasure is (42). 
In his review of The Mediation of Ornament, Rudolph Arnheim calls Grabar to 
account for his statement that ornament’s function is to carry beauty to its viewer, calling 
it a fallback to an old-fashioned relic of aesthetics (‘Mediation Review’ 219). I concur 
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with his view, and note in addition that assigning this and only this function to visual 
pattern is like telling it to just stand there and look pretty, and leave the serious 
intellectualizing to the art. This trivializing of pattern, calling it “mere,” is widespread 
among scholars of art, museums, and visual culture. I have cited examples of this 
thinking in Chapter Three from Niklas Luhmann and Fatemah Ahani in writing about 
ornament in art and in architecture respectively; in another example, André Malraux 
declares that the most beautiful piece of furniture is only an object, while a painting is a 
voice (Museum without Walls 232). In another review Arnheim wrote, this time of 
Gombrich’s The Sense of Order, he falls back himself on the old-fashioned relic of 
aesthetics, calling ornament “cheerful fantasies of shape, remote from the grave 
responsibilities of the representational arts and rarely touched by the anxieties of the 
human condition” (‘Order Review’ 37). In other words, he characterizes visual pattern as 
a fun-loving, simple – even “primitive” – child. This frankly condescending and 
diminishing view of patterned art is alive and well in the twenty-first century, as 
evidenced by Jonathan Jones’s comment in The Guardian that a decorated object is 
ultimately soulless (2). Far more interesting in my view is Gell’s thesis that visual 
patterns are dangerous – that they ensnare the viewer in the barbs and spikes of their 
geometric shapes. However, this view of pattern is a far cry from respondent 0009’s 
heartfelt appreciation of beauty through patterns. Her response seems closer to Grabar’s 
appraisal. In fact, in comparing the literature and the interview texts, I am aware that 
Grabar’s view of pattern as calliphoric (a carrier of beauty) and ternopoetic (providing 
pleasure) (43) is exactly what interview respondents expressed to me. Even so, on closer 
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examination and reflection, I realize that what is missing from the interview texts is the 
“mere” aspect of beauty. There is no “mere beauty” in the interview texts; there is only 
beauty. 
The second sensitizing concept, patterns’ transculturality, reveals more accord in 
the responses of scholars and gallery visitors. Both the literature and the interviews 
contain many statements about patterns’ movements through time and space, across 
continents and vastly different societies. I have included some of these statements by 
Gulru Necipoğlu, Jonathan Hay, and Graham Were in Chapter Three. I add another 
example here to reinforce how increasingly important this quality of patterns is to many 
scholars in current research on patterned art. Finbarr Barry Flood writes about Alois 
Riegl’s puzzlement over the presence of a particular vegetal motif in sixteenth-century 
Persian carpets. In his attempts to create a teleological history of the arabesque, Riegl did 
not recognize that this motif, a type of calyx-palmette, came from China with the Mongol 
invasion of the thirteenth century. This is evidence, Flood maintains, of the “possibility of 
different origins, diachronic rates of change, and even differential temporal trajectories 
for modes of vegetal ornament that appear in combination on a single artifact” (84).  
The following quote from the interviews is an example of the same sentiments 
expressed in a different way: 
Interviewer: did you happen to notice anything in the gallery that you’d 
seen in the animation? Because much of it is in the gallery. And we’re 
interested if people are picking up on that. 
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Respondent: It is basically the basic geometry of Islamic architecture. You 
cannot limit it to one country, you know like people say ok this has mainly 
Persian influence, but it could have originated from any part, and being 
worked on and differentiated in other parts of the Islamic caliphate that 
they had through history. Some parts of it has Spanish influence, some has 
Persian influence, Indian influence, Turkish, we might not have it in the 
museum but through the world when you go to exhibits like this you see 
the Italian influence or the French influence in Islamic architecture (0009, 
young man). 
The third sensitizing concept I want to compare in my two situations is one I 
assigned in NVivo to a code called “semiosis, symbolism, meaning.” In this code, I 
gathered references to the meaning-making of patterns undertaken by scholars and by 
gallery visitors. I have already discussed beauty as a response to patterns; in that 
discussion, I am separating what people see (the beauty of patterns) from what sense they 
make of what they see (the meaning they assign to the beauty of patterns). Here, I turn to 
two other perspectives on the meanings of visual patterns: first, their spiritual symbolism 
in an Islamic context, and second, their relation to the body of knowledge grouped under 
the category of talismanic or operational magic. In the camp of the first perspective, 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr assigns a clear spiritual symbolism to Islamic geometric patterns 
and their reflection of the natural world: 
What can be the significance of such complicated geometric patterns on 
the surfaces of mosques and mausoleums? Besides directing attention to 
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the Centre which is everywhere and nowhere, untying the knots of the soul 
and preventing subjectivism, these patterns also have another significance 
of a remarkable nature. Although on the surface of things, they represent 
the interior structure of corporeal existence or matter as this term is 
understood in its general sense. Recent research by several scientists has 
revealed extraordinary similarities between these geometric figures and 
configurations and the inner structure of material objects both animate and 
inanimate discovered through the electronic microscope and other modern 
techniques (48).  
Keith Critchlow extends this reasoning to include the significance of their 
mathematical operations:  
It is to be constantly recalled that the spatial controlling factor of Islamic 
geometric pattern is symmetry – which is represented in itself by the most 
fundamental symmetrical set that a given pattern can be equally folded 
into. By the same analogy, symmetry can be viewed as reflections of unity 
(60). 
Issam El-Said is the most technically sophisticated of these three scholars of the 
cosmological approach to Islamic patterns, giving detailed instructions on constructing 
patterns based on the square, or the square root of two, and the hexagon, or the square 
root of three (El-Said et al.)  
Gulru Necipoğlu brings a different slant to the debate about the spiritual 
significance of Islamic patterns, on one hand proposing a view of ornament (her term for 
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visual pattern) that includes semiotic signification (‘Early Modern Floral’ 132) and on the 
other speculating that the development of the star-and-polygon motif is related to the 
Mutazilite school of philosophy.25 
All four scholars are working counter to dominant Modernist ideas about 
decoration and ornament that give them the trivial connotations I mentioned in the 
discussion of beauty. In the interviews, there are similarly many mentions of possible 
meanings attached to patterns – one respondent, a mathematician, reflected that the 
patterns looked more rounded than triangular or square. Others noticed circle motifs and 
mused on what they might mean. I will return to the importance of symbolism in the 
section on narrative. 
The second perspective I wish to examine on the meanings of visual patterns is 
their significance for forms of magic. I find that this assignment of signification – their 
symbolism as protective talismans, for example – shades into a marginalized discourse, 
given the pervasive antipathy to magic in modernist paradigms of knowledge, but there is 
some scholarship that examines it, and two respondents make comments related to it. To 
reiterate my points in Chapter Three, scholarship comes from Schuyler Camman, whose 
interpretations of the symbolism of oriental carpets depends on the motifs as protective 
talismans (‘Symbolic Meanings in Oriental Rug Patterns: Part I’ 12), and from Susan 
Meller, whose work on the Central Asian robes I have quoted in Chapter Four. In a 
 
25 The Mutazilites, operating in ninth-century Baghdad, posited a metaphoric and nondeterministic 
approach to Islam based on the atomism and Neo-Platonism found in the Greek manuscripts that were then 
being translated into Arabic (The Topkapi Scroll: Geometry and Ornament in Islamic Architecture 95).  
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similar vein, André Malraux maintains that all art was originally a fetish of a religious 
nature, and that this was transformed beginning with the Renaissance into the way we 
view art today (Museum without Walls 206). 
The references to talismanic protection in the interviews come from an older man 
who muses that a cross on one of the robes may symbolize protection, and from a tour 
guide who notes of a robe, “I let them know the women don’t put their arms through the 
sleeves, they wear them over their heads, it’s a protection for them. A protection against 
evil really is what it is, and they have different colours for different ages” (0032, AKM 
tour guide, middle-aged woman).  
I turn now to other marginalized discourses in responses to pattern and visuality. 
The most striking one, mentioned already in Chapter Two, is the lack of attention to 
patterned objects in the museology and visual culture literature; they are regarded as 
beneath interpretation, as I have argued in previous chapters. In contrast, pattern plays an 
important role in respondents’ discussions about the gallery objects and the museum 
itself. The following exchange makes this clear: 
Interviewer: If you could formulate any kind of thread that’s going 
through the whole thing, what would you pick? 
Respondent: The floral patterns that you see, the animal patterns, the 
connectedness that a lot of this has with nature (0010, older man).  
Some marginalized discourses in this section can be grouped under the phrase 
“optical unconscious.” This term has a genealogy that dates from Benjamin’s writing; it 
is taken up by Elkins to advance his argument that images are not subject to semiotics but 
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work according to their own kinds of systems (xii). In his resistance to a semiotic 
interpretation of visual art, he skates very close to the concept of meaninglessness, since 
what is not noticed cannot have any meaning or can only have a hidden meaning, a 
meaning that is not actualized. In a similar vein, in the visitors’ responses to the Fath Ali 
Shah painting, they do not notice the patterns, some not at first until they are very close to 
it, and some not at all. They never see the jewels as patterns – they see only the 
imagescape, to use Hay’s terminology, and not the surfacescape. Therefore, the patterns 
remain invisible while the jewels are visible. In one final example for this section, one 
respondent remarks, “I feel nothing” when asked what he sees in the robes. Here, he does 
not see, so he does not feel. 
To sum up this section, my testing of theories of pattern and visuality against the 
interview findings yields these insights: first, in both situations, beauty is a sensitizing 
concept in responses to pattern, but in the interviews, there is no purposeful ranking of it 
below figuration. Second, the sensitizing concept of transculturality is present in both the 
literature and the interviews. Third, speculative theories in the literature about visual 
patterns’ meanings are derived from mathematical, philosophical or religious ideas (Bier, 
‘Number, Shape, and the Nature of Space’; Critchlow; Nasr; Necipoğlu, The Topkapi 
Scroll: Geometry and Ornament in Islamic Architecture; El-Said et al.) – but in the 
interviews it is clear that gallery visitors largely find the meanings of patterns in stories. I 
will take this idea up again in the section on narrative. Finally, a discussion of patterned 
objects is notable by its absence in the literature on museology, visual and material 
culture, but attention to patterned objects is a strong finding in the interviews. However, 
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it is the case among respondents that pattern is not noticed first, or at all, if figuration is 
represented in the work of art.  
2. Materiality 
My four criteria for comparison in this section are embodied cognition, making as 
thinking, transmediality, and form/material separation. These are all sensitizing concepts 
that have arisen from my findings in the literature and my interviews in the gallery. 
Where the first criterion is concerned, I have been arguing throughout this study for a 
vision of visual patterns in and on objects as experienced bodily, by peoples’ senses, and 
have found support for this idea in cognitive science’s theories of embodied cognition. 
For example, Ellen Esrock writes of cognition as embodied and situated in time and 
space, using the example of a museum visitor responding to a painting of a woman 
embroidering a handkerchief by feeling a tension in the fingers (788). As I discussed in 
Chapter Two, I have also found many references to sensory responses in the literature on 
museology and visual and material culture, fields that theorize the experience of engaging 
with works of art (Classen; Dudley, ‘Museum Materialities: Objects, Sense, and Feeling’; 
Golding). In anthropology, Suzanne Kuchler’s reflections on Albert Gell’s notions of 
object agency lead her to wonder how thought can conduct itself in things and to remark, 
“as intelligence is designed into everyday products we are reminded of the premodern 
notion that there is no inanimate matter” (‘Materiality and Cognition’ 209). A theoretical 
framing of the gallery encounters between visitors and objects as embodied is borne out 
by the interview data as well. One respondent comments, “I'd love to touch the texture of 
the material, but I can't” (0025, older man), while another gives as her reason for leaving 
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the gallery iPad alone that “I didn’t want to touch it. I didn’t know who else had touched 
it” (0036, middle-aged woman).  
The second criterion, making as thinking, is evidenced in the interviews by many 
comments expressing curiosity about the making process and an admiration for those 
who had made them. I mentioned in the last section that gallery visitors tend to notice the 
imagescape – the story – of the Fath Ali Shah painting, not its surfacescape – its 
materiality, as it were. However, one young woman showed unusual sensitivity to the 
work that went into its making, “I think there's something about the intricacy of this type 
of art, that sometimes we lose in our modern world, just that time and patience that 
someone may have put into a painting like that” (0028, young woman). This sensitivity to 
making is deeply connected to the embodied cognition process of experiencing objects in 
a gallery, like the itchy fingers of the person viewing the painting of a woman 
embroidering. The patterned movements of the woman pushing and pulling her needle 
through fabric results in a patterned cloth. The viewer standing in front of the painting 
experiences an echo of this patterned movement in her own body, in her own fingers. The 
viewer enters the imaginative space of the maker. 
There is a substantial body of literature exploring making as thinking or thinking 
through making that references pattern-making, either directly or indirectly; for example, 
Tim Ingold’s oeuvre contains many mentions (‘On Weaving a Basket’; ‘The Textility of 
Making’; Making). On the other side of the argument, some scholars refuse to 
countenance the prospect of pattern-making as a complex thinking process. George 
Saliba attacks Necipoğlu’s contention that Mutazilite philosophy could have any 
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connection to the design of geometric patterns (640), while Gombrich assumes that 
makers of such patterns were shown how to make them with compass, ruler, or string 
(The Sense of Order 86). I wonder if these two scholars ever tried to make a complex 
geometric pattern with only a piece of string or a ruler, and I wonder whether their view 
of its making would have been altered by the attempt.  
I found many examples of the transmediality26 of patterns, my third sensitizing 
concept, in both the literature and the interviews. Gerhard Wolf defines transmediality as 
“those artistic forms or contents that are shared by or spread across various media” 
(‘Vesting Walls, Displaying Structure, Crossing Cultures: Transmedial and Transmaterial 
Dynamics of Ornament’ 105). I use the term to articulate visual patterns’ way of 
appearing in one material or another, always themselves and always different. In my 
pattern of questions for respondents, I asked repeatedly if there was anything in the 
gallery that reminded them of what we were looking at, and the responses tended to be 
transmedial. The respondents perceived that the patterns in the gallery were manifesting 
in many different materials; one respondent expressed this quality as “appearing in not 
just the robes but I think the art in general, like the mosaic appearances of the sword, the 
 
26 I must clarify that I am not using the term transmediality in exactly the same sense that scholars 
of communication media use it. For example, Henry Jenkins defines transmedia storytelling as “a process 
where integral elements of a fiction get dispersed systematically across multiple delivery systems for the 
purpose of creating a unified and coordinated entertainment experience” (1). My use of the term defines it 
as visual patterns appearing in different visual media, whether physical (textile, ceramic, architectural) or 
digital.  
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whole appearance” (0027, older woman). A group of respondents expressed patterns’ 
transmedial properties in more depth: 
Interviewer: [Looking at the Fath Ali Shah painting] Do you see anything 
that reminds you of something else in the gallery? Is there a theme? 
Respondent One: In the painting, they are showing me the everywhere the 
same design. And there is, what it's called, diamonds, hexagon designs, 
Interviewer: You’re talking about patterns. 
Respondent One: Yes. Patterns on the side, everything. When you see all 
this thing it is the same. 
Respondent Two: The culture was coming from everywhere.  
Respondent One: He is sitting to show the position from the side.  
Interviewer: He's sitting this way but he's facing this way. This painting is 
fascinating to me because it’s so different from anything else but it has the 
same kinds of things in it that the other art does. 
Respondent One: Ismaili culture, Muslim culture, they’re showing from 
every angle this way. When you go to a mosque, or any place you see all 
kinds of designs, on paint, they are using for long, long time. That’s what 
they're showing for this picture, is everything is like – 
Respondent Three: This is our culture, so you can see this everywhere. 
You go to jamatkhana, you go to a mosque, you see it everywhere (0031, 
Young man, older man, older woman). 
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This excerpt is remarkable, for the discussants are expressing a characteristic of 
much geometric pattern on objects, that it does not appear to have an orientation. They 
have noticed this property of the patterns they have seen in the environments they 
frequent and have connected it to the painting via the main figure’s lack of orientation in 
the picture frame.  
My fourth criterion for comparison in materiality is based on an NVivo code that I 
call “form/material separation.” This concept has engendered philosophical debates pro 
and con for millennia. The hylomorphic model of the form/material interaction has the 
human agent manipulating and controlling physical materials that are essentially dead. 
This tradition of thought is called by Nigel Thrift “the form-matter model so common to 
Western thinking” (Non-Representational Theory 155). The other side of the debate, 
which has form and material working together in a field of forces to create actualities of 
all kinds (Ingold, ‘On Weaving a Basket’ 82; Latour, ‘On Actor-Network Theory’; Gell, 
Art and Agency 229), has gained purchase in theoretical thought especially through 
embodied cognition as the model for how the mind works (Dawson 1; Edelman 234). It 
operates through a kind of network thinking which is imbued with pattern thinking, 
epitomized by Gregory Bateson’s “pattern which connects,” and Bruno Latour’s actor 
network theory, which operates, as I wrote in Chapter Three, like pattern thinking: “not a 
thing, but the recorded movement of a thing” (‘On Actor-Network Theory’ 378).  
To try to find evidence of this philosophical debate in the interview responses, 
very lively through it may be in theoretical discourse, is not fruitful. However, there are 
subtle shifts of emphasis in the ways respondents refer to what they are seeing that 
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suggests to me that they are sensing the agency of the objects in addition to the agency of 
their makers. There is a fluidity in the way they respond to the objects, and a lack of 
separation of form and material. They do not differentiate; they talk about the form and 
the material as one. A respondent remarks while looking at one of the robes, “It seems to 
have a spiral figure. Where there's a centre and it comes out, there, there, there, there, it 
seems to be like a flower, like some sort of four – like a star of some sort” (0018, young 
man).These shifts into speaking of material as form become more marked when they are 
responding to the animation, for reasons that I will discuss in the section on virtuality.  
Another theoretical discourse relating to embodied cognition is the one on affect 
theory. Again, it is alive and well in scholarly debates, but not evident in my 
conversations with respondents. This is logical, for affect as it is defined in the discourse 
about it has not an emotional, but a kind of pre-emotional, trans individual quality that is 
below the level of conscious thought (Massumi; Thrift, Non-Representational Theory). In 
its relation to the body, affect is a material unconscious: sensing without thinking. The 
closest I can come to seeing it in action in the interviews is in some respondents’ 
awareness that they are walking within something bigger than their own lives; they are 
immersed in the experience and feel surrounded by Necipoğlu’s “densely charged 
semiotic environments” (The Topkapi Scroll: Geometry and Ornament in Islamic 
Architecture 222). As one respondent put it, “You felt like you were part of what was 
being portrayed, sort of enveloped” (0032, middle-aged woman).  
The material unconscious is expressed in the interview texts by the sense of touch, 
or rather, its lack. If discourse is a communication and is expanded to include more than 
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text, it follows that touch is a discourse, or a vector of discourse. This vector is not 
available to gallery visitors; the only object they are invited, or even allowed, to touch is 
the iPad in the Shahnameh alcove. 
Summing up the comparison in this section, ideas about embodied cognition, 
making as thinking, and transmediality of pattern propounded in the literature are all 
glimpsed in the interview texts. Conversely, affect as a deep, unconscious human 
function is subject to much theorizing and debate in the literature, but is not evidenced in 
the interview texts except as it is lived in sensory responses to the objects and the gallery 
experience.   
3. Virtuality 
In this section, I compare the literature and the interview findings according to 
three sensitizing concepts: object aura in a digital age, coming into being or folding and 
unfolding, and hiddenness or the technological unconscious. In the interview texts, I am 
looking particularly at gallery visitors’ responses to the animation and the iPad.  
Where the first sensitizing concept is concerned, there is a marked difference 
between the literature and the interviews. Scholars, especially in museology, raise the 
question of the aura of a work of art, that specialness that Benjamin identifies with its 
distance from the viewer (Shalem) and with its uniqueness (Clarke et al. 271). Does 
digital reproduction destroy the aura of a work of art by turning viewers’ attention to its 
glittering simulacrum, which is always, it seems, brighter and more enticing? To the 
contrary, Susan Hazan posits that digitizations of works of art have an aura that stems 
from the very fact that they are virtual (8). Fiona Cameron concurs, arguing that digital 
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representations of historical objects are objects in their own right, with a history and a 
provenance (‘Beyond the Cult of the Replicant’ 70).  
Today it seems that the “flashing screens and buzzing software” (Thrift, ‘Beyond 
Mediation’) that are in museum visitors’ hands engage them much more that does the 
actual art. For example, the New Media Consortium’s 2017 report notes that “practically 
every visitor who walks into a museum or gallery today is carrying a smartphone” (10) 
and that museums’ content production has failed to keep up with technology. However, 
my study did not find that there was a general preference in the interview respondents for 
the virtual technologies on offer in the AKM Permanent Gallery over the physical works 
of art. In fact, some respondents showed a distinct lack of interest in them, or even a 
resistance. One respondent remarked about the animation, “I stood there for a few 
moments and I was waiting for it to tell me something. And then it didn’t. So I kept 
walking” (0031, young woman). Another commented when asked about the iPad, “First 
of all when I go to museums I don’t necessarily go for these interactive things. I think it’s 
better to just look at the art, learn about the history. I mean, I can see this from home” 
(0039, young man). The reason for these responses may lie in the attendance of an older 
demographic to the Museum – however, both the aforementioned responses came from 
younger visitors. It may be that visitors’ interactions with digital devices, their own or the 
museum’s, are more nuanced than the literature suggests, and need a great deal more 
careful inquiry.  
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My second sensitizing concept is related in the literature to coming into being, 
characterized by Deleuze as “becoming” rather than “being” (DeLanda, Intensive Science 
and Virtual Philosophy 121), or as folding and unfolding, as he writes in in The Fold,  
Nous découvrons de nouvelles manières de plier comme de Nouvelles 
enveloppes, mais nous restons liebniziens parce qu’il s’agit toujours de 
plier, déplier, replier / We are discovering new ways of folding, akin to 
new developments, but we all remain Liebnizian because what always 
matters is folding, unfolding, refolding (Le Pli 189; The Fold 137). 
I consider the metaphor of folding and unfolding to be a foundational concept in 
pattern thinking, for it is an apt description of how visual patterns run through objects, 
materializing, as it were, through their manifestation in materials and dematerializing 
when the materials of the object wear out, break down, or fall apart. This process is one 
that the animation demonstrates beautifully. A respondent notices this process in the 
following excerpt.  
It’s like a unique thing for us, because you never see that kind of thing. I 
thought at first it was only a picture but after a few minutes, they were 
running for everything, and then coming on the flowers, how they're 
growing, this is very very surprising (0031, older man). 
Hiddenness or the technological unconscious is my third sensitizing concept 
relating to virtuality. In fact, it is both a sensitizing concept and a marginalized discourse, 
in that a great deal of theoretical attention is given to it in the literature, and it cannot be 
claimed that any attention is given to it in the interview texts, since the essence of 
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something unconscious is that it escapes notice. There is a paradox at the heart of digital 
technology: it is nonvisual but manifested in a visual form. It is somewhere between 
image and object: not purely an image because it has so much that is hidden, not purely 
an object because it is represented on a screen. Derek Robinson expresses this very 
paradox in his remark that software is “just bits” (163). 
Summing up this section, I find that many respondents pay attention to the 
“coming into being” of the objects in the animation, a process that I link to Deleuze’s 
characterization of the life processes of folding and unfolding from virtual to actual states 
and back again. What they do not do is lean toward digital devices, their own or the 
gallery’s, in preference to their experience of the actual works of art on display. They 
also show no awareness of the underlayers of digital technology, that I have linked to 
logical depth and to Robinson’s “just bits.” Musings about the non-visuality of computer 
screens are strictly confined to the theoretical arena. 
4. Narrative 
The fourth and final section in my rubric of comparison is narrative. Here, I 
compare my two sets of findings according to three sensitizing concepts: viewer histories, 
object histories, and storytelling in museums. Then, turning to marginalized discourses, I 
take up the current that has run through my comparison so far: the hiddenness that 
confounds communication, termed differently and with different nuances in previous 
sections: the optical unconscious, the material unconscious, and the technological 
unconscious.  
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Viewer histories and object histories, seemingly the very essence of the interface 
between subject and object in a gallery, have become the subject of debates on 
interpretive methods in museology. I have commented on these debates in Chapter Two, 
referring to Dewdney et al’s position that there is no longer a fixed vantage point for 
viewer histories in our global environment (204), and to Yenawine’s contention that the 
viewer’s experience is more important than an object’s histories (25). I found completely 
opposite views on histories in the interviews; in fact, most responses revolved around 
matters of histories, whether of the viewer, of the object, or of both. This finding leads 
me to infer that narrative is a vital vector of communication in the humming space 
between a museum-going subject and a patterned museum object, and it goes in both 
directions. On the one hand, stripping an object of its life story reduces it to an 
aestheticized event, devoid of any other meaning. On the other, assuming that a viewer’s 
life story is irrelevant to their reception of an object takes something important away 
from them as well.  
Issues of viewers’ and objects’ life stories lead directly into my third sensitizing 
concept, storytelling in museums. This concept is debated in museology: one faction 
strongly states that storytelling is the work of museums (Bedford; Mateos‐Rusillo and 
Gifreu‐Castells). Another camp just as strongly refutes this idea, arguing that the 
nondiscursivity of museum objects is related to affect, characterized by non-rational, 
emotional responses to them (Message and Witcomb; Dudley, ‘Chinese Horse’). Once 
again, the primacy of stories stands out in the interview texts. Not only that, but it became 
obvious to me as I completed the analysis and then the comparison of those texts to the 
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literature that respondents considered both figuration and pattern as storytelling vehicles. 
In fact, the object with the most abstract geometric pattern, the mosaic panel, inspired 
two of the most vivid stories. I related one of them, related to Mithraism, in Chapter Four. 
Here is the other one: 
It says it’s from a courtyard. The colour scheme brings that to mind and 
the geometrical design. In my art history classes, when you see an arch 
you’re supposed to think about triumph. Ancient Greece, Rome, the 
Byzantines - because my art history teaching is very Christian-centric, 
when you see things in threes you’re supposed to think about the trinity. 
Three is a number in Islamic thought. Rejecting the idea of the trinity, 
there’s this hadith that says its sunna to do things in threes. It also might 
be visually pleasing (0041, young woman). 
The term “nondiscursivity” as it applies to museum gallery objects needs some 
unpicking. If “discourse” is assumed to apply only to written and spoken language, then 
the term holds as an apt one. However, if the term is expanded to include objects and 
images, static or moving, the term nondiscursivity loses its meaning, for an object or 
image tells a story and conveys a meaning, just not through written or spoken language. It 
uses other systems of communication – for example, visual ones. How do visual patterns 
convey meaning without text? The answer partly lies in Benjamin’s/Arendt’s analogy of 
the crystal: Benjamin writes “History decays into images, not into stories” (Benjamin, 
The Arcades Project 476), and Arendt extends his meaning to infer the decay as 
crystallization, or, as I see it, skeleton-ization into crystal structures. Stafford rewrites 
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Benjamin’s quote to read, “History has a habit of decaying into crystallized shapes, not 
stories” (Echo Objects 154). It is her framing of Benjamin and Arendt’s thinking that I 
am thinking of when I claim that a visual pattern’s story is in the shape of a crystal: the 
crystal tells the story, not nondiscursively but transdiscursively. This is the message about 
visual patterns’ narrative power that the interview respondents were telling me, in this 
and other passages. 
I tell the children, it isn’t just to admire the beauty, it’s a story. It tells you 
what people were like, what they wore, what they ate, their lifestyles, so if 
you look at it from that perspective, it’s a whole world, a whole story 
(0014, AKM teacher, middle-aged woman). 
At the beginning of this chapter I wrote that I may have been asking the wrong 
question. In light of the interview findings, the question is not, is visual pattern like a 
language – it actually does have some similarities to, not language, but writing: visual 
pattern looks like inscription, with some caveats: for example, it often lacks a direction, 
being the same when viewed from one side or another, and it is often in infinite repeat – 
rather, the important question is, how does visual pattern communicate transdiscursively? 
The answer to this reframed question is found, again, in the interview findings: through 
beauty and colour, through lines, shapes and forms, and through memory: the histories of 
the viewer and of the object. If “patterns” are substituted for “forms” in the following 
passage, Grabar is able to shed further light on this question. 
As we know that some geometric forms were given meaning and probably 
that none can be said to be without possible meaning. The question is how 
216 
 
meanings – iconographic, semiotic, or symbolic – can be given or have in 
practice been given to geometric forms. The circle may well be granted a 
theoretical cosmic and metaphysical potential, but this does not mean that 
every circle represents or evokes the universe or the totality of life. It is 
not easy or abstractly logical to detect automatically matrimonial status or 
social position in a combination of triangles or a set of straight lines. And 
while it is legitimate at professional mathematical levels to see arbitrary 
signs and numbers as a language, that language is hardly accessible to 
most mortals. Therefore, the further analysis of the particularly rich trove 
of geometric forms that occurs in the Islamic world should help clarify, if 
not resolve, the more universal problems of how and why it is that 
meaning can be attributed to geometry (129). 
Amid all this talk of communication of narratives, there still remains the question 
of marginalized discourses in the literature and the interviews. What happens when 
communication fails, when nothing is seen and nothing is understood? The examples of 
this in the literature point, as they do in visuality, materiality, and virtuality, to the 
framing of the unconscious processes at work in the perception and cognition of patterns. 
In human perception, pattern is an economy, a shorthand that allows some processes to 
remain hidden (Bateson, ‘Style, Grace, and Information’). This is also how computer 
code works; in the most recent programming languages, many functions are automatic, so 
the programmer is not aware of how they are built (Chun 29). In the interviews, I found 
that some respondents noted the absence of information on offer in the labels and 
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didactics, pointing out that “it’s a pity not to see the continuity. How did the piece end up 
here? There has to be a sort of relationship between me as a viewer and this. To feel it. I 
don’t know that” (0042, older man). I consider a response like this evidence of a short 
circuit in the subject/object exchange. 
My summative comments for this section concern the yawning gap in approaches 
to pattern in the literature versus the interviews. In the literature, even when it is the 
subject of the writing, visual pattern is trivialized as “just an aesthetic addendum” (Ahani 
et al. 30), as or at best as a kind of “tacit knowledge” (Brett 249) In stark contrast, visual 
pattern is a sensitizing concept in the interview responses; by definition, the respondents 
are sensitive to it. The beauty of patterns is highlighted, and it is not appreciated in a 
strictly aesthetic way, but as a storytelling vector. Storytelling is a vector of 
communication – it is as if the viewer feeds their life story into the exchange, and the 
object feeds back its life story. Thus, it is a live interchange, in both directions, a play of 
forces similar to the making of the object, and arguably just as creative. If it is short-
circuited, as in the previous interview response, the interchange slides close to 
meaninglessness and the invisible does not become visible. 
5. The Aga Khan Museum as the Social World of the Study 
How does the literature’s vision of contemporary museums compare to the social 
world of the Aga Khan Museum and to the average visitor’s experience of it? The points 
of comparison that I want to make all have to do with museum interpretation, writ large: 
what a museum believes it is about and therefore emphasizes shapes its effects on its 
audiences. For example, I have already noted that visual patterns figure prominently in 
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the architecture of the AKM and their presence is mentioned in several interview 
responses. While I make no claim to an understanding of the AKM’s internal visions for 
its organization, I am looking for evidence of its priorities as they are demonstrated in the 
design and interpretation choices for its Permanent Gallery, where my study is situated. 
My points of comparison are first, the relevance of information about the objects, second, 
connoisseurship and the preciousness of the objects, and third, museums as sites of 
education. 
First, there is a marked difference in the importance attached to interpretive 
information about the objects by scholars as opposed to visitors. Several writers on 
museology argue for putting the viewer’s personal response to the object first, even 
maintaining that historical or interpretive information is not necessary for a meaningful 
understanding (Ting; Yenawine). Some museologists oppose this view (Cameron, 
‘Beyond the Cult of the Replicant’), but the interview respondents all favour more 
contextualizing information about an object’s life story than less. The second point of 
comparison reveals more differences between scholars and visitors. There is still a vein of 
connoisseurship running through museology’s approach to the preciousness of objects (it 
could be called the “masterpiece” paradigm). This is not good news for patterned objects, 
since a certain hierarchizing of fine versus decorative art goes along with this approach 
(J. Jones; Weber). In interview responses, the emphasis is on meaning, especially 
connected to viewer and object histories.  
My third point of comparison concerns museums as sites of education, 
specifically of enhancing cultural understanding and tolerance. Recent museological 
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writing highlights this function, no longer defining museums as “institutions which carry 
out museum functions for the benefit of people who like museums” (O’Neill 96). The 
contemporary model of the museum, in the literature at least, is an outward-looking 
institution with high educational potential. It seems to me that the Aga Khan Museum 
performs this vision particularly well, by creating an environment where visitors can 
experience the unique qualities of the historic arts of Muslim civilizations – not the 
ossified view of “Islamic art” that was invented by European scholars in the nineteenth 
century (Necipoğlu, ‘The Concept of Islamic Art’). To be sure, there was a certain 
amount of grousing about the lack of interpretive text by some respondents – and I would 
prefer to see more interpretive strategies in the gallery, especially of the patterned art – 
but it can also be argued that the understated approach to interpretive texts enhances the 
ability of a viewer to make of the messages what she will; there is no preaching. 
In sum, the contrast between museum theories and museum experiences leads me 
to the conclusion that the Permanent Gallery of the museum, while not being on the 
cutting edge of the interpretive strategies depicted in the literature – for example, there is 
very little interactive technology and interpretive texts are, as I mentioned, light – is on 
another cutting edge, perhaps a more inviting one according to interview respondents, by 
providing an atmosphere where visitors can walk through its dimly lit, patterned spaces 
and discover the beauties and the stories for themselves.  
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Summary: Pattern Thinking Reformulated 
In building up his thesis of making as a field of forces, Tim Ingold states that a 
woven object has a surface on the inside and the outside simultaneously. Its fabrication is 
the result of the manipulation of those surfaces in tension with each other (Ingold, ‘On 
Weaving a Basket’ 82). I extend this notion to the plied threads – or cords, or yarns – 
with which the object is woven, and alter it slightly: it is not so much that a plied cord has 
a simultaneous inside and outside as that, following the twist of the two or more 
elements, the inside surface comes to the outside and is revealed and the outside surface 
moves to the inside and is hidden. In just this way, my prototype of a twisted cord as a 
synthesis of my findings exhibits this revealing and concealing: some of the findings, the 
sensitized ones, run prominently along the surface while others, the marginalized ones, 
run within the cord, hidden but still there and necessary for the structural integrity of the 
cord.  
It is this action that Deleuze maps with his actual and virtual states, and it is this 
action that, I argue, characterizes the movement of visual pattern through stages of 
perception and cognition – the meaning-making of the pattern – in the experiences of 
viewers. In this chapter, I have attempted to show how this movement works, through 
visuality, through materiality, through virtuality, and through narrative. My prototype of 
a twisted cord shows me how the multiplicities of pattern can be structurally integral and 
manifold at the same time, in the same manner that a cord or thread is wound of many 
different elements and thousands of them form the network that is a whole cloth. The 
twisted nature of a plied thread exemplifies the torque and dynamic tension of pattern; it 
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is always becoming, never at rest. The cyclic movement of pattern thinking is a paradox 
of unity and multiplicity.27 It is topological rather than flat, as T. Hugh Crawford makes 
clear in his description of woodworking: 
Woodworkers know that their practice unfolds between conscious imaging 
and tactile manipulation. Singularities emerge in the space between image 
and execution. Such singularities are topological rather than geometrical, 
but that science of surface is one of affect: topology is the study of felt 
surface, not measured depth (91).  
In the twisted cord that is my theory of pattern thinking, the narrative element is 
much stronger than I anticipated at the start of the study. The finding that visual patterns 
tell stories, and how they do, comes directly out of the interview responses. In a process 
that seems like a textbook case of grounded theory, the theory has come out of the data, 
and it causes me to reformulate my thesis. Pattern thinking is related to affective 
processes, but only if those processes are defined not as irrevocably unconscious, but 
moving, as it were, from invisible to visible, from virtual to actual, from folding to 
unfolding. In fact, coming back to my NVivo mapmaking efforts, I find that the 
positional maps (figures 24 and 25) that I made as the final steps of analysing my data are 
useful charts of these processes. Positional map #1 pictures the visible/invisible and 
 
27 I suggest that Deleuze does not quite capture this paradox of unity and multiplicity. In my view, 
his penchant for setting up conceptual oppositional binaries – for example, smooth and striated, royal and 
minor, and yes, even actual and virtual – gets in the way. Derrida comes closer with his conceptualization 
of the labyrinth of language, “qui comprend en lui ses issues / which includes its own ways out within 
itself” (Derrida, La voix et le phénomène 117; Derrida, Voice and Phenomenon 89). 
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meaningful/meaningless oppositions as continua, in the centre of which visual patterns 
flicker in and out of being. Positional map #2 performs a similar function for the 
immaterial/material and nondiscursive/discursive oppositions, but this time it is patterns’ 
transmediality, transmateriality, and transdiscursivity that flicker in and out of being. It is 
as if the opposing poles act like magnets, holding the experiencer’s perceptions of the 
patterns in tension in the centre of the field of vision, in the space between subject and 
object, thus giving these perceptions a space in which they can actualize and de-actualize. 
How this more nuanced view of pattern thinking is given voice in the museum 
imaginary is the subject of my concluding chapter. 
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Chapter Six, The Museum Imaginary 
The focus of this study has been the nature of the subject/patterned-museum-
object encounter in a gallery of Islamic art. This encounter is what I have been probing, 
problematizing, and theorizing about throughout the previous chapters. In this chapter, I 
offer the conclusions I have reached as a result of my explorations in Chapters Two and 
Three of the literature, my findings in Chapter Four from the Aga Khan Museum 
interviews, and the comparison of these two bodies of data that I undertook in Chapter 
Five. My aim has not been to arrive at a core unifying theory of the encounter and the 
role of visual pattern within it, but instead to uncover the sensitizing concepts and the 
marginalized discourses that transpire in the charged space between the subject and the 
object. However, there is a consolidating process at work in this chapter, as my findings 
in both situations have come together and begun to point in a direction. Accordingly, in 
what follows I present five conclusions of the study and one general recommendation.  
In listing and unpacking my conclusions and their significance, I seek to 
demonstrate the trajectory of my thinking about them, where they originate in the data, 
and how they have come to light. In using the word “pattern” here, I am referring to 
visual patterns on objects, the kind that are active in the subject/object encounter that is 
my concern. In point form, my conclusions are: 
1. Patterns tell stories. 
2. The telling of patterns’ stories is a co-creative process in the subject/object 
exchange.  
224 
 
3. Patterns tell stories through their transculturality, transmediality, and 
transdiscursivity. 
4. Patterns’ stories run through sensory channels. 
5. The AKM Permanent Gallery creates an imaginary world for the telling of 
patterns’ stories, measured in time and space.  
1. Patterns tell stories 
First, I must make it clear that the ensuing conclusions all follow my discovery 
from the interview findings that patterns on objects, far from being nondiscursive, tell 
specific stories in specific ways. In the next four sections, I provide details for how they 
do this, but here I outline the steps in my thinking that led me to this and the following 
conclusions. 
In the Introductory Chapter, I recounted my resistance to the trend in museology 
to think of gallery objects as “accessories to tell stories” (Dudley, ‘Chinese Horse’ 6), in 
other words, to ignore their material properties and to treat them purely as sources of 
information. I was in agreement with Dudley that this stance seemed one-sided: I was 
aware from the outset of, on one hand, the materiality of visual patterns – since they 
always manifest on objects – and, on the other, their immateriality – their mutability and 
variety. I undertook to probe this apparent paradox. My research questions took a two-
pronged approach, asking how visual patterns are perceived and made sense of in two 
research situations: the scholarly literature about pattern and the responses of visitors in a 
gallery of Islamic art. I hypothesized, first, that visual patterns tended to slip into the 
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background in the presence of figurative images, and, second, that they were not similar 
to language in their structure and communicative affordances. I did not concur with 
approaches that theorized visual patterns’ likeness to language by breaking them down 
and analyzing them as if they possessed a syntax (Necipoğlu, The Topkapi Scroll: 
Geometry and Ornament in Islamic Architecture 209; Roe, ‘At Play in the Fields of 
Symmetry’ 241; Washburn 553). This one-to-one comparison to the mechanics of 
language seemed forced and inaccurate to me, and an unsatisfactory way to characterize 
visual patterns’ communicative powers. I considered “nondiscursive,” applied by Dudley, 
Message, and Witcomb to gallery objects, as a better term to apply to the way visual 
patterns communicate with their audiences in a gallery of Islamic art. 
I mentioned in the Introductory Chapter my work on representations of magic 
squares in West African textiles, the subject of my master’s thesis. I cited Epelboin’s 
characterization of these representations as a metalanguage (150) and I thought to apply 
this term to the visual patterns I was studying to explain their agency. However, as I 
stated in Chapter One, my chosen methodology of situational analysis warned me off the 
formulation of a “unifying” or “core” theory. As well, my strong inclination as a maker to 
keep my pattern thinking grounded in patterns’ materiality led me away from notions of 
“meta.”  
In Chapter Three, I moved toward an approach to visual patterns that examined 
them in light of a constellation of four theoretical relationships: pattern and visuality, 
materiality, virtuality, and narrative. I used this approach to structure my conceptual 
framework, arrived at in the chapter’s last section, and I have used it to guide my thinking 
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in the remaining writing. My conceptual framework helped me to see the object agency 
of the subject/object exchange as allied with Deleuze’s conception of the world as a 
constant coming into being from virtual to actual states and back again. I ended the 
chapter with a prototype of a fortune teller puzzle which visualized for me this very 
action. 
In reporting my findings from the gallery interviews in Chapter Four, I wrote that 
the interviewees did not relate to visual patterns if figuration was on the object they were 
looking at, leading me to conclude that, based on my findings, visual pattern does indeed 
recede into the background of the viewer’s attention, superseded by figuration. Therefore, 
I surmised that my first hypothesis was correct. Turning my focus to the second 
hypothesis, I discovered that interviewees often found stories in the patterned objects, and 
that their stories arose from their own histories, or from the histories they perceived in the 
objects, or from both of these factors. Moreover, the stories that the respondents found in 
the objects arose from who they were in that moment, their situation, past and present, 
their profession, and their experiences in their lives. In a sense, this finding contributes to 
an expanded definition of histories; the use of that term can include not only a person’s 
ancestry, but also their life experience.  
The finding that interviewees found stories in patterned objects propelled a 
reformulation of my thesis of pattern thinking in Chapter Five in light of my discovery 
that the narrative aspect of visual patterns is much stronger than I suspected at the start of 
my study. At the end of the chapter, my prototype of a twisted cord visualized for me the 
various paradoxes of pattern thinking: the paradox of an ideality – patterning – and a 
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reality – visual pattern on objects – entwined with each other, in the same operation that 
Derrida expresses about language,28 and the paradox of always moving between hidden 
and revealed/actual and virtual states, powered by difference and repetition, in the same 
operation that Deleuze formulates as the becoming of the world (Difference and 
Repetition 41). 
2. The telling of patterns’ stories is a co-creative process 
A major finding of the interviews was that beauty was highlighted as the most 
important sensitizing concept: respondents mentioned patterns’ beauty more than any 
other aspect of the objects and the gallery. More than merely mentioning it, respondents 
related the beauty of the patterned objects to making and to the expanded view of 
histories that I defined earlier. I interpret this finding to mean that beauty is a storytelling 
vector – a way that patterns tell stories. Respondents find meaning in the patterned 
objects’ beauty – indeed, a story is a meaning. Moreover, the meaning is constructed, not 
in the object or in the subject, but in the space between them. This finding and my 
interpretation of it lead me to conclude that the making of patterns’ stories and the 
meanings therein are a co-creative process, fluid, never finished, and always contingent 
on their situation. The beauty that the interview respondents found in visual patterns drew 
them in and sensitized them to the story of their histories and the patterned object’s 
histories. Therefore, I conclude that beauty is not purely an aesthetic response to patterns; 
 
28 See the Prelude, f4. 
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it is a meaning response, and it operates as a powerful attractant to viewers, thus enabling 
the subject/object interchange. 
3. Patterns tell stories through their transmediality, transculturality, and transdiscursivity 
The interview respondents were fascinated with pattern making in objects; this 
was another major finding. I relate this finding to the theories of “making as thinking” put 
forward by scholars in both material cultures and digital cultures, and I also associate it 
with the sensitivity to the artist’s process shown by the respondents. Both these concepts 
demonstrate the unfolding and folding of patterns’ stories as they flicker in and out of 
being, first through the makers’ actions and then through the experiencers’ responses – 
co-created in each case, as I have said. The essential action of unfolding and folding is 
how patterns seem to appear – always different and always themselves – on objects from 
many different cultures and, as the AKM Permanent Gallery exemplifies, in a wide range 
of materials. The transmediality and transdiscursivity of patterns stem from this action. I 
would take my thesis of the co-creation of meaning further to posit that the subject 
“rehearses” the maker’s experience in making the object.29 The jazz musician and 
musicologist Vijay Iyer describes the same process of active experiencing in music that I 
am arguing for in relation to patterned objects: he maintains that the musician/musical 
object/listener interchange is mutually constructive and that “any model of rhythm 
perception and cognition . . . must treat perception to some degree as a practice” (101). 
 
29 The French verb for rehearse, répéter, better captures this process: in performing her response to 
a patterned object, the subject “repeats” the maker’s experience. 
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I argue that the act of rehearsing the maker’s process creates in the experiencing 
subject an understanding and a knowledge of the object on a deep level. To illustrate this 
act, I offer my own transmedial encounter with a dish in the Aga Khan Museum Bellerive 
Room. The object of my encounter is classified in a Sotheby’s auction catalogue as a 
tenth century ceramic dish from Northeast Iran (Figure 37) that is covered with painted 
geometric patterns and calligraphy. Its catalogue entry reads: 
A very rare Nishapur or Samarkand slip-decorated pottery dish . . . of 
broad form with a recessed well and broad sloping rim, the footing low 
and slightly splayed, decorated on a pinkish-brown ground . . . The present 
example is one of the largest recorded pieces of the coloured ground 
group . . . The calligraphy reads: al-jud min akhlaq ahl al-janna, 
“Generosity is a disposition of the dwellers of Paradise” (Sotheby’s Arts of 
the Islamic World Auction Catalogue). 
I first encountered this object on a computer screen when I was researching 
educational activities that could be created from the objects in the AKM collection. Later, 
when the Museum opened in 2014, it was installed in a case in the Bellerive Room, and I 
went to look at it there. I selected this particular object for investigation because of the 
painted representation of the knot at its centre. My studies of patterns from mathematical, 
art historical and sociocultural perspectives have often led me to reflect on how those 
perspectives view knot patterns. In addition, my experiences with weaving, braiding, and 
other textile making have made me sensitive to interlace forms, so that I feel them as 
tactile forms as well as see them.  
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From the catalogue entry I learned how Sotheby’s classified the dish: it is one of 
several pottery objects that were excavated from Nishapur in Iran and Samarkand, now in 
Uzbekistan, beginning in the early twentieth century. At the time there was widespread 
looting by Europeans in Iran and by Russians in Uzbekistan, but later expeditions were 
arranged by museums and other institutions, for academic purposes (Vernoit). How the 
dish came to auction in 2000 is unknown, but at that time it was purchased for the Aga 
Khan Museum collection.  
The more I looked at the object, the more I was drawn to the knot pattern. Perhaps 
this was due to my aforementioned predilection for knot patterns, but I also think it was 
due to the fact that my desire to physically interact with the object itself by holding it in 
my hands was frustrated. To resolve this frustration, I decided to replicate the part of the 
object that I was most curious about, the knot pattern, in a physical material. The making 
of a physical model would also help me analyse how the knot pattern in the object’s 
centre was constructed. I had tried repeatedly and at length to understand the 
interlacements by looking at the dish but I kept getting confused in my determination of 
which line was over or under which other line. At this point I thought that I could figure 
it out better by making a workable paper model of it. In addition, I reasoned that this 
exercise could lead to the creation of a hands-on, educational geometry activity that 
students could use in the AKM to help them understand how such patterns are 
constructed. I was not trying to posit the original method by which such a knot pattern 
may have been constructed at the time the object was made, although some of this kind of 
research has been carried out by Gulru Necipoğlu, who theorizes the use of underlying 
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grid lines that scaffold the final design but do not appear in it (The Topkapi Scroll: 
Geometry and Ornament in Islamic Architecture 231).  
First, I made a digital sketch of the knot pattern and filled in the paths of its 
interlacements with two colours to distinguish two motifs made up of four circles each, 
the orange motif set at a forty-five degree rotation to the blue motif (Figure 38, left). The 
motifs in the object’s knot pattern are somewhat deformed, as if someone pressed the 
edges in, so I made my own digital model with circles in order to see the motifs more 
clearly (Figure 38, right).  
When I separated the two motifs from each other I could see that the painter had 
omitted the centre of the blue motif in the painting of the pattern on the object (Figure 
39).  
In my digital model the orange motif is superimposed over the blue one, while in 
the painting on the object the lines of the motifs are interlaced in a certain order. I wanted 
to understand the interlacements, so I isolated the four circles of each motif, printed them, 
and cut them out. Then I made a cut in each circle and wove them together, exactly 
following the order of the lines in the painted knot pattern as they crossed over and under 
each other. I still found it very difficult to keep track of the interlacements, so I assigned 
each circle a unique colour in another digital sketch (Figure 40), and I remade the circles 
with one side flattened. The finished model is shown in Figure 41.  
Holding my paper model in my hands and moving the circles as they were held 
tightly by their interlacements, I finally felt that I understood the pattern’s structure. For 
me, the key to understanding was the physical separation and manipulation of the 
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individual circles in the paper model. Once I understood the original order, I could see 
that the circles could be used to make new sets of interlacements and therefore new 
patterns. In sum, I used my experience as a pattern maker to perform again the original 
knot-maker’s process, thereby understanding the object through the action of my fingers. 
It was a transmedial act, for I recreated a painted knot on a ceramic dish as an actual knot 
in paper strips. 
The second term I attach to how patterns tell stories is transculturality. The 
transculturality of patterned museum objects is mentioned many times in the literature 
and in the interviews. It describes the fluidity Dewdney et al are talking about in museum 
audiences, a fluidity that responds not to a static notion of objects’ histories but a to a 
mixed, changing, and contingent one (204). My thesis of the transdiscursivity of patterns 
comes out of the findings’ evidence for patterned objects’ transculturality and 
transmediality. Visual patterns are infinitely adaptable, with the capability of changing 
cultures and materials in their manifestations, and yet they are always recognizable. They 
are rooted in these two paradoxical aspects of their nature.  
A third way that patterns tell stories is through the prehension of their objects’ 
materials. In Chapter Two I described how Whitehead named prehension as the 
resistance of materials that dictates how they are fashioned. Prehension may apply, not 
only to the properties of materials, but also to the complexity or difficulty of a technique 
a maker uses on a material, as illustrated by my struggles to recreate the knot on the 
ceramic dish. This kind of prehension is abundantly evident in the densely layered, 
complex patterns on many of the Permanent Gallery objects. An object’s prehensiveness 
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is an important way that patterns tell stories: if the object’s beauty draws in its 
experiencer, its prehensive qualities activate her sensory responses, in a process similar to 
the one I cited from Ellen Esrock in Chapter Five of a viewer feeling a tension in her 
fingers while viewing a painting of an embroiderer.  
Finally, visual patterns are transdiscursive – that is to say, active in the multiple 
discourses of visuality, materiality, virtuality, and narrativity, as I have argued in this 
study. In their manifestations on objects they belong to no one time period and to no one 
cultural group but have appeared and continue to appear in multitudes of sites, materials 
and expressions. They are fixed and fluid at the same time: fixed to the technical 
properties of their objects, but apt to appear on objects spanning many geographies and 
time periods. By approaching them in this way, I assign new prominence to patterned 
objects as conveyors of stories in museum gallery viewing.  
4. Pattern’s stories run through a subject’s sensory channels 
I am arguing that the subject rehearses the maker’s experience in response to a 
patterned object. Furthermore, I maintain that the interchange is physical: an experiencer 
responds to the objects with her body, through her senses. I have cited many examples in 
the interview texts of visitors’ active sensory engagements with the objects. This finding 
leads me to the conclusion that imagination is lived in the body, with both conscious and 
unconscious perceptions arising and receding. For me, this process best describes affect. 
Affective processes are not stuck in the precognitive level of the body’s lifeworld – 
which is composed, as Bateson defined, of an individual plus her environment (‘Form, 
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Substance, and Difference’ 453) – but they are always moving in and out of 
consciousness. According to this view, visual pattern and figurative image move in and 
out of the subject’s attention, each fulfilling their own role in the stories that an object 
communicates; they are not opposed but complement each other. To illustrate this 
phenomenon of figuration and abstraction exchanging roles in a narrative, I draw the 
reader’s attention to the short film The Powers of Ten. It depicts a rapid camera zoom that 
pans outward by powers of ten (n10) from a couple picnicking in a park to outer space, 
and then zooms back in by powers of ten to finish on a subatomic view of the man’s 
hand. In the most macroscopic and microscopic segments, the viewer apprehends the 
images as patterns while in the segments where the couple are recognizable, she sees 
figures; yet it is the same world. It is only the perspective that is different (Eames and 
Eames). Deleuze would call the macro and micro views “the little crystalline seed and the 
vast crystallizing universe” (Cinema 2 81), assigning them to the virtual realm, while the 
human-scale view is in the actual realm. 
5. The AKM Permanent Gallery creates an imaginary world for the telling of patterns’ 
stories 
In Chapter Four, in my analysis of the Museum as a social world, I mentioned that 
the AKM Permanent Gallery features a light interpretive touch. This style of gallery-
making serves some of its audiences well, but others, including a few of my respondents, 
commented that their attempts to find meaning in the objects were short-circuited. They 
made statements about the animation such as, “I thought it was just light effects” (0024, 
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older man), and “I was waiting for it to tell me something. And then it didn’t. So I kept 
walking” (0038, young woman). About the objects, they commented, “I feel nothing, 
nothing at all” (0024 older man), and about the gallery, “there is a sort of blackout 
between pieces” (0042, older man). I conclude from these findings that meaninglessness 
as well as meaning is part of the exchanges between subject and object. However, I must 
temper this conclusion with an insight that has arisen from my research in the literature 
on logical depth, hiddenness, and the virtual: if I take these theoretical positions 
seriously, then I must redefine meaninglessness as, according to logical depth, all the 
debris that floats in the river of history – or, as Bennett and Dexter assert, as all the 
calculations that have gone into a mathematical formula, including the discarded ones (C. 
H. Bennett 3; Dexter, ‘The Esthetics of Hidden Things’ 130). According to Deleuze’s 
formulation of virtual and actual states, that which is without meaning is that which is in 
the virtual state, whence it may emerge as a possibility. In a sense, meaninglessness is as 
much a part of the subject/object exchange as meaning is – it has to be there, for it is the 
folded side of meaning. On the spectrum between pure meaning and pure 
meaninglessness are all the phenomena I have mentioned in earlier chapters in discussing 
logical depth, the formless, the virtual, and the hidden. These phenomena do not lack 
meaning; rather, like the uninked scaffolding lines in geometric patterns mentioned by 
Necipoğlu (The Topkapi Scroll: Geometry and Ornament in Islamic Architecture 231), 
and indeed like the absent yet essential sections of the knot on the AKM dish, their 
meaning is hidden, folded, or “beneath interpretation.” Gell is getting at this idea when he 
writes that magic haunts technical activity like its shadow or its negative contour 
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(Technology of Enchantment 224). I infer that he uses “magic,” not in an anthropological 
sense but in the sense that technical activity – making of all kinds – has something hidden 
about it, something folded, like the other side of the fortune teller puzzle. Furthermore, I 
read his sentence to mean that logical depth, although it is beneath interpretation, haunts 
technical activity like its shadow. 
In the gallery, I suggest that the juxtaposition of meaning and meaninglessness 
provides a sense of mystery and numinousness that contributes to the making of the 
Permanent Gallery’s imaginary world. The sense of mystery originates from various 
sources, including the dim and dramatic lighting, the entry through a dark corridor that 
swirls with appearing and disappearing animations, and even the action of opening heavy, 
double-walled doors to enter and exit the space. But once the visitor is traversing the 
gallery and paying attention to the objects displayed there in succession, the currents of 
the subject/object exchange begin to course along the channels of transmediality and 
transculturality. Jonathan Hay calls transculturality “intercultural” and claims that it 
involves a slippage between categories that frees the object from its meaning, allowing it 
to float free of rigid interpretations (Hay, ‘Intercultural’ 8). I see the action that Hay 
describes operationalized in the light interpretive touch of the Permanent Gallery.  
Jennifer Barrett points out that museums never display objects in the way they 
were originally intended to be seen (108). As Rachel Morris suggests, this is part of their 
appeal: they are “games of boxes within boxes” (6). My formulation of the museum 
imaginary aligns with these museum scholars’ conjectures, and it is grounded in 
Malraux’s musée imaginaire; but beyond his vision, my conception of the museum 
237 
 
imaginary expands the experiential space to include everything in the gallery that feeds 
imagination: the wall surfaces, the lights or their absence, the sounds, and even the smells 
and the feels. It does not authoritatively dictate meanings to the passive visitor; rather, it 
provides the conditions for imagination’s activation. The visitor is free to sort through 
and take from these conditions what she will, according to her own histories and 
experiences, to create her own experience of the gallery. Indeed, this is the very process 
that visitors recounted to me over and over, in as many variations as there were visitors 
whom I asked to tell me. 
The museum imaginary of my study is also inspired by Jacques Lacan’s theory of 
the imaginary as one of the three orders or dimensions of the human psyche (1159). In 
Seminar XXII at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the 1970s, Lacan pictures 
the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic, as the cords of a Borromean knot. The knot is a 
topological structure that falls apart if one of its cords is removed. Lacan changes the 
structure by adding a fourth cord (figure 42), thereby illustrating in his prototype how the 
psyche can be held together by an inexplicable, yet integrating force (28).  
Aspects of Lacan’s imaginary pertain to my conceptualization of the museum 
imaginary: first, his prototyping of the psyche as a knot is a transmedial act, for he 
translates a psychological theory into a topological form, creating a “prototype that 
argues.” Second, he maintains that “for something to exist, there must be a hole . . . It is 
around a hole that existence suggests itself. Now this hole, we have one at the heart of each 
of these rounds. Without these holes, it would not even be thinkable for something to be 
knotted” (10).   
238 
 
The museum imaginary is grounded in the notion that imagination is lived in the 
body and in the network of communication between a sentient being and an object. In a 
framing of the museum experience which highlights its poetics rather than its pedagogy, I 
take up Derrida’s observation that the gallery is the labyrinth, but where he follows his 
thread of thought to premise the fall of Icarus from the sky (La voix et le phénomène 
117), I liken the experience to a mythic hero’s path of individual and collective heroism 
where memory is continually re-enacted.  
A gallery visitor finds the path open to her and pursues it: to scale the castle walls, 
to travel down the dark corridors, to discover the hidden treasure. On the cover of Images 
of the Art Museum is an image that illustrates this vision: a still shot from Alfred 
Hitchcock 1929 movie Blackmail shows a chase on top of one of the British Museum 
domes (figure 43). Patterned objects enhance this version of the museum experience as a 
quest to unearth its treasures, for they are open to multiple interpretations and they 
express the element of play. 
Implications of my findings for theory, research, and practice 
I have argued for a vision of the museum experience as a poetic one involving the 
visitor’s immersion in an imaginary world. The AKM permanent gallery uses the 
animation corridor, the animated world map, and the Shahnameh iPad to enhance the 
effect of entering an imaginatively rich, mysterious world. More research needs to be 
done to analyse the effects of digital technologies like these. I have only touched on the 
effect of visitors’ own digital devices on their experiences in the gallery. Research has 
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documented the way gallery visitors use their phones to take photos of objects and post 
them on platforms such as Facebook, Pinterest, and Instagram; and how they often 
include themselves in their images (Marcus Institute for Digital Education in the Arts). A 
deeper investigation of this phenomenon would reveal more insights of these effects and 
how they may be used to further improve visitors’ experiences in the gallery.  
I have examined the museum visitor experience throughout as an individual one. 
How does it change when it is a social experience, as it often is? This is another avenue 
of research for future studies. Finally, beyond this study, the methodological pairing of 
situational analysis and data mining that produced my new understanding of patterns has 
possibilities for future research beyond museology and pattern studies to pursue a broader 
set of questions in a range of instructional and cultural contexts. 
My hope is that my research can lead to new interpretive strategies in museum 
galleries that help remove perceptual and intellectual barriers that prevent people from 
appreciating the values of patterned art in subtler and more sophisticated ways. I have 
argued in this study for an expanded interpretation of visual patterns in a gallery’s 
materials, whether text, visuals or interactives, that expresses their narrative power, 
leading to a renewed sensitivity to pattern thinking in the museum-going visitor’s 
experience. My thesis of co-creation of meaning in the subject/object encounter could 
fruitfully be applied to all objects, not just patterned ones; however, I can only support it 
in the context of my investigation of a specific set of objects on display in the Aga Khan 
Museum Permanent Gallery, and of a very limited number of interview respondents. I do 
not claim to have exhaustively fathomed all the mysteries that inhere in the perception 
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and cognition of patterns, only to have argued, I hope persuasively, for an expansion of 
the space around them – as I wrote in the Introductory Chapter, to give them more air to 
breathe. 
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Postscript: In the Labyrinth  
“Culture is a built labyrinth of signification, and its beauty lies as much in the 
journey as in the destination” (Roe, ‘At Play in the Fields of Symmetry’ 233). 
 
In the end, I come back to the labyrinth. Why does Theseus venture into the 
labyrinth? I find myself needing to provide an alternative version of the archetypal story 
of the hero’s journey, a version powered by pattern thinking. Theseus ventures in to find 
the story, his story, at the centre of the labyrinth. Within the labyrinth is the story. 
Benjamin was right, but he did not go far enough: history decays into images, not stories, 
but within the images are stories. And everything that the stories tell is folding, 
unfolding, and refolding at the heart of the labyrinth, in the gallery of the museum 
imaginary, at play in the fields of pattern. 
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Figure 37: Dish, NE Iran, 1000s, earthenware, slip-painted, D 321 cm, AKM541 
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Figure 38: My digital sketch of the knot pattern in the centre of the object  
 
 
Figure 39: The two sets of motifs with the centres of the blue circles greyed out 
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Figure 40: The knot with colours 
 
Figure 41: My interlaced knot with paper strips 
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Figure 42: Lacan’s prototype of the Borromean knot with integrating cord in orange30 
 
30 Source: https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2008/12/04/notes-on-the-borromean-
clinic/ 
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Figure 43: Cover image of Images of the Art Museum 
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Appendix A: AKM Labels for Objects used in the Research Study 
(Figures 2 and 3) Animation, no label displayed 
(Figure 4) Robes and Mantles 
Central Asia, 19th-20th centuries 
Silk, cotton; plain weave, embroidered 
On loan from the Marshall and Marilyn R. Wolf Collection, L2017.3.3-8 
 
Embroidered and woven by nomadic Turkmen tribes of Central Asia in the 19th 
and early 20th century, these robes and mantles are most commonly associated with the 
Tekke tribe in Turkmenistan. The women’s mantle (chirpy) was worn over the head as a 
cloak, covering the back and shoulders, with the so-called “false-sleeves” usually 
attached at the back. The tradition of wearing garments with false-sleeves can be traced 
back 2500 years in Central Asia but their original function is unknown. 
 
(Figure 5) Portrait of Fath Ali Shah Qajar 
Tehran, Iran, early 19th century 
Oil on canvas 
AKM503 
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(Figures 6 and 7) Suzanis 
Central Asia, 19th-20th centuries 
Silk embroidery on cotton panels 
On loan from the Marshall and Marilyn Wolf Collection, L2018.15.1-3 
 
These textiles reveal the wide geography of their origins through their patterns 
and choice of colours: some are attributed to Bukhara, while others are attributed 
variously to Nurata, Samarkand, Shahrizabz, Tashkent, Ferghana, and other places in 
Uzbekistan as well as Tajikistan. Bukhara and Samarkand both played a significant role 
as main cultural and commercial centres of Turkestan and of the Silk Road. Merchants 
and craftspeople came from all over to sell their goods in these cities. The technique of 
chain stitching, largely used to embroider Central Asian textiles, is an ancient tradition 
that has survived across the vast geography of Central Asia from west of China to the 
eastern borders of Iran, and from southern Russia to the northern borders of India. The art 
of making these textiles embraces rich, multi-faceted ethnic and cultural backgrounds. 
Suzani is the term that has been established for this patterned needlework, but it is also 
known as keshte. The terms derive from the Persian words suzan, needle, and kashida, a 
kind of needlework. The embroidered textiles of Central Asia display rich pattern 
variations: large medallions, multiple rosettes, rosette blossoms, and floral grids create 
spectacular pieces in an endless combination of colours. They demonstrate a joyful play 
of sparkling patterns and colouristic effects, including zoomorphic botehs, as seen on the 
textile with a yellow ground decorated with a rosette blossom pattern in the centre of the 
display. 
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(Figure 8 left) Shirin Sits on the Throne as Queen of Armenia 
From the manuscript of Khamseh (Quintet) 
By Nizami (d.1209) 
Copied by Mahmu al-Shirazi 
Iran, late 16th century 
Opaque watercolour, ink, and gold on paper 
AKM523 
 
The Khamseh (Quintet) is a posthumous collection of five narrative poems 
composed by Nizami (d.1209), which begins with an ethico-philosophical poem, 
followed by four medieval romances. The Khamseh become a popular subject for 
calligraphers, painters, and illuminators to create richly elaborated copies of the 
manuscript in both Persian and Mughal Indian Empires.  
 
(Figure 8 middle) Zulaikha Holds a Banquet 
From a manuscript of Yusuf va Zulaikha by Jami (d.1492) 
Copied by Abu’l-Makarem b. Abu’l-Fath b. Muhammad 
Iran, dated 22 Rabi’ al-Thani 936 AH / December 24, 1529 
Opaque watercolour, ink, and gold on paper 
AKM370 
 
(Figure 8 right and Figure 9) Manuscript of Kulliyat 
(A Complete Collection of Poetry) 
Of ‘Urfi Shirazi (d.1591) 
Isfahan, Iran, dated Rabi al-Awwal 1057H/March-April 1647 
Opaque watercolour, ink, and gold on paper 
AKM273 
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(Figure 10) iPad, no label displayed 
(Figure 11) Panel 
Probably Cairo, Egypt, 15th-17th centuries 
Marble and stone mosaic 
AKM571 
 
Fabricated from multicoloured cut stones, this mosaic wall panel is probably from 
the lower part of a courtyard. It is decorated with geometric patterns comprising six-
pointed starts. Borders surrounding the three arches are decorated with a pointed arcade 
pattern. The same pattern can be seen on the eight-lobed steps of the Mamluk fountain in 
this gallery (AKM960). 
  
276 
 
Appendix B: Chart of Interview Responses 
Codes # mentions 
Gallery experience 0 
Objects 0 
Object making 0 
Personal response to the animation 0 
Relationships among objects 0 
No relationship to objects 0 
Code definitions 0 
Cognitive science 0 
Knot/labyrinth 0 
Magic, ritual 0 
Like pattern 0 
Like software 0 
Phenomenology 0 
Digital technologies 0 
Computer model of mind 0 
Digital agency 0 
How a digital prototype argues 0 
Information versus knowledge 0 
Non-visuality of software 0 
Interpreters all the way down then bits 0 
Real versus blocks or virtual world 0 
The computer imaginary 0 
Logical depth and hiddenness 0 
Technological unconscious 0 
Virtual space 0 
Software’s patterned nature 0 
If/else, while, for loops 0 
Material culture 0 
Affect 0 
Making as thinking 0 
How a physical prototype argues 0 
Materiality of the digital 0 
Form-material separation 0 
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Codes # mentions 
Material agency 0 
Making as a field of forces 0 
Performativity 0 
Museology 0 
Influence of time and space in a museum exhibition 0 
Representation in a museum exhibition 0 
Background, New museology 0 
Authority or plurality in museums 0 
Museum agency 0 
Museums about objects or ideas 0 
Social justice 0 
Individual or social museum experience 0 
Challenges of contemporary museums 0 
Museum interpretation 0 
Nondiscursivity in a museum exhibition 0 
Selectivity in a museum exhibition 0 
Storytelling in a museum exhibition 0 
Definitions of Islamic art 0 
Postcolonial perspectives 0 
Subject-object encounter in a museum 0 
Object agency 0 
The mediating work of art 0 
Viewer construction of meaning 0 
Pattern's role in systems of perception and cognition 0 
As it relates to affect 0 
Assemblage theory 0 
Flat ontology 0 
Difference 0 
Patterning systems 0 
As communication 0 
Like language or not 0 
As cybernetics 0 
As device 0 
As event 0 
Cognition as pattern recognition 0 
Cognition as representation 0 
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Codes # mentions 
Metapatterns 0 
Repetition/iteration 0 
Theories of ornament/decoration 0 
As evidence 0 
As meaningless 0 
As pleasure or game 0 
As symptom 0 
As articulation of surface 0 
As dangerous 0 
As tacit knowledge 0 
Visual culture 0 
Figure/ground 0 
Semiotics of images 0 
The optical unconscious 0 
Vision as culturally inflected 0 
Embodied cognition 0 
Kind of object 1 
Painting 1 
Carpet 1 
Fine versus decorative art 1 
Uses of technology in a museum exhibition 1 
Orientalism in a museum exhibition 1 
As visual metaphor 1 
As 'mere' 1 
As surfacescape 1 
Includes all senses 1 
Storytelling vs crystals 1 
Primacy of text interpretation 1 
Relationship among objects through figuration 2 
Relationships with gallery objects in animation 2 
Relationship to objects though figuration 2 
Relationship to objects through narrative 2 
Meaninglessness 2 
Relevance of information 2 
Text in a Museum exhibition 2 
As visual mathematical thinking 2 
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Codes # mentions 
As culturally specific mode of cognition 2 
Sensory aspects 3 
Temporal aspects 3 
As spiritual symbolism 3 
As protection 3 
Building 4 
Bowl 4 
The museum imaginary 4 
Figuration versus abstraction 4 
Islam 5 
Technology of the animation 5 
Relationship among objects through materials 5 
Aura in a digital age 5 
Active looking 6 
Religious symbolism in objects 6 
Object mathematics 6 
Making in the animation 6 
Relation to script 6 
Mosaic 7 
Circle 7 
Physical orientation 7 
No relationship among objects 7 
Relationship among objects through narrative 7 
The “Western” gaze 7 
Visitor agency 7 
Affect in a museum exhibition 8 
Gallery ambience 9 
Imagescape vs surfacescape 10 
Tile 10 
Artist's process in the animation 10 
Relationship among objects through patterns 10 
Relationship to objects through design 10 
Semiosis, symbolism, meaning 10 
How the object is/was used 11 
Movement in the animation 11 
Labels 12 
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Codes # mentions 
Islamic art 12 
Intricacy 12 
Arabesque 13 
Embodied cognition in a museum exhibition 15 
Spatial aspects 15 
Viewer heritage and narratives 17 
Calligraphy 17 
How the object might feel 17 
Object Motif 18 
Folding and unfolding 18 
Clothing 19 
Object Design elements 20 
Ceramic 22 
Geometric pattern 23 
Figuration in objects 24 
Textile 25 
Relationship among objects through design 30 
Object Heritage 32 
Gallery themes 34 
Object Colour 37 
Narrative elements in objects 38 
Object Pattern 38 
How the object was made 40 
Beauty 43 
Total 863 
 
 
